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Abstract 
By the time Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990, no human rights issue had allegedly 
been as debated at the UN as the racially segregated system of apartheid. Mediatized confrontation 
with the structural discrimination inherent to the apartheid system had a transformative impact on 
the self-perception of individuals, communities, and political institutions around the world. A 
notable manifestation of this impact was the formation of the British Anti-Apartheid Movement 
(AAM), which aimed to contribute to the democratic transition in South Africa by – among other 
activities – problematizing links between companies in Britain and the apartheid government. 
The principal objects of study of this dissertation are the AAM and the companies – Barclays and 
Shell – targeted in consumer boycott campaigns conducted by the movement from the late 1960s to 
the early 1990s. The purpose of my analysis of the campaigns is to unpack their implications for the 
companies’ understanding of corporate social responsibility (CSR). The drive towards a more 
distinct conception of CSR in the latter half of the twentieth century forms the subtext of this 
dissertation; implicit in this observation is an increasing awareness of the unintended negative side-
effects associated with economic globalization. The title of the dissertation, Renegotiating 
Responsibility: British Anti-Apartheid Consumer Boycott Campaigns, Late 1960s to Early 1990s, 
accentuates the effort by the AAM to transform perceptions of what constitutes the responsibility of 
transnational corporations. While the targeted companies already had responsibilities towards their 
shareholders, the state etc., the activists sought to reinterpret and renegotiate corporate 
responsibilities in a socially oriented direction through interaction with the companies. Integral to 
this study, then, is the normative supposition that abstract notions of ethics and responsibility 
become concretized and operationalized in specific ways through interaction between different 
societal actors. 
This study finds that anti-apartheid consumer boycott activism incited reflection within the targeted 
companies on the extent of their social responsibilities, which contributed to the advancement of 
CSR. With this dissertation I aim to contribute, first, to the under-researched yet burgeoning field of 
anti-apartheid studies. More broadly, my objective is to elevate the scholarly discussion on social 
movement actors as catalysts for CSR with particular emphasis on insights to be gained from 
historical case studies. 
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Resumé 
Da Nelson Mandela blev løsladt fra fængslet i 1990 havde intet menneskerettighedsrelateret emne 
angiveligt været så omdiskuteret som det raceadskilte apartheidsystem. Medieret konfrontation med 
den strukturelle diskrimination, som lå til grund for apartheidsystemet, havde en transformativ 
påvirkning på selvopfattelsen hos individer, fællesskaber og politiske institutioner verden over. Et 
bemærkelsesværdigt produkt af denne påvirkning er etableringen af den britiske Anti-
Apartheidbevægelse (AAM), som søgte at bidrage til den demokratiske overgang i Sydafrika ved – 
blandt andre aktiviteter – at problematisere forbindelsen mellem virksomheder i Storbritannien og 
apartheidregeringen. 
De primære aktører, der undersøges i denne afhandling, er AAM og de virksomheder – Barclays og 
Shell – som var målene for forbrugsboykotkampagner udført af bevægelsen fra slutningen af 
1960’erne til begyndelsen af 1990’erne. Formålet med min analyse af disse kampagner er at 
afdække deres betydning for virksomhedernes forståelse af corporate social responsibility (CSR). 
Udviklingen mod skærpede forståelser af CSR i anden halvdel af det 20. århundrede udgør 
afhandlingens subtekst; implicit i denne observation er den tiltagende opmærksomhed omkring de 
utilsigtede negative konsekvenser af den økonomiske globalisering. Afhandlingens titel, 
Renegotiating Responsibility: British Anti-Apartheid Consumer Boycott Campaigns, Late 1960s to 
Early 1990s, understreger anti-apartheidaktivisternes forsøg på at omdanne forståelserne af, hvad 
transnationale virksomheders ansvar indebærer. På trods af, at de boykottede virksomheder allerede 
stod til ansvar overfor deres aktionærer, staten osv., søgte aktivisterne at genfortolke og 
genforhandle virksomhedernes ansvar i en social retning gennem interaktion med virksomhederne. 
En integreret del af dette studie er derfor den normative antagelse at abstrakte forestillinger om etik 
og ansvar konkretiseres og operationaliseres på særlige måder gennem interaktion mellem 
forskellige samfundsaktører. 
Resultaterne af dette studie viser, at anti-apartheidorienteret forbrugsboykotaktivisme fordrede 
refleksion blandt de boykottede virksomheder angående omfanget af disses sociale ansvar, og at 
kampagnerne dermed bidrog til at fremme udviklingen af CSR. I undersøgelsen af 
forbrugsboykotkampagner udført af AAM har denne afhandling et dobbelt sigte: formålet er i første 
omgang at bidrage til forskningen på anti-apartheidområdet. Mere overordnet er ambitionen med 
afhandlingen at højne diskussionen vedrørende sociale bevægelser som katalysatorer for CSR med 
særlig vægt på historiske case-studier.
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Introduction 
 
By the time Nelson Mandela was released from prison in 1990, no human rights issue had been as 
debated at the UN as the racially segregated system of apartheid.1 Despite fluctuations in the 
attention of the international community to South Africa over the more than four decades of 
racialized minority rule, Rob Skinner proposes that the political responses prompted by the 
atrocities of the apartheid system ‘provided a context for the emerging language of human rights, 
the subject of a discursive shift in which ideas of democracy and universal rights became a 
normative standard for political legitimacy.’2 More than a domestic South African problem, then, 
mediatized confrontation with the structural discrimination inherent to the apartheid system had a 
transformative impact on the self-perception of individuals, communities, and political institutions 
around the world. 
The principal objects of study of this dissertation are the British Anti-Apartheid Movement (AAM) 
and the companies – Barclays and Shell – targeted in consumer boycott campaigns conducted by 
the movement from the late 1960s to the early 1990s.3 While the AAM figures as the main actor and 
the companies as the objects of the movement’s activities, the interaction between the two 
constitutes the focal point of my analysis. The purpose of this analysis is to unpack the implications 
of the boycott campaigns for the companies’ understanding of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR). Thus, the principal research question of this dissertation is: in what ways have anti-apartheid 
consumer boycott campaigns influenced and contributed to the development of CSR? The drive 
towards a more distinct conception of CSR in the latter half of the twentieth century, then, forms the 
subtext of this dissertation; implicit in this observation is an increasing awareness of the unintended 
negative side-effects associated with economic globalization. Barclays and Shell were present in 
South Africa since early in the twentieth century and thus prior to the intensification of international 
trade and cross-border investment from the 1970s onwards. My examination of the historical 
conditionality of company responses to boycott campaigns, however, remains pertinent on account 
                                                          
1 Bramsen, Sydafrika, Kamp Eller Dialog?, 221; Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis, 256. 
2 Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in Britain and the 
United States, c.1919-64, 59. 
3 I have not been able to identify any exact dates regarding the initiation of the campaign against Barclays or the 
termination of the campaign against Shell. 
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of the growing alertness displayed by the anti-apartheid activists to the unintended negative side-
effects of economic globalization exemplified by British private sector links to apartheid South 
Africa. 
The title of the dissertation, Renegotiating Responsibility: British Anti-Apartheid Consumer Boycott 
Campaigns, Late 1960s to Early 1990s, accentuates the effort by the AAM to transform perceptions 
of what constitutes the responsibility of transnational corporations. While the targeted companies 
already had responsibilities towards their shareholders, the state etc., the activists sought to 
reinterpret and renegotiate corporate responsibilities in a socially oriented direction through 
interaction with the companies. Integral to this study, then, is the normative supposition that 
abstract notions of morality and responsibility become concretized and operationalized in specific 
ways through interaction between different societal actors. In order to make this process evident, I 
develop a framework for the study of social movement activism as a catalyst for CSR. With this 
dissertation I aim to contribute, first, to the under-researched yet burgeoning field of anti-apartheid 
studies. More broadly, my objective is to elevate the scholarly discussion on social movement 
actors as catalysts for CSR with particular emphasis on insights to be gained from historical case 
studies. 
In Britain, anti-apartheid activists helped embed concern with South Africa in the public conscience 
by – among other activities – conducting widely publicized consumer boycott campaigns against 
companies with links to South Africa.4 The stated purpose of the consumer boycott was to compel 
the targeted companies to withdraw their investments from South Africa, which would isolate the 
country economically and impel the authorities to introduce democratic legislation. This 
pragmatically oriented (as opposed to a focus on the signal value) conception of the boycott was 
nuanced in a recent article in The Guardian by Piers Telemacque, a former member of the National 
Union of Students (NUS), where he concedes that ‘nobody thought we’d end apartheid by 
bankrupting the regime. It was about delegitimizing them, shifting public opinion, and ramping up 
political pressure.’5 Reflecting on the concerted effort to withdraw investment from both South 
Africa and transnational corporations operating in the country, Lord Nicholas Stern, former Chief 
Economist and Senior Vice-President of the World Bank, points to ‘international divestment from 
apartheid South Africa’ as an example of a ‘revolution in moral and social attitudes’ and a change 
                                                          
4 Schwartz, Consuming Choices, Ethics in a Global Consumer Age, 61. 
5 Telemacque, “Whether It’s Apartheid or Fossil Fuels, Divestment Is on the Right Side of History.” 
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in ‘perceptions of what is morally and socially responsible behavior by individuals, businesses, and 
governments.’6 
Among the interdependence of factors precipitating such transformations in the recognized moral 
and social responsibility of societal actors are contemporary processes of globalization; thus, Bart 
van Steenbergen notes how globalization ‘implies a capacity for global self-reflection on the part of 
modern societies.’7 The latter half of the twentieth century saw a shift towards greater inclusion of 
extra-British concerns in the development of British self-perceptions, which Ulrich Beck attributes 
to a ‘bursting [of] the container frame of the nation-state’ effected by various processes of 
globalization that include transnational mobility and mass media.8 The argument by Ryan M. Irwin 
that international interest in apartheid South Africa ‘stemmed partly from the new type of 
consciousness that accompanied the growth of television and photojournalism’ divulges some of the 
benefits resulting from a heightened attentiveness to distant events.9 In a similar vein, anti-apartheid 
activism has been construed as ‘part of a globalization from below.’10 
In contrast to these positive ascriptions, Zygmunt Bauman’s discussion of the unruly and self-
perpetuating character of globalization aims to disclose the negative and unintended side-effects of, 
for instance, progressively unrestricted international trade.11 Among these side-effects are escalating 
social inequalities, deteriorating social protection, the attempt by governments to underbid one 
another, and constraints on human rights and environmental measures.12 Håkan Thörn further 
suggests that the anti-apartheid boycott ‘seems to be a political strategy well suited for a phase of 
the globalization process in which increasingly mobile transnational corporations more and more 
easily escape the political control of states.’13 
Having established the consumer boycott as an important strategy employed by the anti-apartheid 
activists, I want to take a step back and address possible sources of motivation for British activists 
to engage in social movement activity aimed at the abolishment of the apartheid system. Anti-
apartheid activism encompassed a diverse set of values, priorities, and strategies; as Simon Stevens 
suggests, ‘opposing apartheid meant very different things for different people and served very 
                                                          
6 Stern, Why Are We Waiting? The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling Climate Change, 314. 
7 Steenbergen, The Condition of Citizenship, 156–57. 
8 Beck, “Cosmopolitanism as Imagined Communities of Global Risk,” 1356–57. 
9 Irwin, Gordian Knot: Apartheid and the Unmaking of the Liberal World Order, 184. 
10 Thörn, “Solidarity Across Borders: The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement,” 69. 
11 Bauman, Globalisering, De Menneskelige Konsekvenser, 60. 
12 Batliwala, Transnational Civil Society, an Introduction, 95. 
13 Thörn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society, 61. 
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different purposes.’14 Early anti-apartheid efforts were largely influenced by processes of 
decolonization and the emergence of the human rights regime as well as anti-racist and anti-
authoritarian political cultures.15 Arguing that the ‘solidarity struggle changed over time in response 
to developments in British society and to ideological currents within the liberation movement,’ 
Christabel Gurney portrays the late 1960s and the 1970s as a period of radicalization characterized 
by an understanding of apartheid as a ‘particular form of capitalism.’16 By the 1980s, the racialized 
system of apartheid was widely perceived as an anachronism and many of the activists once more 
problematized apartheid as a violation of human rights.17 In addition to domestic British advances in 
socio-political thought and social movement culture, developments in South Africa and the 
measures implemented by the international community had a substantial influence on the trajectory 
of the AAM. In the following, I provide a brief account of South African political history from 
1948-1994 and trace some of the formal responses by the international community to the 
progression of apartheid. 
 
Apartheid 
The term ‘apartheid’ means ‘separateness’ in Afrikaans and the modern usage of the term can be 
traced back to 1929 in its printed form.18 Oliver Tambo, former President of the African National 
Congress (ANC), suggests that apartheid ‘in its more comprehensive connotation, is the sum total 
of all the policies and practices, stratagems and methods, beliefs and attitudes’ of the white South 
African minority government aimed at the perpetuation of the political and economic exploitation 
of non-white South Africans.19 Saul Dubow points out that the ‘fact that apartheid was proclaimed 
official South African policy just as the United Nations issued its Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights in 1948 was a telling marker of the country’s retrogressive political trajectory.’20 The term 
‘apartheid’ attained prominence with the election of the National Party in May 1948; the party was 
led by Daniel François Malan who emphasized the resemblance of apartheid to the traditional racial 
                                                          
14 Stevens, “Why South Africa? The Politics of Anti-Apartheid Activism in Britain in the Long 1970s,” 207. 
15 Skinner, “The Moral Foundations of British Anti-Apartheid Activism, 1946-1960,” 5–6. 
16 Gurney, “In the Heart of the Beast: The British Anti-Apartheid Movement, 1959-1994,” 257. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Guelke, Rethinking the Rise and Fall of Apartheid: South Africa and World Politics, 3. 
19 Segal, “Sanctions against South Africa,” 15; despite its flaws and lack of nuance, I deploy the term 'non-white' as an 
umbrella term for South Africans without Western European descent since all those included in this group were 
discriminated against by the white minority rule. 
20 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 47. 
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policies of the previous three centuries.21 ‘The difference in color is merely the physical 
manifestation of the contrast between two irreconcilable ways of life,’ Malan asserted, ‘between 
barbarism and civilization, between heathenism and Christianity.’22 Apartheid should not be 
conceived as a unitary ideology but rather as divided into the large-scale territorial separation of the 
races, known as ‘grand apartheid,’ and as manifestations of ‘petty apartheid,’ which includes 
whites-only buses, restrooms, park benches, ambulances etc.23 
In reaction to the election of the National Party in 1948, the ANC adopted its Programme of Action 
the following year, which opened up for the use of more offensive tactics such as boycotts, strikes, 
civil disobedience and non-cooperation. The ANC experienced a massive increase in membership 
from approximately 5,000 in 1948 to more than 100,000 a decade later.24 In 1956, 156 prominent 
activists were arrested and charged with ‘high treason;’ among these were ANC President Albert 
Luthuli, Nelson Mandela, and Walter Sisulu.25 While the accused were eventually acquitted, Dubow 
suggests that the Treason Trial ‘helped to dramatize apartheid to the outside world.’26 In 1959, the 
ANC split and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was established under Robert Sobukwe. 
South Africa had gained independence from Britain in 1910 yet it was still part of the 
Commonwealth and the two countries maintained close ties. On 3 February 1960, British Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan addressed both Houses of Parliament in South Africa when he famously 
spoke of a ‘wind of change,’ referring to the rise of national consciousness in former African 
colonies and their efforts to gain independence. The implication was that the South African 
government ought to abandon its policy of racial segregation and Macmillan urged that ‘we must all 
accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it.’27 Contrary to this proclamation, 
Britain would continue to veto calls for economic sanctions at the UN Security Council over the 
following decades. 
At a peaceful protest against the pass laws in Sharpeville on 21 March 1960, 69 demonstrators were 
killed by police gunfire and more than 200 were wounded, most of them shot from behind while 
                                                          
21 Ibid., 13. 
22 Mermelstein, The Anti-Apartheid Reader: The Struggle against White Racist Rule in South Africa, 95. 
23 Beinart and Dubow, “Segregation and Apartheid in Twentieth-Century South Africa,” 15; Guelke, Rethinking the 
Rise and Fall of Apartheid: South Africa and World Politics, 27. 
24 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 73. 
25 Ibid., 70. 
26 Ibid., 72. 
27 Butler and Stockwell, The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization, 1. 
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trying to escape.28 As a precautionary measure, the South African government declared a state of 
emergency, effectively banning the ANC, the PAC, and others. This incapacitation of the anti-
apartheid effort precipitated a shift in opinion by parts of the community towards the use of 
sabotage despite its potential conflict with the previous strategy of non-violence. At the Rivonia 
Trial in July 1964, Mandela, Sisulu, and six others were sentenced to life imprisonment. Following 
the international condemnation of Sharpeville, Dubow proposes, ‘apartheid became a global 
metonym for the racially motivated abuse of human rights’ and anti-apartheid activism proliferated 
in many countries.29 Domestically, however, the mass boycotts, strikes, and acts of defiance of the 
1950s were substituted for the ‘golden decade’ of 1960s apartheid.30 By the middle of the decade, 
the South African economy boasted one of the highest growth rates in the world.31 During the 1950s 
and 1960s, the system of apartheid was consolidated with the passing of more than 300 laws.32 
By 1960, the UN General Assembly had already passed 24 resolutions condemning the apartheid 
government.33 As a result of the Sharpeville Massacre, the Assembly classified apartheid as a threat 
to international peace and a crime against humanity, and a Special Committee against Apartheid 
was set up with the purpose of collecting information, presenting policy recommendations, and 
facilitating communication between transnational networks and actors.34 Enuga S. Reddy, Secretary 
of the UN Special Committee, advised that the ‘struggle in South Africa is not a mere political 
conflict in one country. Apartheid is not and can never be politics. It is a crime. The issue is not 
political but deeply moral.’35 
In April 1964, the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa was held 
in London with representatives from more than 40 countries. Organized in part by the AAM, the 
impetus behind the conference was the ‘urgent need for setting up permanent machinery to pursue 
energetically the international application of economic sanctions.’36 Despite efforts to introduce 
legislation on sanctions, however, the following decades were characterized by a profound lack of 
                                                          
28 Bramsen, Sydafrika, Kamp Eller Dialog?, 96. 
29 Dubow, South Africa’s Struggle for Human Rights, 79. 
30 Price, The Apartheid State in Crisis: Political Transformation in South Africa, 1975-1990, 23. 
31 Culverson, “The Politics of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in the United States, 1969-1986,” 57. 
32 Sethi, The South African Quagmire, in Search of a Peaceful Path to Democratic Pluralism, 153. 
33 Dubow, “Smuts, the United Nations and the Rhetoric of Race and Rights,” 47–48. 
34 Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis, 262; Skinner, The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal 
Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in Britain and the United States, c.1919-64, 59; Guelke, Rethinking the Rise 
and Fall of Apartheid: South Africa and World Politics, 1. 
35 Reddy, Apartheid: The United Nations and the International Community: A Collection of Speeches and Papers, 71. 
36 Segal, “Sanctions against South Africa,” 273. 
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political and academic consensus on the impact of sanctions against South Africa. The main 
arguments advanced against sanctions involved, most importantly, the strategic interest of the West 
in South Africa’s continued participation in anti-Communist alliances.37 The overriding point of 
contention by the South African authorities was that sanctions would violate the sovereignty of the 
country.38 Additional justifications for retaining international trade relations with South Africa 
included the cost of sanctioning, difficulties in maintaining a steady oil supply through shipping 
lanes around the Cape of Good Hope, minimized access to important raw materials, expensive naval 
blockades etc.39 It was further submitted that sanctions would principally harm the non-white 
population and retard political reform as well as remove all or most future channels of influence.40 
Finally, there were reservations about whether South Africa’s diversified economy could potentially 
counterbalance the effect of sanctions. 
The main arguments in favour of sanctions against South Africa generally stressed the country’s 
vulnerability to economic isolation and, notably, that this exposure would dictate improved 
conditions for the non-white population and the eventual abolishment of the apartheid system. 
Those who advocated sanctions could claim legitimacy from the support of the majority of the 
opposition parties and organizations; thus, Tambo, President of the ANC, referred to sanctions as a 
‘trump card’ and as the most important measure that could be taken against the apartheid 
government.41 In an analysis of the sanctions debate, William H. Shaw concludes that both 
constructive engagement, public and political pressure, and more traditional diplomacy could be 
applied to influence the South African government.42 Considering this possible mixture of 
strategies, he argues, the lines drawn up in the sanctions debate presents a ‘false dichotomy.’43 
Among the benefits of continuing international debate on sanctions, Reddy lists ‘an acceleration of 
                                                          
37 Reddy, “Apartheid and the International Community,” 21. 
38 Boles, The West and South Africa, Myths, Interests and Policy Options, 5–7. 
39 Smith, Morality and the Market, Consumer Pressure for Corporate Accountability, 236; Shaw, “Boycotting South 
Africa,” 66; Hermele and Odén, “Sanction Dilemmas: Some Implications of Economic Sanctions against South Africa,” 
13; Boles, The West and South Africa, Myths, Interests and Policy Options, 43–44; Sethi, The South African Quagmire, 
in Search of a Peaceful Path to Democratic Pluralism, 16; Kaempfer, Lehman, and Lowenberg, “Divestment, 
Investment Sanctions, and Disinvestment: An Evaluation of Anti-Apartheid Policy Instruments,” 473. 
40 Manby, “South Africa: The Impact of Sanctions,” 194. 
41 Crawford and Klotz, How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa, 15; DTI Group Secretary Mike Sparham in a 
draft paper about DTI’s role in supporting trade with South Africa: Bod.MSS.AAM 1626. 
42 Shaw, “Boycotting South Africa,” 64. 
43 Ibid. 
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international action against racism, the development of solidarity with the black people struggling 
against colonialism and racism, and the growing recognition of corporate responsibility.’44 
After years of sizeable growth, the South African economy began to decelerate during the 1970s. In 
1972-73, the extended suspension of overt resistance against the authorities was broken when 
African workers engaged in what has been labeled the ‘Durban strikes.’45 In 1974, the increasing 
isolation of South Africa from the international community was manifested by the exclusion of the 
country from the UN General Assembly.46 It was not until 1976, however, that South Africa once 
again caught the attention of the world when the authorities were responsible for yet another 
massacre of students and protestors in Soweto who were demonstrating against the requirement to 
be taught equally in English and Afrikaans in schools. Beginning on 16 June, the government 
estimated that 176 people were killed and 1,139 injured during the first week of protest, which 
continued with varying degrees of intensity for a year and a half.47 During this period, 18 
organizations were banned, 50 anti-apartheid activists were detained, and Steve Biko – 
spokesperson of the Black Consciousness Movement – died in police custody.48 All of these events 
prompted widespread international condemnation and the UN responded by recognizing the ANC 
and the PAC as ‘authentic representatives’ for the majority of the South African population and by 
implementing a mandatory arms embargo.49 As an additional signal, 1982 was named the 
‘International Year of Mobilization for Sanctions against South Africa.’50 
After the Soweto Uprising, the South African government began to adopt a series of policies termed 
a ‘total national strategy’ that was intended to enhance the country’s international legitimacy and to 
maintain order domestically.51 The major change in the political scenery of the early to mid-1980s 
was the establishment of the National Forum, the United Democratic Front (UDF), and the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), which consisted of youth movements, trade 
unions, civic associations, and religious organizations etc.52 In September 1984, rent increases 
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precipitated a series of violent demonstrations outside of Johannesburg and the following March, on 
the 25th anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre, the authorities opened fire on the participants in a 
funeral procession in Langa.53 This tragedy came to signify a shift in government policy as Prime 
Minister Botha declared a state of emergency in the surrounding area on 20 July 1985. 
A major turning point in the international response to apartheid South Africa was Botha’s ‘Rubicon 
Speech’ on 15 August 1985: already one month after the speech, the EEC adopted the ‘Luxembourg 
package’ that banned the sale of oil to South Africa, among other measures.54 In October, the 
Nordic countries issued a ban on new investment and the US prohibited the import of 
Krügerrands.55 In 1986, the US Congress passed the ‘Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) 
of 1986,’ which prohibited new investments, lending, direct flight connections, import of a wide 
range of goods etc.56 The British had a particularly conflicted view on sanctions against South 
Africa on account of the close ties between the two countries: Britain was South Africa’s main 
international trading partner in the post-war years and between 1946-1978 more than 350,000 
people migrated from Britain to South Africa, while 100,000 South Africans moved to Britain.57 In 
1983, James Barber argued that there was hardly a ‘single pension fund, insurance company, 
building society or unit trust in Britain that does not have some of its capital invested in South 
Africa.’58 In 1986, Britain was still the third largest importer of South African goods and it was 
estimated that between 70,000 and 250,000 British jobs would be lost in the event of full-scale 
sanctions.59 A Gallup poll from 1985 on the impact of sanctions indicate that 30 per cent of the 
British population believed that sanctions would accelerate the abolishment of apartheid, while 41 
per cent believed that sanctions would have no effect on the apartheid system.60 Subsequent polls, 
however, suggest a major shift in public opinion in the late 1980s: while only 33 per cent of the 
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British population supported sanctions in late 1986, 80 per cent were in favour by mid-1988.61 In 
addition to some of the EEC recommendations, Britain adopted a number of Commonwealth 
initiatives, including bans on the promotion of tourism, state-funded trade missions, and 
government loans to South Africa.62 
The state of emergency was renewed in 1986 and extended until 1990, by which time it had brought 
about the detention of more than 25,000 people.63 With the election of President F.W. de Klerk in 
August 1989, a reform process was initiated of central aspects of the previous government’s 
policies followed by the announcement of democratic elections to be held in 1994. Shortly after his 
release from prison in 1990, Nelson Mandela urged the UN not to relax the measures that had been 
implemented against South Africa yet Britain chose – as the first country to do so – to lift its 
sanctions that year.64 In October 1993, all remaining restrictive measures by the UN were annulled 
in an effort to support South Africa’s transition to democracy. In the spring of 1994, the ANC won a 
landslide victory with just below 63 per cent of the vote.65 
According to Kathleen Schwartzman and Kristie Taylor, the amalgamation of three distinct factors 
advanced the abolishment of apartheid: first, the increasing resistance of South African business-
owners to the artificially high-priced labour; second, the large-scale disinvestment of foreign 
investors; and finally, domestic and international anti-apartheid activity.66 Despite a lack of 
consensus, the impact of state-based sanctions is widely held to have been ‘rather modest and 
ultimately determined by contextual factors.’67 Nonetheless, a 1987 ‘Manifesto for Sanctions’ by 
the AAM asserts that the ‘acid test of opposition to apartheid is the issue of sanctions.’68 A 
campaign briefing by the movement further explains that the ‘context for the consumer boycott 
campaign is set by the Anti-Apartheid Movement’s concern to stimulate support for the total 
                                                          
61 Gallup poll conducted between 1 and 6 October 1986: Bod.MSS.AAM 2241, 2242; the UN Association conducted a 
street ballot in July-August 1988 entitled “Should the United Kingdom Support Sanctions against South Africa?:” 
Bod.MSS.AAM 2241, 2242. 
62 Holland, The European Community and South Africa: European Political Co-Operation under Strain, 100–101. 
63 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 240. 
64 Mandela, Selected Speeches and Writings of Nelson Mandela: The End of Apartheid in South Africa, 154; Thörn, 
“Solidarity Across Borders: The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement,” 75. 
65 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 269. 
66 Schwartzman and Taylor, “What Caused the Collapse of Apartheid?,” 132. 
67 Jones, “South Africa: Sanctioning Apartheid,” 55; Levy, “Sanctions on South Africa: What Did They Do?,” 415. 
68 “Manifesto for Sanctions” by the AAM from January 1987: WoW, Box number 193, Acc. No. 00862. 
11 
 
isolation of South Africa in all fields. […] In a sense the consumer boycott campaign is the 
sanctions campaign at a popular level.’69 
 
CSR 
As discussed, the consumer boycott campaigns conducted by the AAM against Barclays and Shell 
constitute the principal objects of study of this dissertation. At the centre of the interaction between 
the anti-apartheid activists and the companies was the conflict between constructive engagement 
and disinvestment. The former term denotes the belief that socio-political transformation should be 
attained through the gradual improvement of conditions for the non-white population of South 
Africa, while adherents of the latter argued that complete withdrawal of foreign investment would 
necessitate the abolishment of the apartheid system and the introduction of democracy. Thörn points 
to how the ‘conflict of constructive engagement versus sanctions was at the heart of the definition 
of the collective identity of the anti-apartheid movement.’70 
Integral to the debate on the role of foreign investment in South Africa was not only the practical 
consequences of economic isolation but also a more profound concern with the social responsibility 
of transnational corporations. Since the writings of Adam Smith, Gabriel Abend suggests, a tension 
has existed between ‘morals and markets, ethics and capitalism.’71 Abend further notes that current 
CSR manuals are ‘still reminiscent of Richard Steele’s 1684 business ethics manual, The Trades-
man’s Calling.’72 An early example of social initiatives by companies is Henry Ford’s maxim 
‘service before profit,’ though this referred mainly to an increase in production to the benefit of the 
middle-class.73 It has been suggested that CSR ought to be viewed not as a theory or a concept but 
as a field of discourses and practices on account of the inclusion of standardization and regulations, 
branding strategies, workers’ rights, environmental impact, deontological versus teleological 
approaches etc.74 
                                                          
69 Campaign briefing by the AAM: Bod.MSS.AAM 1596. 
70 Thörn, “Solidarity Across Borders: The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement,” 66. 
71 Abend, The Moral Background: An Inquiry into the History of Business Ethics, 13. 
72 Abend, “How to Tell the History of Business Ethics,” 48. 
73 Heald, “Management’s Responsibility to Society: The Growth of an Idea,” 381. 
74 Crane, The Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility, 6; Johnson and Smith, “Contextualizing Business 
Ethics: Anomie and Social Life,” 1359. 
12 
 
Prioritizing developments in the understanding rather than the content of CSR, this study engages in 
what could be labelled descriptive or comparative ethics. The primary concern of this dissertation, 
however, is the changes in perception of social responsibility directly pertaining to the British anti-
apartheid consumer boycott campaigns against Barclays and Shell.75 Tracing advances in corporate 
interpretations of social responsibility from the late 1960s to the early 1990s necessitates a broad 
conception of CSR that is able to comprise contemporary and divergent understandings and that 
facilitates my analysis of the interaction between the activists and the companies. Thus, CSR will be 
defined in accordance with the definition by the International Labour Organization (ILO) as a ‘way 
in which enterprises give consideration to the impact of their operations on society and affirm their 
principles and values both in their own internal methods and processes and in their interaction with 
other actors.’76 This delineation accentuates the declaration by companies of their principles and 
values, which is communicated through annual reports, codes of conduct etc. Importantly, the 
definition by the ILO invites us to gauge the significance of the interaction between foreign-owned 
companies operating in South Africa and the AAM for the development of socially responsible 
policies and programs. 
‘The history of social conflict between corporations and public-interest groups during the last thirty 
or more years,’ S. Prakash Sethi and Oliver F. Williams asserted in 2000, ‘is replete with instances 
in which corporations failed to appreciate the moral and ethical context within which emerging 
social conflicts were being framed.’77 Among these cases, John M. Kline suggests, the anti-
apartheid consumer boycott campaigns are ‘pivotal’ for comprehending the escalation of CSR 
initiatives.78 This observation is substantiated in an address at the 1988 Business International 
Conference in London when Desmond Watkins, Director of Shell International, noted that ‘no 
current business problem is more complex than that of South Africa which, like an X-ray machine, 
shows up the complex interdependence of the structure beneath the skin of each business 
decision.’79 Aiming to expose the structural interrelation of factors that contribute to the social 
attentiveness of transnational corporations, my analyses of anti-apartheid activism and the 
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campaigns against Barclays and Shell are anchored in conceptual frameworks derived from moral 
philosophy and sociology. This approach is prompted by reflections similar to K. Ravi Raman’s 
allusion to the ‘necessity of examining CSR from innovative methodological perspectives and 
ideological backgrounds, not from a purely economic or political angle.’80 
 
Analytical Strategies 
I wish to examine the interaction between anti-apartheid activists and their target companies with 
the use of three different analytical models: Iris Marion Young’s ‘social connection model,’ Ulrich 
Beck’s ‘subpolitics,’ and the concept of political consumerism. As I explain each model, I assess 
the ways in which they may contribute to a better understanding of the implications of anti-
apartheid consumer boycott campaigns: the social connection model helps clarify the practical and 
moral relationship between activists and companies; the subpolitical approach serves to explicate 
the context and the factors that trigger action by social movements as well as their choice of general 
strategy; finally, political consumerist theory problematizes the tactic of boycotting and the 
targeting of corporate actors. The order of the concepts is intended to convey a transition from the 
abstract towards the concrete. I also point out the shortcomings of each model as a comprehensive 
framework for analysis. My principal argument is that the amalgamation of these models will help 
disclose important aspects of anti-apartheid activism as a catalyst for CSR and give nuance to my 
subsequent analyses of the campaigns against Barclays and Shell. 
The central gist of Young’s social connection model is that ‘obligations of justice arise between 
persons by virtue of the social processes that connect them.’81 Young’s model highlights two 
significant phenomena: first, the interrelation between individuals and – importantly – how this 
relation disregards national boundaries; second, the model establishes the idea that individuals have 
moral responsibilities towards one another to the extent that their interrelation occasions 
injustices.82 This interrelation and ensuing responsibility stem from what Young calls ‘social 
structures’ that denote the social context within which individual actions take place. An example of 
a social structure is the way in which British consumers in the 1970s and 1980s would acquire 
services or products from Barclays or Shell as part of their everyday necessities; yet such purchases 
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would perpetuate the poor social and political conditions for the non-white South African 
population due to the taxes paid by the companies to the government, part of which would be spent 
on repressive measures. By going about their everyday lives, in other words, British consumers 
would partake in structures that had a negative social impact on parts of the South African 
population. While it may not be possible to detect the implications of each purchase, the main point 
is that individuals share the responsibility for the outcome of their actions within ‘accepted 
institutions and practices’ such as depositing money or fuelling one’s car.83 In terms of assigning 
responsibility, Young argues, the prevalent model is the ‘liability model’ that seeks to demonstrate 
the causal relation between an actor’s decisions and some type of harm. Usually, the purpose is to 
assign legal responsibility for a particular action yet Young deems this model to be inadequate 
when it comes to social structures and the immoral consequences of lawful actions. Moreover, the 
liability model mainly addresses past actions whereas the social connection model emphasizes 
‘forward-looking issues’ in the attempt to prevent future harms on the basis of social structures.84 
Stressing the significance of individual choice, Young argues that social structures are maintained 
largely through individual action. The implication is that an aggregation of individual actions that 
takes into account the shared nature of responsibility and that aims to rectify harms may be capable 
of remedying structural injustices. Applying this notion to British anti-apartheid activism would 
underline the salience of a focus on campaigns against transnational companies operating in Britain 
and South Africa since these could be seen as enablers of structural injustices through their role as 
intermediaries between British consumers and the repressive apartheid regime. As examined in 
chapter one, the AAM used very similar arguments in the effort to make clear the connection 
between British consumers and the perpetuation of the apartheid system. 
Yet is it over-simplification, Esther Hennchen probes in a discussion of Shell, when ‘blaming and 
shaming Shell alone in a context of a local and global public responsibility void and the global 
interconnectedness of the oil industry?’85 The purpose of including the social connection model in 
my analysis of anti-apartheid campaigns is to provide a structural account of the moral relationship 
between the principal actors. The model brings to the fore the dilemma faced by the AAM in 
choosing a strategy and mobilizing participants since campaigning against companies dictated a 
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mapping of the structural relations involved. As Young points out, the model does not ‘evaluate 
harm that deviates from the normal and the acceptable; rather, it often brings into question precisely 
the background conditions that ascriptions of blame or fault assume as normal.’86 The effect of the 
social connection model for my analysis, then, is to highlight the idea that while Barclays and Shell 
were not operating in conflict with the law they were nonetheless implicated in what anti-apartheid 
activists perceived to be morally contestable conduct. A closer look at some of Beck’s main theses 
will further attest to the interrelation between anti-apartheid activists and companies and detail the 
social and political potential of their actions. 
Beck’s concept of ‘subpolitics’ is developed within a broader framework that includes ‘risk society’ 
and ‘reflexive modernization.’87 Beck characterizes the type of modernity that began with the 
industrialization a few centuries ago as the ‘first modernity’ and he typifies this by a pursuit of 
material accumulation and a dependence on technological progress. Similar to the way in which the 
first modernity constituted a break away from the feudal societal order, however, a new kind of 
modernity is succeeding traditional conceptions of industrial society. This new modernity is 
reflexive, which signifies not ‘reflection’ but mainly ‘self-confrontation;’88 in fact, Mads P. 
Sørensen and Allan Christiansen suggest, modernity is now being forced to ‘modernize itself.’89 
Reflexive modernization is mainly set in motion by the gradual awareness of the unintended and 
previously undetected side-effects of the first modernity, or more precisely ‘effects that were 
originally intended to be more narrow in their scope than they turned out to be.’90 These include – 
on a grand scale – nuclear annihilation, global terrorism, climate change etc. Five events in 
particular appear to have destabilized the first modernity: the intensification of globalization on a 
number of levels, a more noticeable individualization, an escalating climate crisis, a tendency 
towards gender equality, and a so-called third industrial revolution.91 Beck emphasizes that these 
events occur not due to the ‘crisis but the victory of modernity.’92 
                                                          
86 Young, “Responsibility and Global Justice: A Social Connection Model,” 120. 
87 The concept of ’reflexive modernization’ was developed in collaboration with Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, see 
Beck, Lash, and Giddens, Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. 
88 Beck, World at Risk, 109. 
89 Sørensen and Christiansen, Ulrich Beck, 35. 
90 Beck, Bonss, and Lau, “The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses and Research 
Programme,” 2; more recently, Beck introduced the concept of ‘banal’ or ‘coercive’ cosmopolitanization, which 
emphasizes the unintended side-effects generated by an escalation in processes of cosmopolitanization; see Beck, 
“Cosmopolitanism as Imagined Communities of Global Risk.” 
91 Sørensen and Christiansen, Ulrich Beck, 31. 
92 Beck, World at Risk, 55. 
16 
 
The unintended side-effects referred to above also form the basis for Beck’s concept of ‘risk 
society’ in which the unplanned consequences of the first modernity come to predominate. Beck 
defines risk as a ‘systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introduced 
by modernization itself.’93 Reflexive modernization entails distrust in the legitimacy of the 
institutional political system and the corporate domain; company conduct is scrutinized, for 
instance, and more explicit public demands for accountability are presented.94 As Beck puts it: 
 
[The] neutral indicators of wage and profit continue to decide on investments and the 
success of products and the organization, but the substantive “how” becomes political, 
controversial, subject to codetermination, and capable of and even requiring consent. 
Trust becomes central; a trust capital that can be wasted by continuing to act out the 
old industrial scenario.95 
 
The politicization of the ‘how’ of corporate conduct serves as an explanation for the emergence of 
CSR; companies that fail to take social and ethical parameters into account, in other words, risk 
becoming targets for activist campaigns. 
In order to situate these actions against companies (and other forms of institutions and 
organizations) within the wider frameworks of reflexive modernization and risk society, Beck 
introduces the concept of ‘subpolitics.’ Developments brought to attention with reflexive 
modernization, he notes, necessitate new ways of handling political issues at social ‘sites’ that have 
so far been perceived as un-political.96 These sites include boycotts at the supermarket, rallying in 
the streets etc. Subpolitics denotes ‘neither politics nor non-politics, but a third entity: economically 
guided action in pursuit of interests.’97 In this capacity, it represents a ‘decoupling of politics from 
government’ with the aim of transforming ‘society from below.’98 Consequently, subpolitics may be 
distinguished from traditional politics by its disregard of legitimation through democratic processes. 
While reflexive modernization and risk society largely accord with the structural account outlined 
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in the social connection model, subpolitics builds on these ‘narratives’ and presents a more action-
oriented component. The concept similarly serves to bridge the macro-level dimensions of the 
social connection model with the more concrete features of political consumerism. 
I would argue that subpolitics can further explanations of the decisions of both social movements 
and companies. Mads P. Sørensen and Boris Holzer have devised a useful way of distinguishing 
between the subpolitics of activists and companies by dividing the concept into an active and a 
passive form.99 Active subpolitics, on the one hand, denotes intentional efforts to bring about social 
and political change, and it is most often conducted by social movements and civil society 
organizations. The campaigns by the AAM are examples of active subpolitics in the sense that their 
objective was of a socio-political nature – ending apartheid – and the movement sought to realize 
this aim through activist means. 
Passive subpolitics, on the other hand, points to how the decisions of actors not usually interested in 
doing politics may nonetheless have political consequences. Here, politics is an unintended side-
effect of a particular policy. Thus, parts of the loans issued by Barclays issued loans to the South 
African government were spent on military expenditures that contributed to the preservation of the 
apartheid system. Similarly, Shell’s supply of oil to the South African government helped fuel 
military vehicles. The problem with this kind of passive subpolitics, Sørensen suggests, is that 
companies can make decisions within their ‘private sphere,’ which means that the public does not 
have influence on these decisions despite their potentially widespread socio-political ramifications. 
The same deficit in legitimacy applies to social movements, however, which may circumvent 
political platforms that are – to some extent – hinged upon public expectations of transparency and 
accountability. Nevertheless, the consumer boycott campaigns by the AAM can be perceived as 
efforts to counteract company policies by maneuvering in comparable transnational and unregulated 
settings. 
Aiming to distinguish between various types of social movement activities and campaigns, Sarah 
Soule refers to state-oriented activity as ‘contentious politics’ and company-targeting activity as 
‘private politics.’100 The latter term, she suggests, is comparable to the concept of subpolitics. 
Despite the distinction between contentious and private politics, Soule concedes that ‘sometimes 
there is some attempt to target the state either through corporations, alongside corporations, or as a 
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means to impact corporations via regulation.’101 Thus, she interprets the campaigns against Barclays 
and Shell as a form of contentious politics.102 Despite the analytical value of the distinction between 
contentious and private politics, I would argue that the concept of subpolitics – with its active and 
passive forms – is better suited for an apartheid-era case study of consumer boycott campaigns. 
Drawing critically from the notions of reflexive modernization and risk society, we are able to 
construct a narrative of anti-apartheid activism that situates the campaigns against Barclays and 
Shell within a socio-historical context. Donald R. Culverson mirrors this view when he argues that 
‘opposition to apartheid furnished critical space for deepening inquiry into the injustices fostered by 
material and structural adjustments to post-industrialization.’103 Beck’s notions provide part of an 
explanation as to why anti-apartheid activists began to realize the significance of the unintended 
consequences of transnational business conduct and consequently make explicit use of this insight 
in their strategies. The moral relations addressed by Young’s social connection model are thus 
further emphasized and contextualized; moreover, we see how activists can build subpolitical 
strategies on the basis of the moral connections between themselves and the target companies. 
Beck’s theories have been met with much criticism over the years and one of the most recurrent 
contentions is that his concepts have not been tested empirically, which render them somewhat 
speculative.104 In accordance with Magnus Frederiksson’s proposal, however, I will mainly use the 
concept of subpolitics as perspective rather than as empirical analysis.105 The intention is to 
accentuate the levels of context and organization in place of attention to the individual activist. 
Frederiksson claims that Beck’s theories offer a ‘relevant and coherent description of the 
preconditions for interactions between social actors.’106 This characteristic of subpolitics also 
validates my preference for this concept above that of Giddens’ ‘life politics.’107 This concept is 
similarly relevant to the study of social movement participation; indeed, Thörn has conducted an 
illuminating analysis of anti-apartheid activism in relation to life politics. Some of the main aspects 
of such an analysis include movement culture, activism as a ‘form of life,’ and other identity-related 
dimensions.108 Yet since I deal in most part with collective action through the AAM and the impact 
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of this action on the targeted companies, I find subpolitics to be a more suitable framework for my 
analysis of anti-apartheid consumer boycott campaigns. 
We have seen how Young’s social connection model and Beck’s subpolitics offer accounts of the 
structured relations between anti-apartheid activists and companies, the political dimension of the 
operations of Barclays and Shell in South Africa, and the moral impetus to engage in anti-apartheid 
activism. Aiming to include a suitable framework for discussing more concrete methods used by the 
AAM, the final concept that I want to introduce is ‘political consumerism.’ As opposed to the 
comparatively concise concepts of the social connection model and subpolitics, political 
consumerism covers a range of ideas and approaches; and whereas Young and Beck are the 
principal exponents of their respective concepts, political consumerism is a field inhabited by 
scholars from a diverse set of disciplines. There is, furthermore, an intrinsic theoretical ‘narrative’ 
to the social connection model and subpolitics in the sense that they are constructed around a late 
twentieth-century mounting awareness of the adverse impacts of the globalization of markets. The 
advantage of concepts loosely grounded in historical tendencies (if coinciding with the period of the 
case studies) is that they may help provide a more holistic analysis that takes into account 
developments in social perspectives. Thus, I would argue that the underlying narratives of the social 
connection model and subpolitics are closely aligned with considerations made by the anti-apartheid 
activists concerning the campaigns against Barclays and Shell. 
In contrast, I view political consumerism – and boycotting in particular – as a theoretical device less 
anchored in historical insights. Despite the fact that the term first came into use in the mid-1990s in 
Denmark to explain the widespread boycotts of French wine and Shell service stations (though 
unrelated to the company’s operations in South Africa), politically charged consumption has been 
exercised for centuries.109 As Matthew Hilton argues, it has been ‘one of the most recurring means 
by which citizens have moulded their political consciousness and shaped their political 
organisations.’110 Including the concept of political consumerism, then, strengthens my analysis of 
anti-apartheid campaigns not by its particular historical relevance but by its expansion on the 
concrete tactics used by the activists. 
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Relating consumption to social and political issues is by no means a forced association. In fact, 
Michele Micheletti lists five factors that theoretically substantiate a perception of consumption as 
politics: first, consumption can function as a platform for political expression; second, consumption 
can be used to put political pressure on other actors and institutions; third, consumption concerns 
issues such as structures of influence and values in society, often dictated by producers and other 
companies; fourth, as a form of critical consumption the boycott makes up a ‘market-based political 
tool;’ finally, consumption is progressively more politicized with the globalization of trade and 
supply chains.111 These points relate to the political potential of consumption yet the figure of the 
consumer is equally ambivalent and has historically been framed in terms of opposites: rational or 
irrational, active or passive, independent or manipulated, individual or part of a group or mass.112 
Political consumers, alternatively, select products or services on the basis of political criteria rather 
than on the product as ‘material object per se.’113 Thus, a co-op spokesman in London remarked 
during the first boycott campaign launched by the AAM in 1960 that ‘housewives are refusing to 
buy South African products and the reasons have nothing to do with the price.’114 While this type of 
selection allows political consumers to realize the political potential of consumption, a major 
concern is that consumers only have a ‘secondary relationship’ to the products and services 
available since they remain reliant on the assortment offered by producers and other companies.115 
Conversely, it might be argued that the choices of political consumers also transmit preferences to 
the target companies that can adjust future policies accordingly.116 
As with most forms of activism, an effective signaling of preferences requires organization. Thus, 
Philip Balsiger suggests that the literature on political consumerism has understated the significance 
of social movement campaigns as an ‘incentive, if not a determinant, of individual political 
consumption.’117 He contends that while the dominant narrative considers political consumerism to 
be an individualized act characterized mainly by behaviourist principles, political consumerism is in 
fact ‘shaped by the tactical repertoire and by the public framing of collective campaigns.’118 Some 
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scholars have expressed concern with the implications of boycotting by individuals: recently, Léna 
Pellandini-Simányi has argued that political (or ethical) consumerism ‘seeks to provide individual 
solutions to systemic problems, thereby contributing to what Beck calls the privatization or 
individualization of risk: the delegation of responsibility for global problems to the individual 
level.’119 This line of argument perpetuates the common criticism of political consumerism that 
individual micro-actions attempt to effect change in problem areas that can only meaningfully be 
addressed through collective or institutional action. 
These perceived propensities of political consumers have been disputed by scholars such as 
Micheletti who has introduced the concept of ‘individualized collective action’ that aims to reflect 
the ‘political landscape changes of postmodernization, risk society, and globalization.’120 As 
opposed to structured approaches such as affiliation with political parties, individualized collective 
action emphasizes political activity originating with citizens and consumers on the basis of socio-
political concerns.121 While the activity may be carried out individually – as consumer boycotts, for 
instance – it is characterized by affinity for the collective. Extending this understanding of political 
consumers, Nita Mathur suggests that political consumerism poses an ‘antidote to the 
individualization of politics’ and stresses the formation of alternative networks and the symbolic 
and eye-catching protest inherent in some forms of political consumerist action.122 
This is also where the tactic of boycotting becomes pertinent since it attains significance through 
social movements by their ability to amplify both the symbolic message of the boycott and its 
economic impact on the target companies. Alternating between ‘boycott’ and ‘consumer boycott,’ 
my use of these terms denotes company-oriented action and – unless otherwise specified – thus 
extends beyond the narrower conception as an abstention from a purchase. Among the general 
boycott classifications discussed by Monroe Friedman are obstructionist boycotts that use obstacles 
to prevent people from entering a store and commodity boycotts that urge people not to purchase 
any brand within a particular group of products or services. These boycotts are micro-level tactics. 
The macro-level type of boycott that most fittingly explains the strategy of the anti-apartheid 
activists is the surrogate boycott: if activists aim to change domestic circumstances within a foreign 
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country, for instance, they can boycott a company that operates in the target country.123 
Understanding the surrogate boycott and, more broadly, why the decision not to buy certain 
products or services can be deemed a politically charged action are key to understanding the basics 
of the strategy employed by the AAM against Barclays and Shell (I elaborate on the surrogate 
boycott in chapter one). 
In conclusion, I propose that there are substantial benefits to be gained from the insights of Young’s 
social connection model, Beck’s subpolitics, and the concept of political consumerism in an 
analysis of anti-apartheid boycott campaigns. First, this analytical strategy helps contextualize the 
motivations and actions of the anti-apartheid activists, which substantiates my discussions of the 
consumer boycott campaigns. Second, the concepts introduced in this section accentuate the socio-
political implications of the involvement of foreign-owned companies in apartheid South Africa. 
Lastly, the theoretical narratives afforded by the social connection model and the framework of 
subpolitics stimulate consideration of the relationship between the activists and the boycotted 
companies. Thus, the launch of the consumer boycott campaigns may qualify an interpretation, on 
the one hand, of the AAM as proactive. A characterization of these campaigns as reactive, on the 
other hand, may be corroborated by viewing the campaigns as responses to the unintended negative 
side-effects generated by the targeted companies. In this capacity, the application of my analytical 
strategy encourages a more holistic conception of anti-apartheid activism as a catalyst for CSR. 
 
Method 
This study is structured as a historically grounded and theoretically informed discussion of anti-
apartheid activism as a catalyst for CSR. The more than two decades of campaigning offers a 
temporal component to my discussion that allows me to trace advances in the companies’ 
understanding of their social responsibility. By comparing two campaigns by the same actor and 
with the same goal of corporate withdrawal from South Africa, I examine closely the changes in 
activist measures and methods as well as in corporate responses and reactions; moreover, I address 
the question of how such similar campaigns could have entirely different outcomes. 
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In order to examine anti-apartheid consumer boycott campaigns from the late 1960s to the early 
1990s, my primary literature consists of archival sources. I have chosen to concentrate my efforts 
on archival material as opposed to conducting interviews for two reasons: first, it would have 
required considerable time and effort to obtain interviews with some of the anti-apartheid activists 
involved and key employees from Barclays and Shell. Interviewing participants from only one side 
of the campaigns would be counter-productive to my aim of balancing my analytical perspective 
between the activists and the companies. Second, the extensive quantity of archival material that I 
have collected over the past few years justifies the omittance of interviews. 
Located at the Bodleian Library in Oxford, the most exhaustive collection of material on the AAM 
contains not only records on all aspects of the movement but also several internal documents from 
the companies targeted by boycotts as well as sources pertaining to the interaction between the 
actors. In examining the AAM, I draw on documents, briefs, correspondences etc. from the activists 
relating to campaign strategies, reflections on methods, choices of corporate target etc. While I was 
able to obtain a substantial amount of material from Barclays’ archive in Manchester, Shell denied 
access to its archives apart from a small number of documents selected by the company. Visiting a 
range of other archives in Britain and Denmark, however, I have collected ample documents for the 
analysis of the interaction between the AAM and Shell. The sources that disclose the companies’ 
perspective on the campaigns include transcripts from general meetings of shareholders, discussion 
of policy at board meetings, and management papers relating to the issues of apartheid and the call 
for disinvestment. Finally, I take into account contributions from the news media in order to provide 
a more extensive impression of how anti-apartheid activism and CSR were perceived and debated at 
the time. The main criterion for the selection of primary material has been the relevance of the 
sources to an examination of the direct interaction between the AAM and its target companies as 
well as to the subsequent discussion on perceptions of CSR within this context. 
As outlined in this introduction, I employ a conceptual approach to the extent that it offers a 
research strategy for historicizing social processes and developments. The application of theory 
from sociology and moral philosophy to historical events and social movement campaigning should 
be performed with caution, and efforts to present an analysis consistently guided by theory should 
be abandoned in favour of the historical source material. While remaining cognizant of the 
limitations of theory and factoring in the normative implications of the theoretical perspectives 
presented in this introduction, I aim to engage in a broader dialogue between theory and historical 
source material. 
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In a discussion of research on anti-apartheid activism, Rob Skinner proposes that the movement 
should be perceived as an ‘assembly of multiple and overlapping fields of political activity, rather 
than an endeavor that should be set within particular spatial or territorial frameworks.’124 
Considering the emphasis of this study on British anti-apartheid activism, I define my approach as a 
transnationally oriented study of British actors. This definition is grounded in the notion that while 
an assessment of the British anti-apartheid effort against Barclays and Shell is incomplete without 
the inclusion of South African perspectives, the boycott campaigns were mainly conducted within a 
national, urban or even local group-based framework and the interaction between the activists and 
the companies largely occurred inside Britain. This understanding corresponds with Skinner’s 
conceptualization of the international anti-apartheid effort as a ‘series of intertwined, but often 
disconnected, strands of activism.’125 
It seems safe to conclude that the AAM – with more than three decades of activity relating to 
culture, politics, and solidarity across borders – is under-researched.126 With Anti-Apartheid: A 
History of the Movement in Britain (2005), Roger Fieldhouse has provided the most elaborate 
account of the AAM yet he does not detail the campaigns against Barclays and Shell. The highly 
informative works by Christabel Gurney, Rob Skinner, Simon Stevens, Håkan Thörn, Elizabeth 
Williams, and Genevieve Klein similarly focus on other aspects of the movement. The symposium 
held 40 years after the establishment of the AAM constitutes a valuable source for reflections by 
former participants in the movement. For a discussion of the anti-apartheid activists’ use of the 
consumer boycott and the emerging corporate attention to CSR, N. Craig Smith’s Morality and the 
Market: Consumer Pressure for Corporate Accountability (1990) presents an illuminating analysis 
in addition to an important insight into the prevalent perceptions of the late 1980s. My analysis of 
the campaign against Barclays has further been inspired by the work of Nerys John and Stuart 
Jones. My analysis of the campaign against Shell has been aided by the works of Arthur 
Klinghoffer, Boris Holzer, Shuili Du, Edward T. Vieira Jr., and Esther Hennchen. 
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Studies of the impact of boycott activism on corporate policies and agendas is often situated at the 
nexus between social movement and organizational studies. Albert O. Hirschman’s Exit, Voice and 
Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States (1970) was one of the first 
attempts to identify strategies and tactics deployed by stakeholders aiming to influence a 
company.127 Joost Luyckx and Maddy Janssens have recently conducted a methodological 
problematization of historical research on developments in corporate culture: 
 
Despite the fast-growing stream of literature on the integration of historical 
perspective and methods into management and organization studies, we felt that 
crafting an empirical study that may be deemed authentic within the realms of both 
disciplines remains a challenging undertaking. Especially combining the historian’s 
aim to situate phenomena in their unique ‘temporal and spatial context’ and the 
organization theorist’s preference for the distillation of generalizable insights and 
more universal truth claims places serious theoretical and methodological demands on 
researchers.128 
 
The research strategies presented in this introduction is intended in part to meet the challenge 
explicated by Luyckx and Janssens. Chapter two features a more integrative discussion of the 
quandary facing the historian when approaching organization studies by taking into consideration 
the complexities inherent in a comparative discussion of ‘economic agents’ (companies) and 
‘political agents’ (social movements) within the setting of foreign investment in South Africa.129 
Until recently, a limited number of studies examined the interaction between social movements and 
companies yet the past few years has seen a ‘burgeoning domain of social movement research 
focused on activist-firm interactions.’130 
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In a recent quantitative study on the effects of consumer boycotts, Brayden King and Mary-Hunter 
McDonnell juxtapose the CSR policies of boycotted companies with companies that have not been 
targeted.131 Having written extensively on the interaction between boycotters and targeted 
companies, King and McDonnell observe that ‘much research on social movements and 
organizations contends that there is an empirical link between activists’ contentious activity and 
corporate social responsibility.’132 I aim to identify this empirical link not through quantitative 
methods but by detailing the communication and responsive actions between the AAM and its 
target companies while emphasizing the significance of the historical context. While it is difficult to 
assess the impact of the boycott campaigns on Barclays and Shell, I argue that a qualitative analysis 
with particular emphasis on the historical context constitutes an apt methodological approach. 
George Balabanis has recently noted that while a few studies have examined the use of surrogate 
boycotting, none has examined the boycott effects on specific transnational companies, which is 
part of the aim of this dissertation.133 Balabanis examines differences in the boycotters’ approach to 
the transnational companies that are targets of the same wider campaign and his theoretical 
framework consists of earlier boycott studies and theory on social cognition, activism, blame 
attribution, and punishment motivation. Balabanis’ inclination to draw from several fields is echoed 
by Adam Lent who concludes that ‘if one thing is clear it is that movements, which involve 
thousands of people in multiple political processes, are far too complex to be explained by one 
model alone.’134 
Similarly, in her work on the development of CSR as a response to pressure by the civil society, 
Lisbeth Segerlund discusses notions such as constructivism, global governance, and the ‘norm cycle 
model,’ which she applies to her case studies in order to conceptualize CSR as a ‘social 
construction project driven by a normative agenda.’135 Civil society organizations are approached in 
Segerlund’s study as ‘norm entrepreneurs, engaged in international norm construction aimed at 
changing the standards by which TNCs are judged.’136 While the approaches outlined above 
constitute helpful analytical strategies, the analytical strategy employed in this dissertation 
combines the conceptual framework presented in this introduction with insights from social 
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movement theory (introduced in chapter one).137 This analytical method conveys my preference of 
recognizing the AAM as a social movement organization (SMO) rather than a grouping of 
individuals. 
Considering the attention in this dissertation to the interaction between actors and the 
transformation in perceptions of CSR, I want to add a note on discourse analysis. While Quentin 
Skinner’s observation of the ‘study of changing concepts as a distinct form of historical enquiry’ is 
reflective of my general conception of CSR, my area of research extends beyond, on the one hand, 
linguistic and communicative concerns and, on the other hand, understandings and interpretations of 
CSR as a concept.138 My analysis of the interaction between the AAM and its target companies 
includes direct communication in the form of letters and meeting transcripts yet I also accentuate 
the importance of actions such as the blockade by the AAM of Shell stations or the decision by 
Shell to pursue legal action as part of this interaction. If the interaction between the AAM and its 
target companies is construed as a power struggle, however, the employment of discourse analysis 
could prove highly beneficial to subsequent discussions of the response by Barclays and Shell.139 
Three main conceptions of power include, first, invisible and structural mechanisms, second, 
episodic events in connection with decision-making, and finally, more clearly observable 
manifestations of power.140 Thus, the second conception of power is substantiated by Smith’s 
proposal that the early stages of CSR should not be defined in the abstract but rather within the 
more concrete frame of conflict resolution.141 While the inclusion of Critical Discourse Analysis 
(CDA) and perspectives on power relations and structures might contribute to an understanding of 
the discourse employed by both activists and companies as a form of ‘social practice,’ I aim to 
conduct an analysis of anti-apartheid consumer boycott campaigns more closely tied to the specific 
historical context of British activism targeting foreign investment in apartheid South Africa; to my 
mind, the analytical strategies outlined in this introduction are more suitable for this purpose.142 
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This dissertation is divided into two parts: part one conceptualizes and positions the main actors for 
the subsequent analysis of their interaction featured in part two. Each part is subdivided into two 
chapters: chapter one traces the active subpolitical strategies of the AAM, while chapter two 
discusses the passive subpolitics of companies operating in South Africa and integrates the two 
perspectives by discussing anti-apartheid activism as a catalyst for CSR. Part one relies primarily on 
historical source material yet includes continuously integrated theoretical reflections. The analytical 
chapters – three and four – are chronologically structured around, first, the campaign against 
Barclays and, second, the campaign against Shell. Beginning with a review of the role of the 
companies in South Africa and the progression of the consumer boycott campaigns, chapters three 
and four culminate in discussions on the transformation of the relationship of each company to 
CSR. 
In the conclusion, I merge the discussions initiated throughout the dissertation and extend my 
perspective into the present; the main areas of inquiry pertain to the relevance of the strategies and 
tactics used by the AAM today as well as the current prominence of CSR. Specifically, I draw 
parallels between divestment in companies with connections to apartheid South Africa and the 
movement advocating divestment of fossil fuels. I posit that anti-apartheid consumer boycotts has 
had a substantial impact on the methods favoured by climate activists today. Similarly, I suggest 
that codes of conduct developed within an apartheid context and the call by the activists for 
increased attention to the social responsibility of transnational corporations have occasioned an 
increase in CSR-related measures. 
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Chapter 1: The Anti-Apartheid Movement 
 
The examination of the AAM as a social movement actor in this chapter rests on the assumption 
that the ensuing analyses of the interaction between the movement and the companies targeted by 
anti-apartheid consumer boycotts benefit from a comprehensive understanding of the origins, 
strategies, and campaigns conducted by the AAM. By discussing the ethical and practical 
implications of anti-apartheid activism and the use of the boycott tactic, we can begin to ascertain 
the relationship between the activists and the targeted companies before exploring the consequences 
of this relationship for the development of CSR in chapter two. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the study of social movements and relates some of the 
main theoretical approaches to this field. Before outlining the history and organizational structure of 
the AAM, I further situate the movement within a historical British context. The second half of the 
chapter addresses the active subpolitical strategies of the AAM by discussing the movement’s 
choice of strategies and campaigns. I pay special attention to the activists’ use of the surrogate 
consumer boycott in a preliminary effort to conceptualize the interaction between the AAM and the 
target companies. 
 
Social Movements 
The field of social movements can be difficult to navigate as it is in rapid development, and there is 
a myriad of overlapping labels for these movements including pressure group, non-governmental 
organization (NGO), liberation movement, lifestyle movement, new social movement etc. It has 
often been argued that a movement does not have any clear boundaries and that the term ‘social’ 
has become almost too broad for practical use. This section offers an overview of the research 
within the field and traces the emergence and central characteristics of social movements. Towards 
the end of the section, I transition from theoretical reflections to an outline of the proliferation of 
British social movement activity in the latter half of the twentieth century. The main purpose of 
including social movement theory is to qualify my discussion of consumer boycott activism as a 
catalyst for CSR in chapter two; this discussion subsequently forms the basis for my analyses of the 
campaigns against Barclays and Shell in chapters three and four. 
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In line with Charles Tilly and Sidney G. Tarrow, I define social movements as ‘a sustained 
campaign of claim making, using repeated performances that advertise the claim, based on 
organizations, networks, traditions, and solidarities that sustain these activities.’1 A distinction can 
be made between social movements and social movement organizations (SMOs), which are 
structured organizations that usually aim to manage the direction of a social movement and tap into 
the values and beliefs systems of the supporters of the movement. Thus, social movements tend to 
consist of multiple SMOs.2 Accordingly, I generally deploy the label ‘social movement’ since the 
AAM worked closely with other anti-apartheid groups such as Embargo and End Loans to Southern 
Africa (ELTSA). Unless otherwise specified, I also tend to use ‘AAM’ as an umbrella term for 
British anti-apartheid groups since the AAM was the definitively largest SMO within this strand of 
activism. 
In terms of methods or ‘repertoire,’ social movements make use of public meetings, rallies, 
demonstrations, petitions, pamphlets, press releases, sit-ins, blockades, strikes, civil disobedience, 
boycotts, ‘jamming’ of discourses and symbols etc. The boycott in particular has been highlighted 
as one of the main tactics and it often covers a number of other activities also referred to as 
‘companion tactics.’3 
One of the earliest examples of a social movement is the labour movement in Europe, which began 
to take form in the latter half of the 18th century in response to the rapid industrialization of the 
time. The movement provided a new channel for voicing concerns and grievances and it 
strengthened the bargaining power of the workers.4 Srilatha Batliwala and L. David Brown explain 
that the most central value of the early labour movement was ‘a sense of dignity of the human 
being’ and that the movement came to represent the view that all human beings ought to have equal 
rights.5 This emphasis on dignity, equality, and social justice was perpetuated and placed at the 
forefront of proliferating activist efforts from around the 1960s onwards. As Mancur Olson 
proposed in his influential The Logic of Collective Action, Public Goods and the Theory of Groups 
(1975), the prospect of economic gain was not the sole motivational factor for the individual; rather, 
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‘people are sometimes also motivated by a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, and other 
social and psychological objectives.’6 
The complexity of the study of social movements consists in its extension from and merging of 
fields such as behavioural psychology, sociology, and history. During the last couple of decades, the 
research field has become a central part of the understanding within the humanities and social 
sciences of cultural and societal transformational processes.7 The study of social movements 
flourished considerably from around the mid-1970s when it branched out into a number of schools. 
In the main, this development was generated by the intensification in activism that began in the 
1960s and that inspired the reevaluation of existing theories. Up until this point, social movements 
were largely perceived as occupying the space between spontaneous gatherings and formally 
structured organizations. As William A. Gamson wrote in 1975, the ‘study of social protest has only 
recently emerged from the straightjacket of collective behavior.’8 In addition to progressively 
elaborate ways of mobilizing support, the appearance of new strategies and methods for 
campaigning necessitated alternative and more comprehensive analytic approaches. Gauging these 
approaches, Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald identify three factors that are 
included across the various schools: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing 
processes.9 
The first factor – ‘political opportunities’ – is dominated by the political process model. This school 
emphasizes the importance of the institutional political system, and it argues that social movements 
largely emerge as an effect of changes within the system and also that they are molded by the 
opportunities enabled by these changes.10 Four points can be seen as relevant to political 
opportunities: the openness of the institutional political system, the stability of political alliances 
and similar groupings, the support of elected politicians or other influential allies, and finally the 
state’s capacity for and inclination towards the use of repressive measures.11 Paul Byrne suggests 
that political opportunities is not so much a contender to other approaches as a ‘reminder to us that 
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we can only fully understand particular movements by viewing them in their societal and political 
contexts.’12 Examples of domestic political opportunities for the AAM include ties to Labour MPs 
that provided the activists with privileged access to the institutional political system. In an 
international setting, the ability to channel concerns through and receive information from the UN 
Special Committee against Apartheid constituted an important political opportunity for the activists. 
Additional opportunity structures have been discussed more recently in relation to social movement 
campaigning including the ‘industry opportunity structure,’ which denotes the context constituted 
by the broader industry of a boycotted company, and the ‘corporate opportunity structure,’ which 
draws attention to characteristics specific to the targeted company; these aspects of the campaigns 
against Barclays and Shell are examined more closely in chapters three and four.13 
The second factor – ‘mobilizing structures’ – examines the role of leadership within social 
movements and the term designates the procedures and methods used to stimulate social movement 
participation.14 The main school adhering to this paradigm is ‘resource mobilization,’ which became 
the dominant school within social movement studies from the 1970s.15 Departing from most 
previous theories, resource mobilization theory views social movements as commonly occurring 
and rationally grounded as opposed to spontaneously formed protest groups. It is held that social 
movements attain the maximum leverage through professional SMOs that are able to establish long-
term strategies etc. In addition to directing attention to how churches, labour unions, and similar 
groups can muster support outside of the institutional political system, resource mobilization theory 
can be used to explain the failure of social movement constituents to mirror the composition of the 
population.16 
It should be noted that many supporters of the political process model also encourage consideration 
of mobilizing structures despite discrepancies between the two schools pertaining to the equation of 
social movements with formal organization. Most common, however, is an integration of the two 
views.17 Observing the AAM from the perspective of resource mobilization can disclose important 
aspects of the workings of the movement such as fundraising and the effort to attract new members. 
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In addition, resource mobilization accentuates the impact of the strategies implemented by the heads 
of local branches and the main office in London. As an account of the outcome of social movement 
activity, however, the resource mobilization approach has been criticized for ‘being too agentic – as 
if outcomes depended only on the movement.’18 In chapters three and four, I consider the 
contribution of the AAM to the perceived concessions made by Barclays and Shell. 
The final aspect of social movement theorizing – ‘framing processes’ (also referred to as ‘social 
construction’) – calls to attention the idea that people are unlikely to be mobilized around a cause 
with which they do not identify on a personal level. From this perspective, Robert D. Benford and 
David A. Snow suggest, ‘movement actors are viewed as signifying agents actively engaged in the 
production and maintenance of meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or 
observers.’19 Benford and Snow identify points of comparison between framing processes and 
political opportunities by contending that while the latter do not constitute ‘purely socially 
constructed entities,’ the extent to which political opportunities ‘constrain or facilitate collective 
action is partly contingent on how they are framed by movement actors as well as others.’20 Philip 
Balsiger substantiates this understanding in his discussion of the political process model within the 
context of corporate-oriented boycott campaigns when he proposes that the term ‘political’ should 
not be ‘limited to a merely legitimist definition of politics where the political is defined as the game 
of representation within political institutions.’21 Instead, he argues, social movements are 
‘specialized in the construction of new issues as having a political meaning.’22 The perception that 
the anti-apartheid activists were involved in processes of politicization or moralization of corporate 
conduct is theorized in my conceptual framework, and it is a fundamental characteristic of the anti-
apartheid agenda. 
Most commonly associated with framing processes are the new social movements (NSM), which 
tend to engage in culturally oriented interpretations of socio-political issues.23 Such understandings 
involve extending the objective of a movement beyond immediate legal changes and seeking 
instead to transform the ‘cultural structures underpinning modern society.’24 Many NSM theorists 
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are preoccupied with the notion of a ‘collective identity’ within a movement, which denotes a 
synthesis between membership base, issue delimitation, and type of movement activities.25 Part of 
the reason why NSMs contain the label ‘new’ is that they are seen as different – and not directly 
deriving – from the ‘old’ labour and church movements. 
The abundance in literature on NSMs reflects the diversity within this field; thus, Buechler argues 
that NSM theories would be a more appropriate indicator.26 He offers a valuable outline of NSMs 
that demonstrates the disagreement as to their newness, whether they should be perceived as 
political or cultural, reactive or progressive etc. Buechler summarizes six major strands within NSM 
theory: first, importance is given to symbolic action in civil society or the cultural sphere in addition 
to instrumental action in the political sphere; second, the promotion of independence and self-
determination is valued above efforts to maximize influence; third, theorists such as Ronald 
Inglehart have attributed the emergence of NSMs to a shift from ‘Materialist to Postmaterialist 
value priorities,’ thus downplaying the role of material resources; fourth, the construction of 
collective identities is problematized and perceived as a complex process; fifth, movement 
participants’ beliefs and ideologies are underscored as social constructs; finally, NSM theorists seek 
to identify smaller alternative and temporary groupings that can be seen to form the basis of 
collective action as opposed to merely focusing on movement leaders and centralized 
organization.27 
The inclusion of framing processes in my analysis of the AAM allows us to trace the movement’s 
efforts to establish ‘shared understandings of the world’ that legitimate and stimulate collective 
action such as explicating the connection between social responsibility and corporate conduct.28 
Thörn argues that a NSM approach to anti-apartheid activism necessitates several ‘modifications’ 
since the ‘old’ labour and church networks played a central role in the development of the AAM.29 
However, he suggests that the movement’s ‘double strategy of acting both on the outside and on the 
inside of the established political system’ is a distinctive trait within NSM repertoires.30 While the 
AAM may justifiably be categorized as an NSM, my choice instead of the denominator ‘social 
movement’ serves to downplay the cultural and identity-related aspects of anti-apartheid activism 
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and instead direct attention towards the movement’s targeting of corporate actors through consumer 
boycott campaigns. 
Thörn accentuates the context of transnational exchanges of expertise and experiences within which 
NSMs emerged with particular reference to the inspiration drawn from the anti-colonial struggles, 
and he attributes the neglect of this influence in NSM theory to a predominant ‘methodological 
nationalism.’31 As discussed later in this chapter, British anti-apartheid activism was essentially a 
product of transnational processes and the suggestion by Srilatha Batliwala and L. David Brown 
that transnational activities may ‘cross, alter, transcend, and even transform borders and boundaries’ 
is highly pertinent in terms of understanding how the activists worked and communicated.32 The 
transnational anti-apartheid network connected thousands of group and organizations in more than 
100 countries.33 Rob Skinner details the configuration of anti-apartheid activism, however, when he 
asserts that at no point ‘was there a single transnational network of activists’ and that the 
international anti-apartheid movement should consequently be perceived as a ‘movement of 
movements.’34 
Despite this study’s discussion of transnational perspectives and the inclusion of communication 
from organizations such as the ANC and the UN Special Committee against Apartheid, I would 
concede that my methodological approach could be observed as a perpetuation of nation-based 
research as criticized by Thörn on the basis of my focus on the interaction between British anti-
apartheid activists and British-based companies. As noted in the introduction, however, I 
circumvent this criticism by approaching my analyses of the consumer boycott campaigns as a 
transnationally oriented study of British actors. In addition to the inclusion of South African 
perspectives, I would argue that the transnational focus of the analytical strategy established in the 
introduction meets the challenge by Beck that the causal responsibility of global crises and risks – 
such as induced by apartheid – cannot be ‘analyzed through a national lens.’35 
Moving beyond sociologically grounded social movement theory and discussions on 
transnationality, I want to include some perspectives by John Markoff on historical analyses of 
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social movements since he catalogues analytical observations on the basis of their relation to time.36 
First, ‘duration’ constitutes a useful approach to social movement activity by, for instance, detailing 
increases and decreases in the support for campaigns. AAM membership and attendance to events 
organized by the movement did not develop in steady progression but followed alternative patterns. 
Also, a long-standing puzzle among anti-apartheid scholars has been that while support for the 
AAM escalated in the wake of the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, a similar effect failed to occur 
after the Soweto Uprising in 1976. More broadly, taking into account the ‘duration’ factor helps to 
address the diachronic complications of studying anti-apartheid activity from the late 1960s to the 
early 1990s. 
Second, societal ‘trends’ may impact the course of social movements. These include higher literacy 
rates, developments in communication technologies etc. The AAM unquestionably benefitted from 
advances such as faster and cheaper travel, the fax machine, the proliferation of telephones, and 
improved ways of designing and printing posters, pamphlets etc. ‘Trends’ also refer to movement 
trends, which may denote long-term variations in the mobilization for and frequency of rallies and 
demonstrations. Given that the AAM was active for more than thirty years, broader social 
movement repertoires underwent considerable developments during this period, which is reflected 
in the organization of the single-company campaign against Barclays from the late 1960s and the 
‘Freedom at 70’ concert in 1988, both of which tapped into the popular zeitgeist.37 
Third, ‘punctual’ events may significantly affect social movement mobilization and choice of 
strategy. I have already touched upon the events of 1960 and 1976, which may serve as valuable 
points of reference or comparative analysis, yet I would be cautious about overemphasizing the 
implications of such isolated events since they may not be representative of the development or 
activities of the AAM. As Markoff suggests, major events are ‘likely to be particularly attractive as 
research sites’ since they offer a more compact and clearly identifiable disruption from previous 
practices and perceptions.38 In my analyses of the boycott campaigns, I emphasize the continuous 
interaction and renegotiation of social responsibility between the anti-apartheid activists and their 
target companies above the significance of ‘punctual’ events. 
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Fourth, studying the ‘causal dependence’ of events allows for a sequential take on social movement 
developments and activities. Thus, with Barclays’ disinvestment and the termination of the 
campaign against the bank, the activists were able to initiate the boycott against Shell. While this 
approach can help point out the connection between events, there is a risk of unintentionally 
constructing ‘causally plausible stories.’39 In the case of Barclays’ disinvestment from South Africa, 
anti-apartheid activists were quick to claim this decision as a victory for their campaign. As I will 
examine more closely in chapter three, however, a series of converging factors contributed to 
Barclays’ decision. 
Finally, the ‘distinctiveness of place’ pertains to how a combination of temporal and geographical 
dimensions can provide new insights into social movements, and for the remainder of this section I 
want to explore this perspective. The intention is to make clear that the AAM was not an isolated 
phenomenon but rather inspired by and emerging in parallel to other groups, organizations and 
movements, all of which responded or reflected to various degrees the socio-political realities of 
British society as it developed after the Second World War. The AAM was conscious of the 
practical realities of working within a British context and the movement sought to integrate these 
reflections into its strategy. Thus, a discussion paper from 1971 affirms that the movement ‘works 
within the British situation, and its work depends on an analysis of British society. But are we 
voyeurs of a static situation, or active agents within a dynamic situation? How does the raison d’etre 
of AAM […] relate to its participation in the transformation of British society?’40 Such strategic 
considerations are suggestive of the value attributed by the AAM to national setting and 
circumstance. 
As with many other Western European countries, Britain experienced a post-war economic boom 
that almost quadrupled male average weekly earnings between 1951 and 1971.41 The termination of 
rationing in 1954 became an important benchmark in the development of social movements, 
Lawrence Black argues, since people could afford to be ‘more concerned with the quality of life 
than the standard of living.’42 While the immediate post-war years had seen a number of protests 
and demonstrations, more frequent and large-scale mobilizations soon began to stir. Already from 
the 1950s, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) had a significant stake in developing 
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campaign strategies to the extent that they became much more common during the 1960s. It should 
be noted, however, that while the ‘identity politics’ ushered in from the 1960s has been said to mark 
a break away from previous political preoccupations, groups and organizations with a single main 
cause date back at least to the nineteenth century.43 Social movement activity concerned with 
identity politics at this time included the establishment of the Gay Liberation Front (1969), Friends 
of the Earth (FoE) (1969), and the organization of the first National Women’s Liberation 
Conference (1970). In addition to these early activities, further inspiration for the social movements 
of the post-war period came from the various think tanks, independent organizations, and pressure 
groups that proliferated in the inter-war years. These were characterized by a high degree of 
professionalism and expertise, which became increasingly important features of social movement 
organizations. 
Another factor that characterized the proliferation of social movement activity is the human rights 
paradigm, which was introduced with the formulation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) in 1948. Much discourse was now centered upon human rights, which set a new 
standard for thinking about ‘humanity’ in global terms.44 Established in 1961, Amnesty 
International was among the early human rights organizations in Britain. Amnesty helped carry 
human rights from the legal domain and into popular imagination, and the organization was 
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1977. The AAM similarly invoked the human rights paradigm as 
when the Herefordshire AA Group pointed out that ‘profits made by Outspan etc. go in tax to pay 
for massive policy/army expenditure, necessary to […] deny human rights.’45 Other paradigms, 
however, such as anti-racism and solidarity were in competition to become the overarching signifier 
of the AAM. Finally, it is conceivable that the activists were hoping to tap into a shared ‘sense of 
historical responsibility, allied perhaps to a feeling of guilt or unease about British attitudes on 
racial issues’ by emphasizing Britain’s colonial ties to South Africa.46 
The post-war decades saw the creation of the welfare state, National Health Service, political party 
consensus around a strategy of mixed economy, extensive de-colonization, formal entry into the 
European Community, and finally severe economic crisis from the early 1970s. Adam Lent points 
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to three significant factors contributing to the rise of social movement activity during this period: 
first, widespread discontent with the existing political structures and the perceived lack of influence 
led to demands for a more pluralist political culture. 47 The dissatisfaction with institutional politics 
is reflected in the marked decrease in the total membership of the Labour and Conservative Parties 
during the latter half of the twentieth century; Black refers to the relative decline of ‘elite-directed’ 
politics, which both stimulated and was a result of the rise of ‘elite-directing’ politics: single-issue 
campaigns, social movements etc.48 
Second, a much higher percentage of the British youth were enrolled at institutions of higher 
education than ever before: during the 1960s, the student numbers expanded by more than 100 per 
cent to 457,000 full-time students by 1970.49 During these years, students became a particularly 
active segment among social movement participants, and much of the activity was directed at the 
university authorities. The final factor that contributed to the dramatic increase in social movement 
activities was the crisis in international relations: anxiety about the catastrophes of Cold War 
confrontations such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Vietnam War triggered mass support for the 
peace movement.50 A wealth of movements and organizations also focused on conditions in the 
Third World and Britain’s responsibility in this regard; these included War on Want, the Haslemere 
Group, the World Development Movement, Third World First etc. 
The election of Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative government in 1979 entailed the implementation 
of policies that ran counter to the post-war consensus and that favoured greater degrees of 
deregulation, privatization, and trade union legislation leading to more pronounced social inequality 
and division.51 Many movements and organizations had already become increasingly 
professionalized and hierarchic, and they worked towards reform as opposed to radical change 
while targeting the political system in order to bring about legislative change. Lent argues that 
Greenpeace spearheaded this development in the 1980s by conducting highly professional 
campaigns that served as models of inspiration for other movements.52 Generally, movement and 
organizational membership escalated during the 1980s: FoE experienced an increase from 1,000 
members in 1971 to 140,000 at the end of the 1980s, the CND went from 4,000 members in the 
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1970s to around 250,000 in the mid-1980s, and Greenpeace had some 400,000 supporters in Britain 
by the early 1990s.53 
Like the campaigns for nuclear disarmament and abortion rights, Ryan M. Irwin suggests that 
participating grassroots activists were largely from an educated middle-class background.54 ‘To 
affluent and aroused young people,’ he further argues, ‘apartheid was a blank screen and shaming 
white South Africans into reform was as much about accountability in pluralist democracy—forcing 
traditional elites to listen to the moral concerns of diverse voters—as ending the particular 
mechanics of the National Party’s racial policies.’55 Many individual members of the AAM were 
also active participants in other groups that worked in fields related to anti-racism, anti-colonialism, 
or human rights yet the AAM is distinguishable as the only movement with opposition to apartheid 
as its sole raison d’être.56 To my mind, the most accurate presentation of the AAM would convey its 
structured organization and capacity for strategic planning while at the same time accentuating the 
movement’s ties to other actors such as student groups, religious bodies, and trade unions. My 
discussion of anti-apartheid activism within the confines of the social movement category is guided 
by a recognition of the analytical restrictions imposed by a reliance on pre-defined categories, as 
cautioned by Michel Wieviorka: 
 
Whether it be a question of the working-class movement, the ‘new social movements’ 
or ‘global movements’, there is one danger which constantly threatens the analyst: that 
of confusing a relatively abstract concept, a sociologically pure category, with real 
historical phenomena – actual events – which may include this category but are also, 
of necessity, interplaced with others.57 
 
I would argue that the application of the term ‘social movement’ to the AAM furthers an 
understanding of the type of activities engaged in by the anti-apartheid activists as well as the basic 
organizational structure of the movement. The comparatively neutral label ‘social movement’ is not 
overly charged with connotations of identity politics, post-materialism, religious motivations etc., 
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which may complicate analyses of the historical source material. The remainder of this chapter 
engages more closely with the specific history, strategies, and objectives of the AAM. 
 
Brief History of the Anti-Apartheid Movement 
The proliferation of social movement activity from around the time of the formation of the AAM 
provided a productive context for the early years of anti-apartheid activism. Extending the historical 
perspective further, Hilary Sapire argues that the movement drew from preceding influences such as 
the ‘anti-slavery sugar boycotts, domestic radicalism as well as the anti-racism, anti-militarism and 
anti-imperialism of Quaker, non-conformist and Christian Brotherhood movements.’58 In terms of 
post-war Britain, however, the emergence of anti-apartheid activism is indicative of the advent of 
more radical forms of activism in addition to the rising critique of and resistance against British 
colonial politics. Whereas legitimacy had largely been defined within a Cold War dichotomy since 
the Second World War, the AAM significantly claimed support for African nationalism as a source 
of moral validity.59 According to Skinner, anti-apartheid activism began to ‘encapsulate the de-
legitimization of systems of racial discrimination and colonialism.’60 In the 1950s, Reverend 
Michael Scott, a prominent figure in British anti-apartheid activism, established the anti-colonial 
Africa Bureau in London. Together with the Movement for Colonial Freedom – among others – this 
organization contributed to the rising anti-colonial culture in Britain.61 Skinner suggests that 
apartheid was looked upon in Britain first and foremost as a moral issue and that the anti-apartheid 
cause was thus correspondingly a response to an immoral system.62 
During the 1950s, British support for the ANC-led struggle against apartheid slowly began to take 
form. The Treason Trial of 1954-55 brought attention to the political developments in South Africa 
and initiated fund-raising efforts that have been labelled the ‘first major co-ordinated international 
response to apartheid.’63 In 1956, the International Defence and Aid Fund (IDAF) was formed by 
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Canon John Collins as the first international anti-apartheid organization.64 The following year saw 
the Declaration of Conscience, which was an attempt to establish a global anti-apartheid campaign. 
Efforts were made to organize boycotts of South African products and the British retailers that sold 
them, and Archbishop Trevor Huddleston had called for a cultural boycott of South Africa already 
in 1954 yet this failed to generate enough impetus to establish an actual movement. The call for a 
boycott of South African products at the All Africa People’s Conference in Accra in 1958 similarly 
failed to materialize into a movement organization in Britain. Subsequent mobilization efforts, I 
would argue, may have been facilitated by this early exposure of the British public to the idea of an 
anti-apartheid boycott. 
In the summer of 1959, a meeting was held in London with the purpose of organizing a boycott of 
South African products. This meeting saw the establishment of the British Boycott Committee, 
which soon after became the Boycott Movement, the precursor to the AAM. Due to the work of 
Brits and exiled South Africans, the British movement had before long attained a vital position in 
the transnational network of information among activists. Appeals were also issued from within 
South Africa and international anti-apartheid activities were increasingly interconnected with the 
agendas of opposition parties within South Africa. The early boycotts launched by the Boycott 
Movement were partly in response to a call from the ANC a few months prior to the establishment 
of the movement. A more public appeal was requested, however, which could be used to mobilize 
wider support in Britain.65 The reply was a direct appeal signed by ANC leader Chief Luthuli, 
President of the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) G.M. Naicker, and National Chairman of 
the Liberal Party Peter Brown. Built on the ANC’s domestic boycott strategy, the appeal urged the 
‘people of Great Britain to strike a blow for freedom and justice in South Africa’ that would compel 
the South African government to abandon its apartheid policies.66 In the appeal, it is explained how 
the domestic South African resistance had attempted deputations, petitions, and parliamentary 
influence before employing the boycott strategy. Already in this early statement, the potential 
adverse impact of a boycott is addressed: ‘It has been argued that non-white people will be the first 
to be hit by external boycotts. This may be so, but every organization which commands any 
important non-white support in South Africa is in favour of them.’67 While the ANC and its partners 
may have hoped to terminate the sanctions debate with this appeal, the contention that the non-
                                                          
64 Thörn, “Solidarity Across Borders: The Transnational Anti-Apartheid Movement,” 288. 
65 AAM Archives, “The Boycott Movement.” 
66 AAM Archives, “Appeal from Chief Luthuli.” 
67 Ibid. 
43 
 
white South African population would be most affected continued to proliferate until the end of the 
apartheid system.68 
In January 1960, the Boycott Movement held a large conference, which precipitated the formation 
of several local boycott committees through Britain. This event also issued a call for sanctions on 
the grounds that the ‘moral pressure of the consumer boycott was no longer sufficient.’69 The main 
concern at this time was the organization of a month of boycotting in March that aimed to attract 
attention to the situation in South Africa and the British anti-apartheid effort. This effort succeeded 
to such an extent that a Guardian editorial from 1 March noted that ‘the boycott begins today, and it 
is an indication of the organizer’s success so far that no-one needs to ask “boycott of what?”’70 
During the month of boycotting, anti-apartheid activists distributed an estimated two million leaflets 
and managed to sell 250,000 copies of the newly produced Boycott News; such quantities were not 
achieved again until the 1980s.71 These numbers demonstrate how the AAM from the onset put 
considerable effort into awareness-raising and mobilizing support through the media and other 
channels of communication. Well into the month of boycott, the Sharpeville Massacre on 21 March 
decisively anchored the atrocities of apartheid within the public imagination. Abdul Minty, 
founding member of the AAM and Honorary Secretary from 1962-95, argues that there was a 
mutual relationship at work in the extensive condemnation by the British media of the South 
African government: on the one hand, the media reported widely on the Sharpeville Massacre, 
boosting support for the AAM. On the other hand, the publicity already achieved for the March 
boycott had helped place apartheid within the media consciousness in the first place.72 
The tragedy in Sharpeville not only enhanced public awareness of apartheid, it also had significant 
implications for the internal organization of the AAM. The banning by the South African authorities 
of liberation movements forced many South Africans into exile, a great number of whom went to 
London where they became involved in the early development of the AAM. As a continuation and 
extension of the early boycott campaign, the AAM could be perceived as ‘a permanent body 
established as a response to the transformation of the landscape of anti-apartheid protest after the 
banning of the ANC and the PAC.’73 One of the principal tasks of the international anti-apartheid 
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movement was now to give voice to the South African resistance against apartheid, which had 
largely been forced underground. While it is tempting to view the Sharpeville Massacre as the 
instigating event in the movement’s transformation to the AAM, future boycott campaigns and a 
wider internationalization of the anti-apartheid struggle had already been planned beforehand.74 As 
the month of boycott was drawing to a close, it was decided at a meeting on 30 March that the 
movement was to be renamed the ‘Anti-Apartheid Movement,’ a moniker that tied the movement 
more closely to the struggle against apartheid in the public perception.75 
Since its establishment, the movement had gradually come to encompass a loose coalition of 
supporters and affiliations. The AAM immediately recognized the persuasion that trade union 
leaders might exert on their members as well as the concerted pressure that could be exercised by a 
coalition of trade unions, particularly in the form of the Trades Union Congress (TUC). By the late 
1960s, the AAM had secured the support of 14 unions and a trade union action group was set up in 
1968.76 The TUC represented a wide range of interests, however, and it generally did not favour 
measures such as sanctions and boycotts that would damage Britain’s economic position in South 
Africa.77 
Similar to the TUC, religious organizations were perceived by the AAM as important partners. 
Prominent religious figures had played a major role in fostering awareness of apartheid and in the 
early development of the AAM itself. The strong moral current in anti-apartheid can be traced back 
to individuals such as Archbishop Huddleston, Canon John Collins, and Reverend Scott who had 
perceived anti-apartheid protest as ‘a moral obligation that was at least partly a consequence of their 
religious vocation.’78 Reverend Scott, for instance, petitioned at the UN before the establishment of 
the AAM, thus helping place apartheid on the international political agenda. Archbishop 
Huddleston – who co-founded and later became President of the AAM – wrote the influential 
Naught for Your Comfort (1956). Rob Skinner describes how Archbishop Huddleston ‘appeared to 
offer a peculiar resonance with public opinion in Britain; both an older generation who retained 
faith in the righteousness of Britain’s “imperial mission” and a younger generation beginning to 
question that faith found a focus in Huddleston and his campaign for the international isolation of 
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South Africa.’79 The AAM maintained close ties to a number of church and religious organizations, 
which helped the movement’s standing among wider sections of the public. These organizations 
also contributed with channels for the exchange of information, material resources etc. The 
Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility (ICCR), for instance, became a highly valuable 
partner for the AAM in terms of its corporate-oriented campaigns. Comparable to the TUC, it was 
difficult for the AAM to muster support for direct engagement with the British government for 
policy proposals among British religious organizations despite overall support for the anti-apartheid 
cause.80 
The movement’s stance on policy measures was complicated not only by the need to cater to its 
partner organizations and groups but also by ideological deliberations provoked by the underlying 
Cold War narrative. Politics remained a delicate topic for the AAM, mainly out of fear of losing 
appeal among potential supporters and influence with elected officials. Labour was the party most 
responsive to anti-apartheid programs and the fact that some AAM members were Labour MPs 
attests to the movement’s ties with institutional politics. The party’s manifesto from 1979 
announces that it was ‘totally opposed to the system of apartheid, and will continue to support the 
opponents of apartheid […].We will take active steps to reduce our economic dependence on South 
Africa and discourage new investment in South Africa by British companies.’81 In the early 1980s, 
Labour leader Michael Foot further declared that he would support mandatory economic sanctions, 
which the Conservative Party was unwilling to do.82 
There should be no doubt about the predominantly leftist leanings of the AAM: openly communist 
members appear to have constituted a substantial part of the British anti-apartheid effort and they 
tended to associate apartheid with capitalism and labour exploitation.83 James Barber, however, 
suggests that the far-left segment within the movement was not representative of the AAM in its 
entirety.84 It was clear from the early days of the AAM that the movement would not be able to 
effectively channel all the conflicting political views of its members. Yet this proved advantageous 
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in the sense that ‘many people who did not consider themselves to be politically involved, and who 
rarely if ever attended a meeting or demonstration, boycotted South African produce and thought of 
themselves as committed against apartheid.’85 
Beyond political leanings, other divides were observable in the composition of the AAM such as the 
failure to attract extensive support from the working class or among black Britons, which remained 
a source of concern for the movement.86 As Thörn notes, ‘international solidarity in Britain at the 
time would come easier if the persons appealing for it had a white face – and spoke with a British 
accent.’87 One way to meet this charge and to enhance the legitimacy of the AAM was to emphasize 
the movement’s close ties to the South African liberation movements. While the AAM sought to 
engage with all the liberation movements, the ANC was its most important South African partner 
organization. Genevieve Klein points to the harsh critique of the AAM by the PAC and the 
‘superior organization of the ANC in exile’ as reasons for the British anti-apartheid activists’ 
preference of this movement.88 The AAM sought to mobilize British support for the struggle of the 
ANC, which meant that their roles were ‘mutually supportive but totally different.’89 In the early 
1960s, the ANC’s turn to a strategy of sabotage was problematic for the AAM since many Brits saw 
this as a controversial decision. From the mid-1960s onwards, however, the AAM and the ANC’s 
office in London were generally on good terms. In 1990, for instance, the AAM produced a plan to 
help the ANC during South Africa’s transition to democracy; the strategy proposals included 
ensuring publicity for statements by the ANC and persuading the British government to recognize 
the legitimacy of the South African party. The AAM would further raise funds for the ANC and 
work to generate support for the party.90 
The central configurations of the AAM had been developed during the early 1960s and the 
movement retained many of these basic features as it continued to evolve over the years. Chairman 
Robert Hughes has described the AAM as a ‘very democratic movement,’ though it had a clear 
hierarchical structure.91 The national office in London, also referred to the as ‘hub,’ helped to 
coordinate the activities of the various branches and committees throughout the country.92 The 
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London office had a small number of full-time staff yet much of the work was performed by 
additional volunteers. The number of staff grew steadily from just a few people in the early 1960s to 
twenty-three by the end of the 1980s. It was the responsibility of the national office to develop 
large-scale strategies to be subsequently employed by the regional offices. The organizational 
structure of the AAM was affected by the rapid expansion in supporter base during the 1980s when 
the movement became more reliant on a bureaucratic structure in order to address the increasing 
strain on the resources at the national office. Consequently, the leadership of the AAM began to 
allocate more of its time to movement organization and administration.93 The National Committee 
was the policy-making body of the AAM, while the role of the Executive Committee was to advise 
the National Committee and to effectuate the established policy.94 
The movement did not seek nor receive any substantial government contributions, most probably on 
the grounds that it wanted to be able to claim independence from institutional political interests. The 
movement had little regular monthly income, which meant that it was compelled to apply for funds 
at all times. Most of the steady income was made up of membership fees that were introduced in 
1962. 1,135 members signed up during the first year, with slightly more the following year.95 At the 
time, more than half of the members were students.96 While overall membership numbers ended 
much higher than they were at the early 1960s, it was not a linear progression: membership 
remained at around 2,500 until the mid-1980s when it suddenly increased drastically, peaking at 
approximately 18,000 in 1987-88.97 Yet official membership numbers did not reflect the extent of 
the actual support for the AAM since participants in demonstrations, pickets, and boycotts were not 
necessarily members of the movement organization. For the individual member, membership was 
meant to signal support for the AAM and perhaps to facilitate access to information about events in 
South Africa and the British and international anti-apartheid efforts through subscriptions to 
newsletters, meetings etc. In addition to a steady source of income, membership constituted a base 
from which to draw in terms of the organization and execution of activities etc. Membership fees 
were supplemented by collections at demonstrations and meetings, which did not represent a stable 
source of funding. 
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With a few exceptions, most local groups had between 100 and 200 members at their peak in the 
mid-1980s. Fieldhouse estimates that around 10 per cent of the local groups were ‘very active’ (the 
committee), 25 per cent ‘active’ (demonstrations, pickets etc.), 25 per cent ‘occasionally active’ 
(subscribed to newsletters, gave money etc.), and 40 per cent ‘passive support’ (engaged in 
boycotts).98 Apart from local groups, organizational memberships entailed political groups, church 
groups, women’s organizations, trade unions, students groups, and various other organizations. 
Similar to the individual membership numbers, the number of affiliated organizations went up from 
267 in the mid-1970s to 1,291 in the late 1980s.99 
In Irwin’s analysis, this marked increase was not a product of the ‘inevitable consequence of 
preceding activism’ as much as an indication of the distinct transformations of Britain from the 
1960s (as related earlier in this chapter).100 Whereas Irwin stresses these predominantly 
domestically oriented factors, Christabel Gurney is mainly preoccupied with developments in South 
Africa in her account of the increase in support for the anti-apartheid cause. Although she similarly 
points to the policy course of the Thatcher administration, Gurney accentuates the growth of mass 
resistance as evidenced by the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 and the 
township insurrections in 1984-86 as a powerful stimulus for support of the AAM facilitated 
through coverage by the British media.101 
In addition to these factors, the implications of the organizational initiative of the AAM should not 
be discounted. Gradual awareness of and antagonism towards apartheid was generated by years of 
dissemination of information and extended campaigns. At the same time, it was a learning process 
for the AAM, which became more efficient at organizing campaigns, rallies, and events such as the 
‘Freedom at 70’ concert, which the movement may not have had the expertise nor the resources to 
execute during the formative years. While the mid- to late 1980s had seen an explosion in AAM 
membership numbers and general support for the movement, the release of Mandela in 1990 and the 
announcement by President De Klerk of the first democratic elections considerably weakened the 
sense of urgency that had sustained the anti-apartheid effort.102 While Mandela continued to appeal 
to the international community to retain most of the sanctions in place, it was becoming clear that 
the final part of the struggle was increasingly a matter for the South African liberation movements. 
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The recruitment of new members of the AAM fell to nearly zero in the early 1990s and the 
movement amassed a debt of £250,000.103 In 1994, the National Committee approved a proposal 
that the movement should continue its work on Southern Africa under the name ‘Action for 
Southern Africa’ (ACTSA). The membership and affiliations of the AAM were transferred to 
ACTSA, and focus would now rest more explicitly on anti-racism.104 
 
Anti-Apartheid Strategies and Campaigns 
For 35 years, the AAM had a clearly defined aim: the introduction of democracy in South Africa. 
Matters become complicated, however, when dissecting the strategies and methods deployed by the 
movement to help generate this political transformation. The AAM found itself engaging with the 
political establishment, struggling with mobilization efforts, and challenged by an often 
unsympathetic media, and the movement had to update and fine-tune its approach on a continuing 
basis. Already in 1983, Barber noted that the movement’s tactics continued to respond to ‘mood and 
circumstance.’105 He points to the organized demonstrations against rugby tourists in 1969-70 as an 
example of a campaign that was suitable for its time, to which I would add the ‘Freedom at 70’ 
concert that was held in the wake of other similar events such as Band Aid. Regardless of such 
successes, however, the AAM by no means found itself at the vanguard of public popularity at all 
times: a 1965 Gallup poll found that only 42 per cent of the British public believed that the non-
white population of South Africa should enjoy the same rights as the white population.106 A later 
British Gallup poll from October 1986 found that only 33 per cent was in favour of imposing 
sanctions against South Africa, a policy campaigned for by the AAM for more than two decades at 
this point.107 This section examines dimensions of anti-apartheid activism explicated in the three 
main social movement frameworks previously introduced, namely political opportunities, 
mobilizing structures, and framing processes. 
In order to identify more clearly the intended and actual effects of the strategies applied by the 
AAM, we can adopt a ‘mobilizing structures’ perspective by viewing the movement as an SMO and 
accentuating the importance of the London main office. Externally, the London office 
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communicated with South African liberation movements and anti-apartheid movements globally in 
addition to representatives from sympathetic organizations, the political establishment, or 
companies targeted by the AAM. Internally, the London office coordinated action between the local 
groups to ensure the success of its strategies through continuous mobilization efforts and concerted 
pressure. Despite the fact that local groups staged campaigns and events of their own, the London 
office stuck out the main lines along which activism within the movement was defined. The office 
disseminated briefings on the social implications of boycotting, for instance, as well as initiating 
nationwide operations. The central position of the office in an expansive network of information 
and activity meant that it was well disposed to formulate long-term strategies and it is conceivable 
that the campaign against Barclays could not have been sustained for almost two decades without 
centralized administration. 
A leaflet published by the AAM in 1962 divides the movement’s aims into two categories, the first 
of which is pressure on the elected officials. The government should ban arms sales to South Africa, 
vote for economic sanctions and a withdrawal of South Africa’s mandate over South West Africa 
(Namibia) at the United Nations, end bilateral trade agreements with the South African government, 
and finally assist the High Commission territories to ‘become outposts of freedom in Southern 
Africa.’108 The goals listed emphasize the need of a pluralist strategy and of a holistic perception of 
pressure tactics since the AAM was well aware that the banning of arms sales alone, for instance, 
would not be sufficient to change political power structures in South Africa. 
By drawing from the ‘political opportunities’ framework, we can identify the challenges faced by 
the AAM in terms of the confines afforded by the institutional political system. David Owen, who 
was Foreign Secretary from 1977-79, has acknowledged that anti-apartheid activism ‘brought 
matters to the attention of ministers and it helped to create a public opinion which politicians could 
not ignore. It was more effective if it was not too strident.’109 Despite early advances such as the 
exclusion of South Africa from the Commonwealth and most international sports activity, the close 
ties between the AAM and several Labour MPs failed to translate into substantial political results. 
Internationally, the movement enjoyed privileged access through the UN Special Committee against 
Apartheid yet countries such as the US, West Germany, and Britain itself continued to veto major 
sanctions initiatives. 
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The second part of the leaflet by the AAM affords guidelines for individual action and suggests that 
people should boycott South African products, ask the local Co-operative Society to purchase 
products from elsewhere and the local Council to enforce the boycott, support national and 
international trade union action, and finally raise funds for ‘victims of apartheid’ and political 
action.110 This diverse set of procedures allows for various levels of commitment by individuals: 
boycotting South African products, for instance, does not have to be particularly time-consuming 
whereas fundraising requires a more active effort. With very few full-time activists, it was 
important for the AAM to provide its supporters with options for participation that were compatible 
with other everyday routines. 
The AAM described its relationship to the media as ‘difficult and complex,’ and the movement had 
two principal media strategies: first, persuading the mainstream media to cover events in South 
Africa as well as British and international anti-apartheid efforts; second, producing publications that 
could be distributed through alternative channels.111 Håkan Thörn outlines advances in two areas 
that influenced the media strategy of the anti-apartheid activists: first, new national media spaces 
began to take form, which meant that local problems more frequently figured as national issues and 
that political identities were molded in new and alternate ways; second, a ‘visualized transnational 
media space’ emerged, which includes the considerable expansion of the tabloid readership and the 
proliferation of television sets.112 Thus, the approximately 10 million British television sets in 1960 
rose to 16 million in 1970.113 This globalizing media space is characterized as a ‘site of political 
struggle, where different political actors, through symbolic actions, are trying to influence 
opinions.’114 The use of boycotts by the AAM was deliberately symbolic and the movement’s 
production of posters and pamphlets announcing imminent boycott events was intended to attract 
attention to the anti-apartheid struggle. 
One of the most consistent strategies for publicity by the AAM was the dissemination of 
information about events in South Africa. With aid from external specialists and sources, the 
movement conducted research for campaigning purposes as well as for publications such as the 
early Boycott News. The first issue was published a month prior to the March month of boycott in 
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1960 and a year later it had sold 100,000 copies.115 The second issue bore the title ‘You can Fight 
Apartheid With Your Shopping Bag,’ which demonstrates the early significance of the boycott.116 
From 1965, Anti-Apartheid News, the successor of Boycott News, was published on an almost 
monthly basis and this newsletter was more ambitious in scope and it reached a larger audience. 
Christabel Gurney, editor of the Anti-Apartheid News from 1969-79, suggests that the publication 
was the ‘main propaganda vehicle of the AAM and that its role was to explain AAM policy and 
implement AAM strategy.’117 According to Genevieve Klein, the Anti-Apartheid News was useful 
within activist circles as it came to function as a point of guidance for much anti-apartheid 
activity.118 
The AAM was fundamentally distrustful of the ability of the mainstream media to report on the 
anti-apartheid cause in an unbiased manner. Part of this skepticism was rooted in cognizance of the 
clandestine effort by the South African authorities to influence the international media agenda in its 
favour. Since the introduction of the apartheid system in 1948, the relationship between the South 
African government and the international media had deteriorated, and after Sharpeville, P.J. Nel, the 
Director of Information, asserted that the ‘public opinion outside our country has reached a stage 
where it reacts to emotions and no longer to facts.’119 James Sanders explains how the government 
‘engaged in an extensive campaign of propaganda and disinformation in order to counter the work 
of the global anti-apartheid movements’ throughout the 1970s.120 Sanders’ characterization of this 
undertaking as a ‘war of representation’ hints at the irreconcilable opposition between the South 
African authorities and the anti-apartheid activists, as well as the significance attributed by both 
parties to symbolic achievements.121 Abdul Minty declared in response to this ‘war of 
representation’ that the South African government and its ‘allies spend millions of rand on their 
propaganda each year. We may not have the same resources at our disposal but we do have justice 
and truth on our side.’122 Even this statement, however, was a perpetuation of the representational 
struggle since the AAM deliberately framed information with the purpose of ensuring the public 
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transmission of the movement’s agendas.123 Thus, a letter from ELTSA to the AAM bluntly relates 
concerns pertaining to the depiction of the anti-apartheid cause: 
 
Our problem lies in the best way to get press attention, without using the usual image 
of ‘Black as Victim’. In the past we have tended to rely on a photogenic ‘gimmick’ 
and a few MPs (white and male), to attract the press. While we still hope to have our 
traditional supporters, we really want to branch out to make the photocalls and pickets 
more existing and definitely with more positive images.124 
 
British anti-apartheid groups – with the AAM at the forefront – were highly conscious of their 
representation of the struggle against apartheid, and they often walked the fine line, as indicated 
above, between victimization and empowerment. At the centre of the AAM’s media strategy was a 
power skirmish between the activists and their opponents, or what Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn 
Sikkink refer to as a pursuit of ‘moral leverage,’ which entails a ‘mobilization of shame’ and the 
exposure of opponents to the ‘bright light of international scrutiny.’125 The AAM sought to 
circumvent criticisms of bias by claiming credibility, an example of which is the title FACTS on a 
leaflet by the local Herefordshire AA Group.126 As with many activities by the AAM, however, a 
lack of methodical consistency meant that the movement expressed diverging signals; thus, a highly 
charged rhetoric was employed when stickers with the label ‘Contaminated with Apartheid’ were 
attached to products in the supermarkets.127 
Håkan Thörn and Sebastian Svenberg have recently conceptualized this contradiction in rhetoric as 
‘discursive ambivalence,’ which they perceive as a significant factor in the interpretation of 
collective action.128 This ambivalence may pertain to ‘observable conflicts between the movement 
and its opponents or within the movement; or to contradictions in movement practice.’129 I would 
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suggest that much of the discursive ambivalence of the media and publicity-oriented output of the 
AAM reflects, on the one hand, the movement’s internal structure with a vast number of semi-
autonomous local groups and, on the other hand, a conscious effort to adapt the movement’s 
rhetoric to the context and target in question. Irrespective of the strategy by the activists to appeal to 
a diverse audience, it should be noted – as argued by Beck – that the perceived legitimacy of social 
movements is dependent upon the credibility of the information they provide and the campaign 
material they disseminate.130 Thus, as important as defending itself in the ‘war of representation’ 
was to the AAM, it was vital for the movement to be recognized as trustworthy advocates of social 
justice; my analyses of the campaigns against Barclays and Shell elaborate on strategies for 
publicity and public standing. From the mid-1980s onwards, anti-apartheid activities began to 
attract more widespread publicity: a Gallup poll from 1960 found that 94 per cent were aware of the 
Sharpeville Massacre, while another poll from 1985 indicates that 90 per cent had heard or read 
about the Langa shootings.131 
In the 1980s, a more decidedly cultural turn in the approach of the AAM to mobilization 
materialized in the form of documentaries, novels, songs, concerts, music videos, T-shirts etc. 
Similar to the earlier rugby demonstrations, this tactic seems to have resonated with many people in 
the mid- to late 1980s, and I would suggest that appeals relating to people’s everyday lives were 
undeniably potent tools for anti-apartheid mobilization. Related to both culturally hinged 
representations of the anti-apartheid struggle and the often deliberately biased media strategy of the 
AAM is the ‘framing processes’ perspective, which problematizes the social movement strategies 
that can be used to fashion mutual understandings for purposes of mobilization and strategic 
pressure. Viewing the Anti-Apartheid News as a framing device facilitates a discussion of its efforts 
to reclaim and transform notions such as ‘apartheid’ and ‘constructive engagement’ into social 
constructs charged with specific connotations. Thus, the newsletter was an important mouthpiece 
for the AAM in its attempt to build a cohesive movement with shared perceptions and a ‘collective 
identity.’132 
The principal task for the AAM was to generate sustained support in ways that were not dependent 
upon the whims of the mainstream media. While the AAM organized a number of general boycotts 
of South African products over the years, Fieldhouse points out that the London office was better 
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equipped to conduct more specialized campaigns such as against single corporate targets or 
proposed parliamentary legislation.133 For the remainder of this section, I review some of the 
campaigns pursued by the AAM in order demonstrate the significance attributed to campaigning by 
the movement, as well as to set the scene for the analyses of the campaigns against Barclays and 
Shell in chapters three and four. 
One of the earliest campaigns was called ‘Pennies against Apartheid’, or ‘Penny Pledge,’ and it was 
set up in September 1960 partly to ensure financial contributions to the AAM. Local groups and 
individuals sold pledges at the price of a penny, or a little more, which allowed signatories to 
display their support for a boycott of South African products. Initially a fundraising effort, the 
campaign soon began to emphasize the benefits of boycotting in order to recreate the immense 
impact of the March month of boycott.134 The AAM argued that an additional purpose of the Penny 
Pledge campaign was to ‘follow up the encouragement given by the victory of South Africa’s 
exclusion from the Commonwealth.’135 The final motivation to conduct the campaign was specific 
to the AAM as an SMO since the campaign was intended to ‘provide a focus for the activities of 
local committees of the Anti-Apartheid Movement and supporting organizations.’136 
Another campaign was the ‘No Collaboration Campaign,’ which ran through most of the 
movement’s existence. Often appearing under synonymous headings, it was a broad campaign that 
sought to terminate British collaboration with the South African government. The campaign 
advocated state-based sanctions as well as individual and organizational boycotts, and at times, the 
activists made use of pledges similar to the Penny Pledge campaign. While in practice the boycott 
of South African products often meant boycotting retailers such as Tesco’s or Sainsbury’s, it was 
not until the campaign against Barclays that a single company became the focus of a distinct 
boycott campaign. 
A highly profiled campaign by the AAM was the consumer boycotts that targeted fruit from 
Outspan and Cape, which were mentioned already in the first edition of the Boycott News from 
1960. The boycott of fruit was the focus of much AAM activity in the first half of the 1960s when 
around 57 local councils refused to purchase South African products. Britain was the largest buyer 
of South African fruit at the time and the location of the headquarters of Outspan in London made 
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this a practical target for a boycott campaign. Similar to the campaign against Shell, the AAM 
collaborated with Dutch anti-apartheid activists in the boycott of fruit. In the late 1980s, the AAM 
conducted another large-scale campaign against Outspan called ‘Operation Orange,’ urging activists 
to send a message to Thatcher on 26 June 1989 (South Africa Freedom Day) that stated: 
‘OUTSPAN – this product funds apartheid.’137 This statement was printed on 250,000 cardboard 
oranges that were distributed around Britain.138 Much of the imagery used in the fruit boycotts 
carried violent undertones and one poster was seen as particularly controversial due to its depiction 
of the head of a black South African being squeezed like an orange. A leaflet by the Herefordshire 
AA Group entitled ‘Please don’t buy that blood orange’ explains that ‘anyone who has watched the 
news recently will know that it is no exaggeration to say there is blood on South African 
products.’139 
While the AAM had campaign on behalf of political prisoners since the early 1960s, it was not until 
the 1980s that the campaign to free Mandela caught hold of the public interest in Britain. The AAM 
used alternative tactics such as distributing a film entitled ‘Portrait of Nelson Mandela,’ organizing 
a number of exhibitions, and putting together the highly popular Freedom at 70 concerts in 1988.140 
From a strategic social movement viewpoint, the campaign for political prisoners engaged with and 
operationalized common perceptions of injustice for mobilization purposes, which corresponds to 
the persuasive power of a justice-based rhetoric explicated in Young’s social connection model. 
Similar to the forward-looking characteristics of the social connection model, the use of platforms 
such as popular music with a positive spin (the ‘Freedom at 70’ concerts) informed people of their 
ability to hasten the release of Mandela rather than emphasizing the structural links of British 
colonialism or the complicity of individuals in the perpetuation of apartheid policies through 
consumption practices. 
As previously indicated, a recurrent feature of the strategies and campaigns of the AAM was the 
effort to tap into pertinent concerns among the movement’s supporters and the wider public. As 
Christabel Gurney notes: 
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The AAM turned the multiplicity of British links with South Africa into a weapon 
against apartheid by challenging them at every level. Its campaigns were framed in 
such a way that everyone was faced with choices in their personal, social and working 
lives: whether to buy South African oranges; bank with Barclays; fill up with petrol at 
a Shell garage; question their pension fund’s investment policy; or challenge their 
employer’s use of contractors with interests in South Africa.141 
 
At the centre of the campaigns, in other words, was the resolve to politicize seemingly non-political 
arenas. As explicated in the social connection model, all links between British consumers and the 
South African government can be perceived in terms of social structures that implicate the actors 
involved in a chain of responsibility. A coupling of these exposed links with the unintended 
negative side-effects of corporate conduct identified in the framework of passive subpolitics enables 
us to identify the political subtext of, for instance, oranges imported from apartheid South Africa. 
Having established the purchase of products and services by companies with South African 
affiliations as politically charged, the active subpolitical strategies discussed in this section act as 
countermeasures intended to remedy what Gurney refers to as the ‘multiplicity of British links with 
South Africa.’142 Thus, anti-apartheid boycott campaigns should be seen as a response to the 
already politicized private sector rather than a politicization of this sphere. 
 
Anti-Apartheid Surrogate Boycotting 
The names of the precursors to the AAM – the Boycott Committee and the Boycott Movement – are 
indications of the central role afforded to the boycott tactic by the anti-apartheid activists. Yet 
already in the early days of British anti-apartheid activism, the Committee stated that ‘the boycott in 
this country is essentially a gesture… No-one imagines this boycott will bring an unjust and 
detested system swiftly to an end.’143 From the onset, the boycott was thus primarily used as a tool 
for mobilization and for its symbolic value in attracting publicity and exerting pressure on the 
boycott targets. The AAM proposed that the boycott tactic ‘should be seen within the context of 
calls for the total isolation of apartheid in all its international aspects – economic, diplomatic, 
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military, sporting, cultural – which are made by the leaders of the struggling black people of South 
Africa.’144 The consumer boycott continued to figure substantially in the action repertoire of the 
AAM and as part of the movement’s wider strategies where it was often employed in combination 
with other forms of pressure.145 The remainder of this chapter examines the choice of surrogate 
boycotting as a tactic by the anti-apartheid activists and the implications of targeting companies 
operating in South Africa. In extension of previous discussions on social structures and cross-border 
activity, the surrogate boycott is conceived as a transnational subpolitical strategy that aims to effect 
change in South Africa through activity in Britain by factoring in broader societal developments 
such as the advances of economic globalization. 
When the AAM first attracted media attention for the use of boycotting in the spring of 1960, the 
tactic was widely praised as a sensible way of protesting against apartheid within the confines of the 
law. Only a few newspapers regarded the movement’s boycott tactic as controversial: The Times, 
for instance, ran an editorial under the heading ‘A Tradition Abused.’146 In Fieldhouse’s view, the 
symbolic use of the boycott exhibits self-awareness by the AAM since the movement was neither 
sufficiently well-organized nor did it have the membership numbers to sustain a long-term effective 
consumer boycott; hence, the activists quickly began to stress the need for additional state-based 
sanctions. With regular intervals, however, the AAM relaunched the broad consumer boycott that 
had proved so effective in 1960 in terms of publicity. In 1974, for instance, the movement appealed 
to youth groups, trade unions, the UN, church groups etc. to collaborate on a consumer boycott in 
commemoration of the fourteenth anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre; this campaign lasted 
three months.147 Six years later, another consumer boycott was organized, followed by yet another 
the year after. In 1984-85, the AAM launched large-scale consumer boycotts in response to the 
uprisings in many South African townships as well as to mark the movement’s 25th anniversary. 
By 1986, the AAM was building its consumer boycott strategy on two focus areas: first, the 
activists called out companies that had failed to respond to anti-apartheid demands to sever links to 
South Africa; second, the activists maintained pressure on the companies that had pledged support 
for the anti-apartheid cause without making any actual changes in company policy.148 Local groups 
such as the Sheffield AAM also built up networks of ‘apartheid free’ shops that abstained from 
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selling South African products, which simplified everyday shopping for those committed to the 
boycott. Thus, the St. Paul’s Community Association in Bristol declared that it would ‘not stock 
any South African goods on our shelves nor will we do so until the people of South Africa are 
free.’149 
According to a leaflet by the AAM, three motives can justify a consumer boycott; first, the tactic 
can be selected ‘on personal grounds, prompted by one’s own conscience, without worrying about 
the consequences.’150 In moral philosophy, this would be characterized as a deontological approach, 
which is recurrent in much anti-apartheid campaign material. Thus, a leaflet from 1965 asks: ‘You 
hate racialism? What can you do?’151 The solution provided is to boycott South African products, 
join the AAM, and read and distribute the Anti-Apartheid News.152 This motive for boycott 
engagement emphasizes the participatory implications for the individual activist, as elaborated in 
the suggestion by William H. Shaw that boycotting can be viewed as a ‘moral or political gesture 
that is entirely personal, not something which others are required to do, nor even something which 
they particularly want others to imitate.’153 
The second justification for a consumer boycott pertains to the ‘objective, by inflicting economic 
injury, of exercising influence in the desired direction.’154 In contrast to deontology, this influence-
oriented rationalization is considered a teleological or consequentialist approach. From this 
perspective, the surrogate boycott is viewed as a leverage-based mechanism for effecting socio-
political change in South Africa. Gauging the economic impact of the boycott is notoriously 
difficult, however, on account of its abstentious character. 
The final justification promotes an understanding of consumer products as symbolic and stimulates 
activists to ‘seize it as a starting point for influencing the public opinion in the European countries 
and in South Africa itself.’155 Here, the boycott is assessed neither in terms of its significance to the 
individual nor on its impact on the target company. Instead, it is observed as a manifestation of 
resistance towards South African apartheid policies as well as perceived British complicity in such 
policies. The intention was to use the boycott prefiguratively in order to signify public support for 
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sanctions, which the AAM believed was a necessary measure in the international struggle against 
apartheid. The activists’ own analysis of the motives for justifying a consumer boycott concludes 
that ‘in all three cases, one hits a pillar of the support which South Africa gets from Europe.’156 
By encouraging three different approaches to boycotting, the AAM displays a flexible conception of 
anti-apartheid activism that indicates a diversified internal organization and that facilitates 
individual reflection on boycott participation. While individual engagement is a fundamental 
component in anti-apartheid activism, my analyses of the campaigns against Barclays and Shell 
emphasize the signals made possible through structured collective efforts. An isolated act of 
boycotting is essentially mute yet sustained campaigning orchestrated by an SMO enables the 
movement to issue unified statements on behalf of the boycotters. In the case of anti-apartheid 
activism, individual boycotting was largely ‘shaped by the tactical repertoire and by the public 
framing of collective campaigns,’ as previously discussed in relation to political consumerism.157 
Thus, the surrogate boycott campaigns conducted by the AAM arguably exemplify Mathur’s 
conception of political consumerism as an ‘antidote to the individualization of politics.’158 An 
additional benefit for the movement is the function of the boycott as an equalizer that juxtaposes the 
different clusters of anti-apartheid activists in their mutual effort to target companies operating in 
South Africa. 
Related to the motivations for boycotting outlined above is what Friedman refers to as ‘the criterion 
problem,’ which makes a distinction between ‘execution’ and ‘consequence’ criteria.159 While the 
organization of a boycott campaign may be successful, the target company is not necessarily moved 
to comply with the activists’ demands. Equally, a campaign may fail to mobilize a satisfactory 
amount of participants yet the target company may still – due to related or unrelated reasons – 
choose to adopt the changes in policies demanded by the activists.160 While the AAM was quick to 
proclaim its perceived boycott successes, the target companies often disputed such claims. Thus, an 
article by Ray Joseph in The Times recounts the response of some business-owners to the relaunch 
of the consumer boycott: ‘We’ll carry on as normal. This boycott has existed for many years and 
has had no real effect.’161 The criterion problem elucidates a crucial complication in my assessment 
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of the campaigns against Barclays and Shell, and the tension between intention and outcome is 
further addressed in chapters three and four. 
In extension of reflections on the motivation for boycotting are the criteria by which specific 
companies were targeted. A 1975 brief by the AAM  entitled ‘Some Thoughts on Consumer 
Boycotts and South Africa’ addresses a number of considerations that ought to factor in the 
selection of boycott targets: first, the products involved should be purchased by many people on a 
regular basis; second, alternatives in terms of both quality and price should be available; third, the 
target company should ideally have contracts or links with the South African government, which 
would further justify a boycott; the fourth and fifth points caution against targeting companies 
encompassing more than three brands, which would complicate a clear message; finally, it is argued 
that the ‘sacrifice’ committed to by the boycotter correlates with the price of the product or service 
in question.162 This list of criteria attributes significance to the public opinion, strategic 
considerations on the target company, and accessibility for the individual boycotter, which indicates 
that the AAM was cognizant of the benefits of a holistic approach to boycotting that incorporates 
both micro- and macro-level concerns. 
Part of the company-oriented aspect of the boycott strategy of the AAM included compiling 
information on the British companies in collaboration with organizations such as the Haslemere 
Group and ELTSA. Used by the activists to select boycott targets, the aim of these records was to 
disclose the extent of the companies’ involvement in South Africa and the practicalities involved in 
boycotting particular companies. An additional concern was identifying companies and industries 
that would appeal as boycott targets to diverse segments of anti-apartheid activists. The collected 
information was disseminated in leaflets, briefings etc., and by the late 1980s the AAM updated its 
list of companies three times annually.163 Prior to launching a consumer boycott, the AAM usually 
wrote shops and other companies to persuade them not to stock South African products and to sever 
all links with South Africa. Most companies contacted by the AAM expressed criticism of the 
apartheid system yet they would not engage in further discussion with the activists. A substantial 
number of companies responded by referencing the amorality of imposing restrictions on the 
consumer such as the argument by Colchester & East Essex Co-operative Society Limited that 
‘there must be no interference with the free choice of the consumer. Censorship should not be 
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applied which would interfere or aggravate the freedom of choice.’164 The perceived interference 
with the freedom of choice explicated in this argument is, I would argue, not dissimilar to the 
‘interference’ made by the companies in their selection of products made available to the 
consumers; chapter two elaborates on the related discussion on the infusion of social responsibility 
into corporate policy-making. 
The counter-response by the activists was that prioritizing the free choice of the consumer above 
economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa requires transparency in terms of the country of 
origin of the products available. Shula Marks explains a commonly used tactic among boycotters: 
‘You would go into a shop to buy oranges and you’d say “Where are these from?” knowing that 
they were South African. “Oh! South African, no thank you.”’165 This was a subtle and non-
confrontational way of informing the shops about the popular support for a consumer boycott of 
South African products. If the products bear no marker of origin, however, the consumers’ ability to 
opt out of South African products is severely impeded. A customer letter to the manager of Tyler’s 
Food and Wine explains that a member of staff was seen ‘filling a shelf marked “French” with Cape 
pears.’166 When the customer inquired about this, she was told that as ‘no-one would buy South 
African’ produce it was normally labeled as French.167 A number of letters obtained by the AAM 
attest to the prevalence of this practice and the movement urged people to report on instances of 
mislabeling.168 Similar cases are found in other countries such as in Denmark where the anti-
apartheid group Landskomiteen Sydafrika-Aktion claimed responsibility for a revision of the 
Danish law on declaration, which began to penalize ‘false declaration of goods’ more heavily from 
the late 1970s.169 
In Britain, the former Merchandise Marks law was replaced by the Trade Descriptions Act 1968, 
which was supplemented by the Trade Descriptions Act 1972. These acts sought to minimize 
confusion about the origin of imported products. During deliberations within the EEC about ending 
mandatory marking of country of origin in the mid-1980s, the AAM corresponded with the 
Consumer Affairs Branch of the British Department of Trade and Industry to lobby for the rejection 
of such legislation. In 1985, the Consumer Affairs Branch explained to the AAM that an ‘essential 
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part of consumer sovereignty is the right to join boycott campaigns to exercise pressure on 
manufacturers, retailers or countries. […] Country of origin marking is essential for them to be able 
to exercise this choice.’170 Despite this support, 1988 saw the revocation of the Trade Descriptions 
Act 1972. The AAM noted in response that the only way for boycotters to circumvent this was to 
boycott all the products of companies or shops known to have some connection to South Africa as 
opposed to merely boycotting the product in question.171 The movement also acknowledged that 
such indiscriminate measures would ‘unjustifiably affect firms and products for the sake of 
complying with EEC directives.’172 This double-edged quality of boycotting is reflected in the 
suggestion by Dietlind Stolle and Michele Micheletti that political consumerism may threaten the 
‘livelihood of workers in targeted firms.’173 My analyses of the campaigns against Barclays and 
Shell elaborate on similar problematic aspects of the surrogate boycott tactic. 
The inclusion of the political developments outlined above conveys the practical obstacles and 
ethical dilemmas faced by the AAM in their effort to conduct consumer boycotts. Both the case of 
deliberate mislabeling and the overturning of the requirement for imported goods to be origin-
marked can be tied to Beck’s view that ‘trust becomes central’ as part of the process of reflexive 
modernization since the extension of the anti-apartheid activists’ concerns beyond prices anticipated 
demands for greater degrees of corporate transparency and accountability.174 Observed from an 
anti-apartheid perspective, both cases signify the emerging conflict between what Beck refers to as 
the ‘old industrial scenario’ and the insights of the activists prompted by the unintended side-effects 
of corporate conduct within the context of developing processes of globalization.175 The mislabeling 
of South African products obscured the potential for political consumerist efforts and the legislation 
eliminating the requirement for origin-marking furthered distrust among the activists in the 
legitimacy of the institutional political system that characterizes the onset of reflexive 
modernization. 
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Part of the reasoning for promoting surrogate consumer boycott campaigns was the expectation by 
the AAM that the boycotted product would prompt a series of questions with consumers that would 
ultimately ‘contribute to a more questioning attitude amongst the population as a whole as to the 
desirability of contact with apartheid as such, represented here through the particular South African 
good in question.’176 This conception of boycotting is emblematic of Beck’s assertion that the ‘how’ 
of corporate conduct is politicized until the point when it begins to function as a catalyst for CSR.177 
This ‘how’ is not only directed at transnational corporations and political institutions but also 
inwards in the form of identity-related reflections. Thus, a debate within the AAM on the 
organization of a boycott campaign against the oil industry prompted the concern that to ‘tackle one 
of these companies means tackling issue of non-automotive lifestyle maybe.’178 
It is evident that the AAM consciously imbued the boycott with qualities that went beyond the 
economic impact of the act itself. Often employing politically charged rhetoric, the activists claimed 
that ‘by boycotting products of apartheid we are casting a vote against British collaboration and for 
sanctions.’179 By the end of 1988, a motion submitted by the AAM London Committee at the AGM 
of the AAM contended that ‘boycott action has already deprived the apartheid state of millions of 
pounds otherwise available for its war crimes.’180 By accentuating the role of foreign-owned 
companies in South Africa, the surrogate consumer boycott helped foster awareness about the 
implications of the social structures inhabited by ordinary citizens and the extent of the social 
responsibilities of the companies involved. According to Mike Terry from the AAM, there was a 
‘sense to which we saw ourselves as being in a kind of combat with big business, but not because 
we were against big business, but because that was the logic of the facts that we had.’181 Chapter 
two details the effort by the AAM to influence corporate agendas and elaborates on the dialectical 
relationship between the two kinds of actors. 
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Conclusion 
The overview of social movement research in the first section of this chapter qualifies an 
organizational approach to the AAM, which facilitates my juxtaposition of the movement with its 
targeted companies in later chapters. The brief history of the AAM in section two expands on the 
development of the movement; this section is mirrored in the historical overviews of Barclays and 
Shell in South Africa in chapters three and four. Also, section two addresses the necessity of 
pursuing action outside of the political system as conveyed by Ethel de Keyser, Executive Secretary 
of the AAM from 1965-1974, when she suggests that in terms of political lobbying she ‘can’t really 
say that we had a huge influence on government… I don’t think we moved governments.’182 
Underpinning the intent of the third section is the assumption that my subsequent analyses of the 
consumer boycott campaigns benefit from insight into previous and parallel anti-apartheid 
activities. My emphasis on a holistic view on the efforts by the AAM is reflective of the contention 
by Sarah A. Soule that ‘we should begin to think about the sequencing of tactics and how some 
tactics may actually impact the emergence and success of others.’183 The concentration on surrogate 
boycotting in the final section is more directly applicable to the campaigns against Barclays and 
Shell, and it serves as a transition to chapter two, which examines the relationship between anti-
apartheid activists and companies involved in apartheid South Africa. 
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Chapter 2: Foreign-Owned Companies in South Africa 
 
Beyond socio-political developments in Britain and South Africa and persistent efforts by the 
AAM, the success of the anti-apartheid consumer boycott campaigns was dependent upon the target 
companies’ response strategy and willingness to engage in dialogue. Little precedent had been set in 
terms of productive interaction between social movements and transnational corporations, and the 
campaigns against Barclays and Shell can be conceived as test sites for the promotion of social 
responsibility concerns through consumer boycott activism. 
This chapter begins with an overview of the conceptual development of CSR before linking this 
notion to the operations of foreign-owned companies in apartheid South Africa. Revisiting the 
discussions of anti-apartheid activism in chapter one, I proceed to address the impact of social 
movement activism on corporate targets with special emphasis on the expansion of CSR programs. 
Finally, in order to contextualize the involvement of Barclays and Shell in South Africa, I include 
decisions and statements from other foreign investors and expound on the incipient regulations of 
transnational corporations in the form of codes of conduct. 
 
Conceptual History of CSR 
Already in the 1920s, the US Chamber of Commerce Committee on Business Ethics identified a 
responsibility for companies beyond its shareholders: it should also pertain to ‘employees, to the 
public which they serve, and even to their competitors.’1 Until the 1950s, most discussion on CSR 
was concerned with the perception of companies as social institutions and the impact that these 
might have on consumers and citizens within national borders.2 Howard R. Bowen’s standard-
setting definition from 1953 suggests that CSR concerns the ‘obligations of businessmen to pursue 
those policies, to make those decisions, or to follow those lines of action which are desirable in 
terms of the objectives and values of our society.’3 At the time, companies tended to perceive of 
their responsibility in terms of either philanthropy or involvement in community affairs, both of 
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which were often detached from the core business of the company. When many corporations 
expanded and attained more influence during the decades following the Second World War, the 
central concern among legal scholars became ‘who should control the vast economic, political, and 
social power of these large and powerful wealth-generating machines and how that power should be 
restrained.’4 From the 1960s onwards, the literature on CSR grew extensively and ideas about how 
companies’ social responsibility could become part of a style of management began to develop. 
This heightened academic interest in CSR coincided with the emergence of a vast number of 
socially oriented organizations and new social movements (as discussed in chapter one), many of 
whom focused on what they perceived to be the unethical conduct of companies. 
As the field drew more attention, the benefits and negative impacts of CSR began to form the basis 
of serious discussion. One of the most prominent early voices to reject the idea of a social 
responsibility for companies was the economist and Nobel Prize recipient Milton Friedman whose 
1970 article in The New York Times Magazine entitled The Social Responsibility of Business is to 
Increase its Profits generated much debate. In the article, Friedman questions the ethical foundation 
of CSR when he asks: ‘What does it mean to say that “business” has responsibilities? Only people 
have responsibilities. A corporation is an artificial person and in this sense may have artificial 
responsibilities, but “business” as a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in this vague 
sense.’5 While the reference to corporate personhood plays into another long-standing legal debate 
in the US, the gist of Friedman’s understanding is that companies have no legal responsibilities 
beyond those of individuals. He stresses this point by stating that ‘society is a collection of 
individuals and of the various groups they voluntarily form.’6 Friedman and other critics of CSR 
argue that since a company’s primary responsibility is to maximize shareholder value, a deliberate 
decrease in this value due to – for instance – socially responsible investment (SRI) essentially 
means that the company has failed its responsibility.7 
Over the past few decades, this critique of CSR has been met with the argument that companies 
have responsibilities not only towards their shareholders but also towards their ‘stakeholders,’ 
whom would include the various groups and individuals that are in any way affected by company 
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conduct and policies.8 The term first appeared in the early 1960s as a deliberate play on 
‘stockholder’ and it originally covered shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers, and lenders, 
in addition to a vague conception of ‘society.’9 Not until R. Edward Freeman’s Strategic 
Management (1984), however, did the stakeholder concept begin to attract serious attention.10 
Freeman defined the stakeholder as ‘any group or individual who can affect, or is affected by, the 
achievement of a corporation’s purpose.’11 While a comparatively concise definition, I would 
suggest that reference to a company’s ‘purpose’ requires further clarification before serving as a 
workable tool for analysis. Max Clarkson has recently elaborated on the concept by distinguishing 
between voluntary stakeholders that include shareholders, investors etc., and involuntary 
stakeholders that denote ‘those that are, or may be, exposed unknowingly to risk and thus be 
harmed, or benefitted, as a consequence of the corporation’s activities.’12 
Following Clarkson’s emphasis on the consequences of company activities, it is possible to 
conceptualize involuntary stakeholders as those affected by a company’s passive subpolitics. In the 
context of this dissertation, such victims of corporate activity might include the non-white 
population of South Africa who were affected by, for instance, Shell’s supply of oil to the South 
African government used as fuel for military vehicles. Despite the fact that British anti-apartheid 
activists were not affected in the same sense, they could be classified as stakeholders in two ways: 
first, as customers and voluntary stakeholders of Barclays and Shell they would be making financial 
contributions to the company’s operations; second, as British citizens their public amenities would 
be financed in part by tax contributions from Barclays and Shell. In this case, the activists would be 
involuntary stakeholders. Employing a stakeholder perspective on CSR, then, allows for an 
analytical alignment of the interests of the activists and the operations of British-owned companies 
in South Africa. Thus, stakeholder management seeks to ‘systematically address the question of 
which stakeholders do and do not deserve or require management attention through evaluation of 
relationships between organizations and stakeholders based on exchange transactions, power 
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dependencies, and legitimacy, or other claims.’13 While I maintain that the conceptual framework 
outlined in the introduction to this dissertation is better suited for discussions about the motivation 
behind anti-apartheid activism and the interaction between activists and companies, the fact that 
some management theory corroborates my sociologically determined understanding of the 
relationship between the two actors substantiates my characterization of this relationship. 
In terms of the development of CSR from the late 1970s onwards, Segerlund identifies two catalytic 
events that represent the ‘emergence of new issues and actors:’ the anti-apartheid campaigns and the 
boycott of Nestlé.14 Parallel to the Barclays campaign – and similar in many respects – was the 
controversy concerning infant formula in developing countries and the related boycott campaign 
against Nestlé. This controversy began in 1970 when a perceived connection between bottle-feeding 
and infant mortality was articulated, eventually precipitating a campaign that ran until 1984. Critics 
of Nestlé’s practices pointed to how infant formula does not provide the same ‘immunological 
properties’ as breast-milk and that bottle-feeding might cause non-lactation.15 Furthermore, many 
poor families in developing countries were compelled to further dilute the formula to make it last 
longer and to mix it with contaminated water which poses an additional health risk to the baby. At 
first, the critique was aimed at the industry yet from around 1973 Nestlé was singled out as the 
frontrunner within the field of infant nutrition research.16 In 1974, War on Want published the 
pamphlet The Baby Killer, which was taken up and translated into German by a Swiss group that 
modified the title to Nestlé Kills Babies. Nestlé consequently sued for libel and while the company 
won the case, Tehila Sasson argues that the ‘suit cost the company its public image.’17 Spearheaded 
by the Infant Formula Action Coalition (INFACT), the boycott began on 4 July 1977.18 Two years 
later, the World Health Organization (WHO) and UNICEF engaged in a collective effort to draft an 
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes for nation-states and this was passed by 
the WHO in 1981. The same year, Nestlé responded to the boycott campaign and international 
pressure by establishing the Nestlé Coordination Center for Nutrition, Inc. (NCCN). NCCN sought 
to end the ‘unproductive shouting match with Nestlé’s critics’ and began to take heed of the 
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activists’ views and gather information.19 In 1984, the international boycott of the company was put 
to a halt when the campaigners acknowledged Nestlé’s compliance with the WHO code.20 
There are several similarities between the Nestlé and the British anti-apartheid campaigns such as 
the strong support from church-affiliated groups; the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility, 
for instance, played a significant role in both instances. From a strategic point of view, the 
campaigns also ‘fused development and humanitarian discourse with consumer activism.’21 Both 
groups of activists saw political consumerism or, more specifically, the boycott as an outlet for 
articulating protest and a mechanism for effecting change through pressuring companies. Shortly 
after the end of the campaign against Nestlé, Raphael Pagan Jr., who led the NCCN and thus 
Nestlé’s counter-boycott strategies, pointed to two lessons learned: the first was that companies not 
only face financial issues but to an increasing extent sociopolitical issues. The second lesson was 
that companies that engage in sociopolitical issues may in fact become ‘as dynamic and assertive in 
shaping its political environment as it is in shaping its financial and marketing environment.’22 
These reflections suggest that CSR was still, by the mid-1980s, not a widely recognized concept 
and that most major disputes concerning the social responsibility of companies were likely to set 
examples. 
My juxtaposition of these campaigns with the boycott against Nestlé serves to demonstrate that 
Barclays and Shell’s reactions were not unique but rather symptomatic of contemporary corporate 
attitudes to CSR. In studying these reactions, we should thus not merely interpret the AAM’s use of 
large-scale surrogate boycotts as an unusual tactic but instead consider the very connection between 
business and ethics as a novel phenomenon.23 I would argue that this approach most aptly conveys 
the prevailing attitude within the private sector at the time, which in turn provides nuance to my 
analyses of the campaigns against Barclays and Shell. I also want to emphasize the fact that while 
CSR today is often associated with workplace conditions etc., the ultimate aim of the anti-apartheid 
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drive for increased social responsibilities among companies was the introduction of democracy in 
South Africa. 
A series of CSR-related initiatives began to emerge from the early 1980s such as the Ethical 
Investment Research Service (EIRIS), which aims to promote a broader understanding of CSR.24 
The first international business initiatives were established in the late 1980s with the formation of 
the Caux Round Table group and the Social Venture Network, and these were followed by multi-
stakeholder monitoring schemes.25 Finally, CSR has seen a marked increase in public, academic and 
corporate attention since the 1990s. During this period, branding has become increasingly important 
to large transnational corporations, particularly those that are not based on a ‘business-to-business’ 
model but whose products or services require consumer interaction.26 A company’s brand is also 
referred to as a kind of ‘corporate identity’ and maintaining this identity is a way to legitimize the 
company’s activities in the eyes of the public.27 The stronger emphasis on corporate identity 
developed simultaneous to the emergence of the anti-apartheid movement and its campaigns against 
Barclays and Shell. Demonstrating the relation between social movements and companies, King 
suggests that the increased preoccupation with brand and corporate identity instigated the explosion 
in boycotts, which meant that this tactic might have become more than four times as likely during 
the years from 1985-1993.28 Boycotting, as we have seen, may involve viewing the target company 
as a moral actor and this was considerably easier as the corporate domain – in addition to broad 
sections of the public – gradually began to appreciate the notions of branding, corporate identity, 
and CSR. A clear progression can be discerned: less than half of the Fortune 500 companies 
mentioned CSR in their annual reports in 1977, while by the end of the 1990s nearly 90 per cent of 
them did.29 
The purpose of this review of the conceptual history of CSR has been, first, to trace transformations 
in the perception and acceptance within the academic community and the private sector of social 
responsibilities for companies. The second aim of this review has been to identify key aspects 
within the framework of CSR from which the ensuing discussion will extend. I have indicated that 
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anti-apartheid activism functioned as a catalyst for CSR; in the following section, I elaborate on this 
assertion. 
 
Anti-Apartheid Activism as a Catalyst for CSR 
Anthony Giddens proposes that ‘social movements have their own reflective engagement with the 
organizations they confront and the institutions they set out to alter.’30 Recent literature examining 
the impact of social movement activities on companies emphasizes the idea that CSR developed 
partly ‘as a result of efforts by various social actors to monitor and control the consequences of 
corporate and economic activities.’31 My discussions of the campaigns against Barclays and Shell 
are guided by similar reflections. Based on an examination of British anti-apartheid activism, N. 
Craig Smith infers that the early stages of CSR should not be defined in the abstract but rather 
within the more concrete frame of conflict resolution.32 Gay Seidman perpetuates this observation 
when she cites a journalist suggesting that the effectiveness of the anti-apartheid effort to compel 
companies to take an ethical stance was ‘based on Milton Friedman’s classic model of social 
responsibility, whereby external pressures on a corporation defined its societal obligations, not the 
moral instincts arising from within.’33 Companies that pay little attention to their social 
responsibilities, in other words, tend to adopt or expand their CSR programs as an effect of external 
pressure rather than altruistic concerns. The problem, Yaziji and Doh suggest, is that interaction 
between companies and activists is ‘more likely to occur in the more advanced stages of developing 
CSR policies and that companies in earlier stages are less equipped to take on the challenges 
associated with close collaborations.’34 In the following, I engage with this paradoxical narrative 
relating to the idea of activism as a catalyst for CSR and situate it within the context of anti-
apartheid campaigning. 
During the 1970s, several scholars within the field began to shift their focus from the ethical 
dimensions of CSR to the dynamic processes behind CSR as a response, or what William C. 
                                                          
30 Bryant and Jary, Giddens’ Theory of Structuration A Critical Appreciation, 220. 
31 Tsutsui and Lim, Corporate Social Responsibility in a Globalizing World, 3; see also Soule and King, “Markets, 
Business, and Social Movements.” 
32 Paper by Dr. N. Craig Smith from 1987 entitled “A Strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility: The Case of the 
Withdrawal from South Africa of Barclays Bank:” Bod.MSS.AAM 1617. 
33 Seidman, “Monitoring Multinationals: Lessons from the Anti-Apartheid Era,” 392. 
34 Yaziji and Doh, NGOs and Corporations: Conflict and Collaboration, 125. 
73 
 
Frederick characterizes as ‘corporate social responsiveness’ or CSR2.35 With the introduction of 
CSR2, he argues in a 1978 paper, the original question of whether companies had any social 
responsibilities is assumed to have been affirmed. In its place, the question of how companies 
address their social responsibilities emerges.36 More concretely, Frederick proposes that ‘social 
responsiveness means the ability to manage the company’s relations with various social groups.’37 
Despite early academic consideration of this aspect of CSR, the study of the interaction between 
companies and activists remained a niche area of research throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. In 
1993, James Jasper and Jane Poulsen revived this approach by emphasizing the strategic responses 
of target companies to social movement boycotts.38 Others have engaged in similar research from 
different theoretical perspectives such as field theory and game theories of behavior as well as 
overall interest in the interaction between companies and activists has increased in recent years.39 
McDonnell, King and Soule note that most studies characterize this relation as a direct correlation 
between the pressure of a social movement or activist group and its impact on the target company. 
Alternatively, their findings ‘suggest that activism and increased corporate social responsibility 
reinforce one another through a feedback cycle of activist activity and increased receptivity to 
activists.’40 I elaborate on this perspective in my examination of the boycott campaign against Shell. 
A central aspect of the interaction between social movements and companies that has attracted a 
substantial amount of academic attention in recent years is the idea of corporate legitimacy. Joost 
Luyckx and Maddy Janssens even propose attributing the escalating CSR commitment of many 
transnational corporations in recent years to the ‘legitimation process’ transpiring over the past few 
decades.41 Writing in 1993, Brenda Sutton suggested that the ‘modern business corporation is 
generally perceived to be legitimate because it appears to fulfill its implicit contract with the public: 
to produce the goods, services, and utilities needed for the provisioning and prosperity of society.’42 
So far, she added, the ‘social role of corporations has not really been a topic of open public 
debate.’43 I agree with this assessment in the sense that it was previously not expected of 
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transnational corporations to have extensive CSR programs. Also, while I include examples from 
the public debate in the form of, for instance, newspaper articles from the mid-1980s on Barclays’ 
disinvestment and the implications of this decision for the bank’s social responsibility, such 
sporadic interest in the topic does not qualify as sustained debate that anchors the concept within the 
public imagination. In fact, part of my analyses in chapters three and four rests on the understanding 
that CSR was not yet an established feature of the business platform of transnational corporations, 
and it is precisely the expectation gap between the activists and companies that I seek to explore.44 
Expanding on her conception of corporate legitimacy, Sutton proposes that, the ‘normative 
endowment of power which corporations enjoy […] has reached a kind of conceptual impasse; it is 
becoming increasingly necessary to redefine and reexamine the implications of that power in 
contraposition with fundamental changes in systems, interrelationships, and values.45 Sutton here 
anticipates the following decades of conceptual development of corporate legitimacy. I would argue 
that an emphasis on the socially constructed dimension allows us to further view corporate 
legitimacy as a ‘result of communication where the societal limits on business are continuously 
defined and redefined.’46 This conception of the legitimation process as essentially discursive 
underpins my analysis of the interaction between the anti-apartheid activists and Barclays and 
Shell.47 
Luyckx and Janssens provide nuance to the notion of ‘discursive legitimation’ by subdividing it into 
‘discursive antagonism’ and ‘discursive co-optation.’48 The first of these seeks to maintain a sense 
of legitimacy through dispute, confrontation, and repudiation of criticism. To counter an emerging 
controversy, they argue, this strategy ‘primarily denies the critique and discredits the criticism and 
its advocates, hereby reproducing, even reinforcing existing hostilities with opponents.’49 As 
demonstrated in chapters three and four, both the activists and their boycott targets became involved 
in discursive antagonism as part of an effort to win the sympathy of the public and the ‘war of 
representation.’ Discursive co-optation, conversely, concerns engagement with criticism by 
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‘strategically appropriating previous opponents’ in order to offset their leverage.50 Albeit to a lesser 
extent than discursive antagonism, this strategy can also be observed in the anti-apartheid 
campaigns such as when Barclays began to label itself ‘The Anti-Apartheid Bank.’51 
In terms of legitimacy more generally, I would suggest that the anti-apartheid activists recognized a 
discrepancy between their own morally determined struggle and the policies of foreign-owned 
companies that invested in South Africa, which resulted in a perception of these companies as less 
‘legitimate’ actors. There is an important distinction to be made, however, between the morally 
illegitimate and the illegal: the activists criticized and campaigned against the companies based on 
moral values, not because the companies had violated any laws. As noted in the introduction, 
Young’s social connection model helps accentuate this distinction by addressing the structural 
conditions that facilitate morally illegitimate business conduct. 
In recent studies by McDonnell and King on the response by companies to activist critique, it is 
proposed that ‘prosocial claims are a well-suited counter-measure for corporate targets.’52 Contrary 
to predominant understandings, McDonnell and King’s studies suggest that many companies’ 
‘ostensibly responsible actions and investments may actually be defensive (or in some cases, 
preventative) impression management tactics, rather than concessions.’53 In extending the assertion 
by Smith and Friedman outlined at the beginning of this section that CSR develops in confrontation 
with external pressure, this analysis expands on the internal reasoning within the companies for 
complying with activist demands. With regards to the anti-apartheid campaigns, however, the 
surrogate character of the boycott targets minimized activist preoccupation with effecting a 
sustained transformation in the policies of Barclays and Shell since they were perceived as a means 
to an end. 
As will be examined in chapters three and four, both companies adopted increasingly pro-social 
programs throughout the campaigns by the AAM, a strategy explained by McDonnell, King and 
Soule as an expansion of ‘their repertoire of defensive practices.’54 Contemporaneous to the Shell 
campaign in the late 1980s, Smith suggested that corporate repertoires generally included four 
tactics: ‘ignore, fight, fudge/explain and comply.’55 The fudge/explain tactic had the highest success 
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rate, Smith argued, and it may be motivated by a genuine disparity in views. Philip Balsiger has 
recently expanded on the strategic responses of targeted companies by including denying 
responsibility, reputation/impression management, legal action, and infiltration.56 I do not refer 
directly to these terms in the analytical chapters (three and four) yet the classifications presented by 
Smith and Balsiger provide a useful indication of the response tactics by Barclays and Shell. 
With regards to the emergence of CSR within an apartheid-related context, Anthony Sampson 
argues that South Africa had already by the mid-1980s ‘become the new testing-ground for all the 
old arguments about the social responsibility of corporations.’57 In a paper entitled Foreign 
Investments in South Africa: the Economics of Withdrawal, Charles Harvey, Fellow of the Institute 
of Development Studies at the University of Sussex, proposes that the ‘main argument for pressing 
companies to withdraw is not that they are likely to do so, or because it would achieve their critics’ 
desired objectives, but because it forces firms to justify remaining in South Africa.’58 He further 
notes that activist pressure on foreign companies operating in the country was intended to compel 
them to ‘improve wages, conditions, training and black employees’ advancement;’ in other words, 
to adopt socially responsible programs.59 While the development of concrete CSR initiatives and 
programs might have been the intention of some proponents of disinvestment, the primary aim of 
the AAM was the complete withdrawal of foreign investment. As previously noted, the interrelation 
between CSR and the anti-apartheid call for disinvestment should not be perceived in terms of 
concrete policies but rather as a more abstract appeal for the introduction of ethical considerations 
into the private sphere. A juxtaposition of the findings of Harvey’s paper with the aim of the 
AAM’s boycott campaigns points towards an intricate correlation between CSR, the companies’ 
own strategies, and external pressure by activists. 
Discussing motivations for companies to retain operations in South Africa, David Hauck lists some 
of the strictly profit-oriented reasons for companies to encourage an improvement in the living 
conditions for the non-white population of South Africa. First, many foreign-owned companies had 
begun to realize that the South African government’s apartheid policies were precipitating a 
shortage of skilled labour; better living conditions would translate into more accessible labour. 
Second, a more educated population would be less likely to push for political systemic change. 
                                                          
56 Balsiger, “Managing Protest: The Political Action Repertoires of Corporations,” 6. 
57 Sampson, Black and Gold, 27. 
58 Study paper no.15: “Foreign Investments in South Africa: the Economics of Withdrawal,” by Charles Harvey, Fellow 
of the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex: Barclays Archive 80/4516. 
59 Ibid. 
77 
 
Finally, companies had an interest in being viewed sympathetically by the non-white population 
after a possible democratic transition in the future.60 These reasons, of course, are aimed at a 
domestic South African context. An entirely new set of factors comes into play when applying a 
transnational perspective such as the marked decline in Barclays’ student accounts due to consumer 
boycott campaigns in Britain. 
Most of the responses to the concept of CSR by transnational corporations operating in South 
Africa reveal a refusal to engage in discussions on ethics; in fact, Sethi and Williams assert that 
most US companies refrained from using moral arguments ‘even when those moral arguments were 
justified.’61 They further claim that this did not indicate that the companies were unmoved by the 
moral aspect of the issue but that they were simply ‘adhering to the prevailing dogma of proper 
corporate conduct.’62 Thus, George Champion, Chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, explained in 
1965 that ‘we can’t be responsible for the social affairs of a country […]. Where there’s commerce 
and trade, we feel we should be part of it.’63 In 1971 Lord Nelson, Chairman of the General Electric 
Company, affirmed that ‘if you start moralizing about whom you’ll trade with and whom you 
won’t, where do you stop?’64 This comment is largely emblematic of transnational corporate 
philosophy at the time, though to be sure, most companies expressed their disapproval of apartheid 
while retaining a skepticism towards certain aspects of CSR. The major shift in international 
attention towards the role of foreign investment in the wake of the Soweto Uprising led a substantial 
part of the South African business community to agree on an agenda ‘calling for the end of all 
forms of job reservation, inclusion of blacks in training programs, elimination of racially 
discriminatory wage rates, and improvement of housing and educational opportunities for Africans 
living in the urban areas.’65 Assessing the period from the late 1970s onwards, Williams identifies a 
sizeable shift: ‘the implicit social contract between business and society,’ he notes, ‘was being 
rewritten.’66 This new development meant that companies now ‘saw the necessity of factoring 
human rights into business decisions.’67 In Williams’ evaluation, this shift was mainly prompted by 
activist and shareholder pressure on the companies. In support of this claim, he points to how more 
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than five hundred shareholder resolutions had been presented to more than ninety companies by 
1990.68 
In April 1982, Rafael D. Pagan Jr. from the consulting firm Pagan International (later employed by 
Shell) held a speech entitled Carrying the Fight to the Critics of Multinational Capitalism at a 
Public Affairs Council in New York.69 In the speech, Pagan Jr. discussed the changing role of 
transnational corporations and the contribution of activist pressure to this development. ‘Quite 
simply,’ he asserted, ‘the activists simply have done a better job in the political arena. They have 
allied themselves to some of the world’s resentments, and have called these resentments into battle 
against us.’70 Pagan Jr. suggested that it was necessary for transnational corporations to start 
incorporating political considerations into their strategies and that this newfound role would dictate 
‘an awareness of the concerns of others,’ which conveys the increased corporate attention to 
stakeholders.71 Companies were further advised to reach ‘out to hold an ongoing dialogue with the 
many new publics whose understanding we need to remain in business,’ which entails more public 
profiles as companies conducting morally legitimate business.72 Pagan Jr. elaborated that ‘we are 
going to have to explain the reasons for our actions or non-actions; their immediate and long-term 
benefits; or their cost – and why that cost must be borne by local interests.’73 In other words, 
intensifying the commitment of companies to social responsibility and transparency was a strategy 
suited to fend off critics. Another more confrontational tactic, however, was to ‘strip the activists of 
the moral authority they receive from their alliances with religious organizations.’74 Chapters three 
and four address how the implications of these two approaches to external pressure are symptomatic 
of the repertoire employed by both Barclays and Shell. 
In the mid-1980s, Tony Bloom, Chief Executive of the Premier Group, addressed the growing 
importance of CSR when he stated that ‘we all know that evolution and acceptance of a doctrine of 
social responsibility is relatively new and still controversial. The idea that business has one and only 
one objective – to maximize profits – was the consensus for the better part of business history and 
this view is still currently held by some eminent and notable business thinkers.’75 Some managers 
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chose to wait and observe the development of CSR, while others chose a more noticeable approach 
such as an advertisement by a group of American and South African company leaders in the 
Johannesburg Sunday Times on 29 September 1985: 
 
As responsible businessmen committed to South Africa and the welfare of all its 
people, we are deeply concerned about the current situation. […] We believe in the 
development of the South African economy for the benefit of all of its people and we 
are, therefore, committed to pursue a role of corporate social responsibility and to play 
our part in transforming the structures and systems of the country toward fair 
participation for all.76 
 
The message of this advertisement was in line with the recommendation by a number of 
commentators to ‘visibly represent human rights values’ in order to contribute to the growing 
pressure on the South African government.77 
As discussed in this section, the study of the interaction between social movements or activists and 
companies can be approached from numerous angles. Thus, McDonnell, King, and Soule suggest 
that their research on corporate responses to activists contributes to existing social movement theory 
by ‘providing evidence that movement challenges are not only affected by, but can also affect, the 
opportunity structures of their targets.’78 This argument refers back to the first of three central 
factors in social movement studies discussed in chapter one, namely political opportunities. 
Panayiotis Georgallis has recently pointed to three mechanisms by which social movements can 
induce socially responsible policies in targeted companies: first, boycott campaigns may stimulate 
support from other stakeholders; second, at an organizational level direct interaction between social 
movements and the targeted company may help develop social initiatives; and third, at an individual 
level boycott campaigns may affect managers’ perception of a particular cause.79 By placing 
transnational corporations within the same analytical category as social movements, we are able to 
apply theory traditionally reserved for movement dynamics to the corporate domain. While social 
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movements and transnational corporations typically operate within dissimilar milieus, I would argue 
that the nexus constituted by their interaction renders them comparable actors for analytical 
purposes. 
Beyond social movement theory, this understanding of social movements and companies as 
comparable is perpetuated in the conceptual framework outlined at the beginning of the dissertation. 
First, the social connection model establishes the interconnectedness between the two types of 
actors by explicating the social structures within which they operate. Second, identifying social 
movements and transnational corporations as engaged in both active strategies and passive patterns 
of subpolitical repercussions enables us not only to juxtapose the two types of actors but to discern 
developments pertaining to CSR as manifested through the interaction between the two actors. 
Finally, the political consumer has been recognized as a ‘driver of CSR’ that problematizes the 
implications of companies’ conduct and applies pressure through boycotting, picketing etc.80 
In the following section, I elaborate on the emerging awareness of CSR among transnational 
corporations and interlace this tendency more closely with the context of foreign investment in 
apartheid South Africa. 
 
Foreign Investment in South Africa 
Foreign private investment and the presence of transnational corporations almost unavoidably 
influence local social and economic conditions. Nevertheless, it is difficult to assess the impact of 
large-scale disinvestment not due to lack of data but rather, in Deon Geldenhuys’ words, a 
‘confusing mass of statistics.’81 Foreign investment in South Africa was a central target for anti-
apartheid activities in Britain. The activists believed that – from a moral perspective – there should 
be no association with the South African government nor contribution to the country’s economy. In 
terms of the concrete effects of large-scale disinvestment, alternatively, it was believed that the 
South African economy would deteriorate to such an extent that the government would be 
compelled to abolish the apartheid system and introduce democracy. More subtle side-effects would 
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include the removal of modern technology, the diminished access to management techniques central 
to the efficiency and competitiveness of South African companies etc.82 
Before proceeding with a discussion of the role of foreign investment in apartheid-era South Africa, 
I want to engage in some terminological clarifications: I deploy the term ‘disinvestment’ to refer to 
a company selling off its subsidiary or ridding itself of ownership of assets in South Africa.83 In 
1987, William H. Kaempfer, James A. Lehman, and Anton D. Lowenberg described three types of 
disinvestment common at the time: first, ‘financial disinvestment’ is when a company sells its assets 
in South Africa. Second, ‘physical disinvestment’ is the removal of equipment or the demolition of 
buildings etc. Finally, ‘human capital disinvestment’ points to the re-location of employees.84 An 
often repeated criticism pertaining to disinvestment is that many companies ensured that their 
products or services would continue to be available on the South African market after the 
companies had left the country.85 In these instances, nothing changed but the name of the local 
provider; I examine this issue in more detail in chapters three and four since Barclays and Shell 
used this argument as a justification to maintain operations in the South Africa. 
Foreign investment in South Africa had become a significant factor from at least the latter half of 
the nineteenth century when large quantities of gold and diamonds were discovered. Additional 
gold fields were found in the Orange Free State shortly after the Second World War, which 
precipitated a second wave of foreign investment and interest. In 1962, foreign investment in South 
Africa was at approximately R3 billion. This number rose to R20 billion in 1974 and eventually to 
R40 billion in the mid-1980s.86 Throughout the 1970s, the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU) compiled a list of approximately 3,000 transnational corporations operating 
in South Africa and the organization called for sanctions against foreign investment in the country, 
the withdrawal of pension fund investments in companies related to South Africa, and pressure on 
companies operating in the country to improve their CSR standards.87 Looking at US investment 
alone, in the early 1980s more than 6,000 companies did business with South Africa and more than 
300 of these companies had actual operations in the country.88 It is estimated that Anglo-American 
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Corp controlled 70 per cent of the economy, though a powerful state sector ensured a high degree of 
self-sufficiency.89 South Africa’s economy was comprised of gold, diamond, coal and arms export 
and production in conjunction with foreign manufacturing and finance, the bulk of which could be 
attributed to Britain. 
Many companies became engaged in efforts to bring about a reform of the apartheid system from 
the 1970s onwards. Around this time, there was also a marked shift in the attention towards the role 
of foreign investment and many investors and companies had experienced a substantial increase in 
political pressure and public protest.90 The disinvestment that received the most attention in the 
1970s was perhaps a decision by the American company Polaroid: in 1970, two employees had 
begun protesting the company’s business in South Africa where Polaroid cameras and film were 
used for the passbooks, which had become a symbol of the racialized and oppressive apartheid 
system.91 The following year, Polaroid became the first major American company to publicly 
criticize apartheid and the company introduced a number of CSR initiatives such as giving a third of 
its South African profits to education for non-white South Africans and increasing wages by up to 
22 per cent for non-white employees.92 By this time, a campaign had been launched against 
Polaroid and the aim of the campaigners was to compel the company to disinvest entirely.93 Despite 
Polaroid’s socially responsible policies, the company eventually withdrew from South Africa in 
1977.94 Eric J. Morgan suggests that ‘Polaroid’s attempt to challenge apartheid by going public with 
verbal opposition and new policies to empower blacks set a bold precedent for later challenges to 
apartheid.’95 
In the mid-1970s, two noteworthy events contributed to the changed circumstances for foreign 
companies: the Durban Strikes in 1973 and the Soweto Uprising in 1976. In Britain, The Guardian 
further incited debate on British investment in South Africa with a series of articles by Adam 
Raphael, the first of which was entitled British Firms Pay Africans Starvation Rate. Shortly after 
the publication of this article, The Observer noted that the ‘keen public response stirred by the 
Guardian’s disclosures about starvation wages paid by many British firms in South Africa shows 
                                                          
89 di Norcia, “The Leverage of Foreigners: Multinationals in South Africa,” 866. 
90 Mangaliso, Strategic Choice under Uncertainty: Multinational Corporations and the Pressure to Disinvest from 
South Africa, 150. 
91 Sampson, Black and Gold, 121. 
92 Morgan, “The World Is Watching: Polaroid and South Africa,” 521; Sampson, Black and Gold, 121. 
93 Sampson, Black and Gold, 121. 
94 Morgan, “The World Is Watching: Polaroid and South Africa,” 546. 
95 Ibid. 
83 
 
how strongly the British conscience feels about this country’s involvement in the harshly 
discriminatory practices of apartheid.’96 From a corporate perspective, Soweto in particular ‘raised 
danger signals in respect to future business prospects.’97 Foreign-owned companies came to 
perceive South Africa as more of a long-term risk, which was partly responsible for why long-term 
investments were gradually exchanged for shorter-term arrangements with higher interest rates. A 
survey among 500 American executives from 1977 revealed that 26 per cent were inclined to 
disinvest or scale down, whereas the majority part of 62 per cent wished to remain in South Africa 
but without expanding their businesses.98 By 1979, Spandau asserted that ‘for the foreign investor, 
South Africa tends to be economically attractive, but politically risky.’99 Mounting information on 
the poor working conditions in many foreign-owned companies in combination with South Africa’s 
deteriorating international image and the country’s unsuccessful economic decisions led many 
foreign companies to reassess their business in South Africa. As a consequence, direct foreign 
investment fell from $2.6 billion in 1981 to $1.3 billion in 1985.100 
Many influential institutions also began to adopt formal policies on the social aspect of business 
such as in 1982 when the British Council of Churches – with inspiration from the Board for Social 
Responsibility’s report Facing the Facts – encouraged the Church Commissioners to ‘reconsider 
their portfolio with a view to cutting to the minimum investment in any firm that have dealings with 
South Africa.’101 In early 1985, six South African employer groupings collectively representing 
more than 80 per cent of the workforce publicly proclaimed that they would seek to achieve 
economic and political reforms.102 Inflation in South Africa had increased drastically and the overall 
annual growth rate fell to minus 1 per cent just prior to Botha’s catastrophic ‘Rubicon’ speech in 
August 1985.103 During this month alone, American banks withdrew approximately $300 million.104 
Shortly after the speech, a delegation of South African executives – including the Anglo-American 
Corporation – met with members of the ANC in Zambia as a clear sign that the ‘Botha regime may 
not survive’ and that ‘there was a need to find middle ground,’ as the record of the meeting noted.105 
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These were clear indications to foreign investors that the South African market was unstable and 
that involvement thus entailed a considerable amount of risk. After Botha’s speech, Frost Sullivan, 
a political risk consultancy company, adjusted South Africa’s rating from one of the safest national 
economies to the level of a Third World country. The October 1985 issue of the business journal 
Insight even stated that ‘we caution investors against holding stocks of companies with operations 
in South Africa.’106 Botha’s follow-up speech in January 1986, known as ‘Rubicon 2,’ displayed a 
greater willingness by the South African government to accommodate foreign investment and the 
banks in particular.107 
Already from the early to mid-1980s, foreign investment began to decrease; thus, U.S. investment 
in South Africa fell from $2.8 billion in 1983 to $1.3 billion in 1985.108 By mid-1988, 1332 
American companies and 115 non-American companies (among them 49 British) had pulled out of 
the country.109 In total, more than one third of foreign companies disinvested from South Africa 
during the 1980s.110 As a further indication of the scale of economic isolation experienced by South 
Africa during the mid- to late 1980s, the Danish export decreased from approximately DKK 422 
million in 1986 to DKK 104 million the following year, while the import decreased from 
approximately DKK 829 million to just DKK 28 million during the same period.111 After Mandela 
was released in 1990, he called upon the foreign-owned companies to contribute to and continue the 
isolation of South Africa.112 
With regards to the companies’ own stated reasons for disinvesting, several factors were involved. 
Some of the companies that were underperforming on the South African market attributed their 
decision to leave the country to ethical concerns.113 Others listed only economic motivations for 
their decision, though other matters such as political pressure were also at play. In the early 1960s, 
the American bank Chase Manhattan alluded to the Cold War in the company’s rationalization of its 
loans to the South African government when it stated that ‘it would endanger the free world if every 
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large American bank deprived developing countries of the opportunity for economic growth.’114 
Dow Chemical was worried about public pressure, Citicorp and International Playtex stressed that it 
was a business-related decision, and Honeywell referred to the ‘total business environment’ in 
South Africa.115 The CEO of IBM, John Akers, noted in early 1986 that ‘if we elect to leave, it will 
be a business decision’ and that the company did not seek a socially responsible policy but to 
‘conduct business.’116 
S. Prakash Sethi and Oliver F. Williams have conducted a content analysis of press releases, news 
reports, and editorials on American companies that state only a single reason for the companies’ 
decision to disinvest. The five main reasons listed: deterioration of the economic climate in South 
Africa, reaction to anti-apartheid campaigns, opposition to apartheid, response to selective 
purchasing laws in the US, and finally other more general business-related strategic decisions.117 
The stated reasons vary quite significantly, though I would assert that only listing a single reason 
does not provide an adequate explanation of most companies’ decision to disinvest. A concern by 
some companies not explicitly mentioned in the analysis above was that the abolishment of the 
system could result in nationalization of business operations or even anarchy.118 These prospects 
also caused some companies to reassess their presence in South Africa. For most companies the 
decision to disinvest was made on the basis of both political and economic reasons and in the end 
the decision was, as Dubow argues, a ‘question of whether South Africa was an attractive and 
prudent place in which to do business.’119 
Many predicted that disinvestment would have little impact on the South African economy in the 
short term while the more severe repercussions could only be felt in the long term. In fact, large-
scale disinvestment could potentially strengthen the economy in the sense that the former 
subsidiaries could be acquired at ‘fire sale prices’ while domestic enterprise would be stimulated, 
thus decreasing dependency on import.120 Thus, Anglo-American’s control of shares increased to 60 
per cent on the Johannesburg stock exchange after it acquired Barclays and a number of other 
                                                          
114 Seidman, “Monitoring Multinationals: Lessons from the Anti-Apartheid Era,” 387. 
115 Sethi and Williams, Economic Imperatives and Ethical Values in Global Business: The South African Experience 
and International Codes Today, 321–24. 
116 Massie, Loosing the Bonds: The United States and South Africa in the Apartheid Years, 622. 
117 Sethi and Williams, Economic Imperatives and Ethical Values in Global Business: The South African Experience 
and International Codes Today, 317. 
118 Geldenhuys, Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis, 393. 
119 Dubow, Apartheid, 1948-1994, 223. 
120 di Norcia, “The Leverage of Foreigners: Multinationals in South Africa,” 866. 
86 
 
companies.121 While the disinvestment of well-known companies such as IBM and GM sent a 
strong message about a shift in political and economic circumstances, the economic impact was 
more moderate than expected and particularly white South Africans did not experience a 
deterioration in living conditions. In fact, South African consumers were able to purchase more or 
less the same products as before foreign companies began to disinvest.122 
Another effect of large-scale disinvestment was that foreign companies were now unable to 
influence local company policies in a progressive direction. The new South African owners required 
added profit to repay the loan taken to acquire the company and they thus focused more narrowly 
on short-term revenue, which in turn reduced their likeliness to initiate apartheid-critical projects 
and policies. An often cited case is when GM sold its facilities to Delta, a South African company 
that immediately lowered wages and reduced its staff. Moreover, the company prohibited the 
employees from going on strike and cut their funding of social development programs.123 In 1987, 
David Beaty and Oren Harari offered predictions that ‘even in the worst case scenario of concerted 
global sanctions and disinvestments, [the South African economy] can still grow at an annual rate of 
3 per cent.’124 
Whether or not such forecasts were correct, they challenged and problematized anti-apartheid 
activists’ focus on corporate disinvestment as a means to bring about an end to apartheid. It is thus 
important to include these contemporary estimations of the impact of disinvestment in order to 
assess the saliency of the strategy advocated by the anti-apartheid activists. This strategy was 
pinned on far more optimistic expectations about the effect of disinvestment than the GM case 
revealed. Support for such a case can be found in Coca-Cola’s disinvestment from South Africa: the 
company announced its decision to disinvest in September 1986 when the company’s president 
detailed that the decision was ‘a statement of our opposition to apartheid and of our support for the 
economic aspirations of black South Africans.’125 According to a report in Business International, 
this explicitly stated connection between Coca-Cola’s opposition to apartheid and the company’s 
decision to disinvest broke ‘new rhetorical ground.’126 Coca-Cola proclaimed that it would sell its 
operations to non-white investors and further explained that the company would ‘disinvest in a way 
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that creates significant multiracial equity participation in the South African soft drinks industry. Our 
goal is to structure the transactions in a way that improves the prospects of black South Africans 
and increases their ability to invest in their country’s economy.’127 Juxtaposing the GM and Coca-
Cola cases indicates that the debate on disinvestment was not a question of either/or but that there 
were several ways to execute a plan to disinvest depending, often, on the company’s level of social 
and political engagement. 
Another argument in favour of disinvestment was its contribution to an ‘overall atmosphere of 
uncertainty’ that halted most new foreign investment in South Africa.128 Apartheid was perceived 
by many companies as increasingly risky to business operations, causing many to call for more 
comprehensive reforms. Lee Jones proposes that this shift did not take place abruptly but was part 
of a gradual development in the attitude of foreign companies towards involvement in apartheid 
South Africa.129 Moreover, whereas foreign investment could signal support for the policies of the 
South African government, the signal sent by disinvestment could diminish the ‘perceived risks 
associated with political resistance, or increase the probability of successful opposition to the 
apartheid state.’130 In other words, disinvestment could stimulate domestic support for the ANC and 
other apartheid-critical parties and organizations, which was the principal aim of much British anti-
apartheid activism. 
The AAM’s disinvestment campaign was built on three components: exposing the links between 
companies in Britain and apartheid, persuading various institutional actors to divest from such 
companies, and demanding that the British government impose full-scale sanctions against South 
Africa. As discussed in chapter one, at the centre of the disinvestment campaign was a perception of 
companies as surrogate targets. The divestment by institutions of stocks connected to foreign 
investment in South Africa, or even companies’ decision to disinvest entirely, did not represent the 
ultimate aims of the AAM.131 As Cosmas Desmond noted in an article in the Rand Daily Mail, 
‘divestment is not an end in itself and it has no direct effect on South Africa’ and ‘others will no 
doubt purchase the shares disposed of.’132 As surrogates, however, transnational companies served 
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as a conduit between the activists and the South African government. To some extent, this tactic 
worked: an article in The Economist on 30 March 1985 estimated that the ‘total sales of stocks in 
South African-linked companies instigated by the anti-apartheid movement over the past year is 
probably past the £5 billion mark.’133 Of the 60 British companies that withdrew between 1984 and 
mid-1986, several named the so-called ‘hassle factor’ as important to their decision.134 
Aside from the increasing number of disinvesting companies, however, the AAM remained 
concerned about ‘false withdrawals,’ as in the case of GM where the disinvesting company did not 
ensure the continuation of improved working conditions. In a May 1987 discussion paper, the 
movement stressed the importance of identifying ‘more precisely what disinvestment entails, the 
better to distinguish genuine from false withdrawals, and the more effectively to target the 
companies still collaborating with apartheid.’135 Yet while encouraging a more precise distinction in 
terms of disinvesting companies, the same discussion paper proposes a campaign targeting the ‘Top 
Twenty collaborators,’ which would provide institutional investors with easy solutions in a 
disinvestment process that could otherwise ‘appear as a vast, even unmanageably wide field of 
action.’136 As previously discussed in relation to boycotting, negative aspects of this tactic include 
its often undiscriminating usage. In the effort to present an accessible method for institutional 
investors to divest, the AAM appears to have been oblivious to the fact that some companies would 
be targeted more intensively than others. This also applies to single-company campaigns, though 
from the movement’s point of view all the companies referred to were engaged in immoral conduct 
through their links to South Africa. 
While many agreed that large-scale disinvestment could have an adverse impact on the non-white 
population of South Africa in the short term, the long-term effects were widely believed to render 
the apartheid system progressively more unprofitable.137 Yet once again, it is difficult to assess the 
success of disinvestment as an instrument for social and political change due to the myriad of 
factors that contributed to the government’s decision to abolish the apartheid system. On the one 
hand, Fieldhouse suggests that the ‘campaign to discourage economic collaboration and investment 
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in South Africa was probably the most significant and influential of all the campaigns.’138 On the 
other hand, Geldenhuys concludes that there is ‘no clear evidence to suggest that the South African 
government has become more reformist or less repressive (or the reverse, for that matter) under the 
pressure of disinvestment.’139 Nonetheless, I would suggest that the debate on the role of foreign 
investment in South Africa did contribute in a significant degree to the rising awareness of 
companies as actors for social change. Also, the debate explored the idea that companies are able to 
effect social and political change and that they might have a responsibility to do so, which formed 
the underlying premise for the anti-apartheid campaigns against Barclays and Shell. 
 
Codes of Conduct 
So far, I have discussed the development of CSR as a gradual rise in awareness about the link 
between social responsibility and corporate policies and activities. Foreign-owned companies that 
operated in South Africa and wanted to adopt socially responsible policies were often uncertain 
about how to translate questions of ethics into tangible company programs. During the 1970s, codes 
of conduct were introduced that enabled companies to make CSR more practicable. Most codes of 
conduct are voluntary guidelines that have little or no legal enforcement and that are essentially 
dependent upon companies’ own inclination to comply or, alternatively, the degree of public 
pressure on companies to adhere to the codes. This last point is important since codes not only 
render CSR more adaptable for companies, they also provide activists with a set of demands with 
which to confront companies that do not meet the requirements of the codes. Even companies that 
do not adhere to any codes of conduct may be subjected to pressure to explain this choice of policy. 
In this section, I elaborate on the concrete CSR measures applied by foreign-owned companies in 
South Africa and discuss the critique by the anti-apartheid activists of corporate strategies of 
constructive engagement. 
Shortly after the establishment of the first codes of conduct for transnational corporations in the 
second half of the 1970s, Sten Niklasson noted that it ‘is clear that we are dealing with a new 
concept, the nature and implications of which should not be assessed in conventional legal 
terms.’140 He asserted that the codes had been drafted in part due to the realization that transnational 
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corporations could often circumvent national legislation and that ‘situations may occur in which 
economic and social development takes place on terms set by the enterprises, not the society as a 
whole.’141 The codes, in other words, were intended to curtail the influence of private transnational 
corporations in areas external to the market. Such codes had been proposed since at least the end of 
the 1940s and by 1960 the International Labour Organization (ILO) had adopted 115 conventions 
on international labour standards.142 It was not until the 1970s, however, that a series of guidelines 
emerged including the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Guidelines for Investment 
(1972), the ICFTU Charter of Trade Union Demands for the Legislative Control of the 
Multinational Companies (1975), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (1976), the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (1977), a code for transnational 
corporations by the UN (1977), and the WHO International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk 
Substitutes (1981).143 
The UN code has been attributed to a 1972 meeting of the UN Economic and Social Council when 
the representative of Chile accused the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT) of 
interfering in the domestic political affairs of the country, which substantiates Niklasson’s claim 
about the need to inhibit the influence of transnational corporations.144 According to the UN, part of 
the purpose of the code was to ‘further the understanding of the nature of transnational corporations 
and of their political, legal, economic and social effects on home and host countries and in 
international relations, particularly between developed and developing countries.’145 It is evident 
that the introduction of codes of conduct were not only intended to improve conditions at the 
workplace but that they also constituted an effort to limit the unintended side-effects of international 
trade and an increasingly globalized market. In this sense, the codes represent a formal strategy to 
address concerns similar to those discussed by Beck in his account of the emergence of active 
subpolitics. 
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Two additional codes directly targeted transnational companies operating in South Africa: the EEC 
Code of Conduct (1977) and the Sullivan Principles (1977). It should be noted that these codes were 
an important part of a strategy of constructive engagement that sought to use foreign-owned 
companies as vehicles of gradual political change in South Africa. I want to briefly discuss these 
two codes to further clarify the role of foreign-owned companies in South Africa and the 
interrelated development of CSR. 
The EEC Code of Conduct replaced the UK Code of Practice which had been launched three years 
earlier in response to media coverage on the low wages paid to non-white South Africans by British 
companies. A series of articles in The Guardian by Adam Raphael had detailed that only three per 
cent of the investigated British companies paid all their employees above the poverty line.146 The 
code was voluntary and, according to Sethi and Williams, ‘left entirely to the discretion of the 
companies involved.’147 Companies in Britain were not legally obliged to adopt a new set of strict 
policies and the EEC Code was consequently seen by many critics as too ineffective since it was 
‘interpreted individually, not collectively.’148 Nevertheless, the code’s emphasis on issues such as 
the right to equal pay, non-discrimination in the workplace, and the right to unionize served to 
indicate the public’s expectations towards the companies involved. In essence, the EEC Code was a 
‘compromise between economic interests and moral obligations.’149 Equally important, the code 
could be seen as legitimating foreign-owned business in apartheid South Africa if they adhered to 
the EEC Code despite the fact that the code’s recommendations did not challenge apartheid laws. 
By most parameters, the EEC Code appears not to have been successful. In 1987, ten years after the 
establishment of the code, a reported 85 per cent of British companies maintained a minimum wage 
below what the code deemed the ‘absolute minimum necessary.’150 Holland contends that the key 
purpose of the code may in fact have been to promote political cooperation between EEC member 
states.151 Moreover, he points to three possibly intentional consequences of the EEC Code: 
preventing the implementation of sanctions, protecting EEC business in South Africa, and delaying 
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anti-apartheid pressure for disinvestment.152 Again, this can be explained by viewing the 
establishment of codes of conduct as part of a strategy of constructive engagement, which is what 
the AAM advised against. Commending the code, Robin Smith asserts that ‘even the most radical 
critics admit that it has served some purposes,’ among which are the generation of dialogue between 
corporate headquarters and their subsidiaries and the disclosure of the ‘myths, uncertainties and 
obfuscations, surrounding labour relations in South Africa.’153 It is extremely difficult to properly 
assess the impact of the EEC code, however, since most British companies did not comply with its 
recommendations. 
Emerging parallel to the EEC Code of Conduct, the Sullivan Principles became the most recognized 
code of conduct in South Africa.154 Reverend Leon Sullivan drafted the initial ‘principles’ in 1977 
when he was a member of the Board of Directors at General Motors. At the time, he believed firmly 
in the beneficial effects of a code of conduct and in 1969 he had written that if companies were to 
engage more critically and systematically with their role as instruments of change in South Africa, 
‘within a single year the practice and preaching of apartheid there would begin to disappear.’155 
According to Sullivan, the aim of the Principles was not merely to ‘shine the chains’ but to ‘break 
the chains en route to achieving full freedom and justice for all’ and he thought of the Principles as 
the first steps towards a reconfiguration of the role of companies in society.156 Companies were 
invited to participate in the Sullivan Principles regardless of their country of origin and Sullivan 
himself noted that ‘no one can have more impact than the British.’157 In practice, however, the vast 
majority of signatories were American companies: between 1977 and 1982, 146 American 
companies signed on to the Principles. Robert Massie suggests that while the Principles were 
initially perceived as a radical instrument by most companies, they were gradually recognized as a 
‘reasonable middle ground between doing nothing and actively divesting.’158 
From 1983, however, the number of signatories began to decline and Sullivan progressively lost 
confidence in the effect of the Principles. He revised them five times in the first ten years: in 1977, 
companies were urged to improve conditions for non-white employees yet within the confines of 
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South African law, and by 1985 signatory companies were required to take a public stance against 
apartheid. That same year he announced that if the apartheid system had not been abolished within 
the following two years he would abandon his policy of constructive engagement.159 By early 1987, 
companies were called upon to ‘support the ending of all apartheid laws, practices and customs’ and 
later that year Sullivan encouraged all companies to disinvest from South Africa by 1988 due to the 
lack of progress by the South African government.160 While Sullivan denounced the Principles, they 
continued to run until 1993, by which time American companies had spent more than $300 million 
implementing the guidelines.161 
The early and definitive demand for disinvestment by the British anti-apartheid activists 
precipitated the widespread frustration with the codes’ lack of substantial results by the mid- to late 
1980s. There was, furthermore, no formalized method with which to verify the companies’ 
statements on their implementation of the framework set out by the Principles.162 Towards the end 
of apartheid, in 1992, the ANC and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) 
publicized an initiative called a ‘Platform of Guiding Principles for Foreign Investors,’ which 
emphasized the need for guidelines concerning companies’ social responsibilities.163 While the 
ANC had opposed the implementation of codes of conduct during the apartheid years, the party 
recognized the potential of CSR and related monitoring efforts. In July 1993, the South African 
Council of Churches (SACC) introduced its own code of conduct for businesses operating in South 
Africa.164 
The introduction of the voluntary EEC Code of Conduct and Sullivan Principles was met with 
substantial criticism by many key actors in the struggle against apartheid. Bishop Tutu, for instance, 
proclaimed that ‘we do not want apartheid to be made more comfortable. We want it to be 
dismantled.’165 Jennifer Davis, a member of the American Committee on Africa, noted that the 
codes had been ‘an extremely useful tool for the South African government and the corporations,’ 
while others even suggested that the principles were a placebo ‘designed to lull people into false 
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hope and complacency.’166 In recent years, however, particularly the Sullivan Principles have been 
noted for their contribution to changes in corporate culture within the field of CSR. Sullivan himself 
argues that the establishment of the Principles constituted a ‘process that many have said was the 
beginning of corporate social responsibility in America and the world.’167 In their assessment of the 
Sullivan Principles, Sethi and Williams conclude that ‘no one with any knowledge either of 
multinational corporate codes of conduct or the developments in the field of corporate social 
responsibility could fail to recognize its crucial role in helping to legitimate such codes.’168 
Demonstrating the gradual popularity of such measures, a survey conducted by the ILO in the early 
2000s concluded that more than 400 principles, standards and corporate codes were in existence.169 
I want to emphasize the value of applying multiple perspectives in order to nuance my conception 
of codes of conduct. First, codes of conduct have historically been triggered by an awareness of a 
structurally generated disproportionality in the influence of transnational corporate actors. Young’s 
social connection model helps explain the negative side-effects of this influence and identify the 
points of connection between the transnational corporations and their individual customers. Second, 
the introduction of codes can be seen as an institutionalized effort to structure corporate decision-
making in accordance with ethical principles similar to the subpolitical corporate-oriented strategies 
by social movements and activists. Third, situating the codes within the framework of anti-apartheid 
campaigning against transnational corporations enables a closer look at the interaction between 
activists and companies, which Seidman argues most discussions on codes of conducts fail to 
recognize.170 By examining the dynamics between the two actors related to the implementation of 
codes, we can trace developments in the societal expectations towards companies, the importance of 
CSR, and consequently contextualize the companies’ responses to consumer boycott campaigns. In 
this effort, it is important to be mindful of the intricate relation between CSR and codes of conduct 
since on the one hand, both concepts are embedded into a framework that accepts the equation 
between business and social responsibilities. On the other hand, the distinction becomes apparent 
when considering that the AAM urged Barclays and Shell to integrate social responsibilities into 
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their businesses yet dismissed the adoption of codes of conduct as elements of a policy of 
constructive engagement. Both the codes and the anti-apartheid activists ultimately aimed at 
improving conditions for non-white South African workers yet the important distinction between 
the two was that the codes were designed to be applied within the confines of South African law, 
while the anti-apartheid activists discounted the legitimacy of the South African government 
entirely. 
 
Conclusion 
The introduction to CSR in the first section of this chapter serves to clarify the conceptual 
development of the idea of social responsibilities for companies. By examining the advance of CSR 
as a corporate instrument intended to curtail the unintended side-effects of foreign investment in 
South Africa, we are able to identify both the AAM and Barclays and Shell as actors within a 
coherent theoretical narrative. My emphasis on the AAM in section two as a potential catalyst for 
socially responsible policies establishes a frame of analysis for the boycott campaigns that discloses 
central aspects of the interaction between the movement and its corporate targets while concurrently 
accentuating broader developments within the field of CSR. The intricacies of this interaction is 
substantiated by Mary McDonnell and Brayden G. King’s assertion that ‘we still know little about 
the larger questions of how organizations defend their positions when they are disparaged by social 
movement challengers and how they defend their reputational standing in an organizational field 
when challenged by social activists.’171 The inclusion in sections three and four of contemporary 
corporate interpretations of the socio-political role of companies involved in South Africa provides 
insight into dominant perceptions and discourses that may have influenced the policies of Barclays 
and Shell. The discussion of codes of conduct in section four further concretizes the abstract 
concept of CSR and situates it within an apartheid-era context. 
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Chapter 3: The Campaign against Barclays 
 
‘The end of geography,’ Richard O’Brien explains, ‘refers to a state of economic development 
where geographical location no longer matters in finance, or matters much less than hitherto.’1 He 
further suggests that this state of economic development should be perceived as a ‘challenge to all 
participants in the world economy.’2 The anti-apartheid campaign against Barclays presents a 
response to this challenge by, first, emphasizing the structural relations between Barclays in Britain 
and Barclays in South Africa and, second, transforming this insight into concrete action through the 
consumer boycott. Encompassing nearly two decades, the consumer boycott of Barclays was the 
first major single-company campaign by the AAM. From early on, the targeting of a single 
company in favour of other British companies with ties to South Africa became a point of 
contention among the activists since many had difficulties justifying this style of boycotting. From a 
social movement perspective, however, the campaign against Barclays presented a timely 
opportunity to concentrate resources within the AAM, mobilize participants around a well-defined 
cause, and communicate a clear-cut message to the public. 
The first section of this chapter reviews the history of Barclays in South Africa by addressing 
historical and political contexts relevant to my analysis of the campaign against the bank. The 
subsequent three sections trace the development of the campaign, which culminated in the decision 
by Barclays to disinvest. In the final section, I discuss the implications of the campaign for the 
bank’s relationship to CSR by detailing interaction between Barclays and the AAM. 
 
Barclays in South Africa 
‘I wish to refer to a matter of some controversy.’3 These were the introductory remarks of Sir 
Anthony Grant, a Conservative member of House of Commons, on the issue of Barclays’ 
involvement in South Africa in a parliamentary debate in 1984. The bank was targeted by the anti-
apartheid activists partly due to the size of its operations in South Africa, its involvement in the 
Cabora Bassa dam in Mozambique, and its familiarity and visibility to the British consumer. Yet 
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importantly, the bank also became the subject of substantial and prolonged protest on account of the 
perceived leverage of the foreign-owned banking industry on the South African government. 
Sometimes referred to as the ‘industry opportunity structure,’ the banking industry as embodied by 
Barclays provided a context to the boycott campaign that conditioned much of the interaction 
between the activists and the bank.4 Before turning to the campaign against Barclays, then, I want to 
situate the bank and its South African subsidiary within the appropriate historical and economic 
contexts. 
The first of the large so-called ‘imperial banks’ opened in South Africa during the early 1860s. 
These were major British banks led by boards of directors in London such as the London and South 
Africa Bank and the Standard Bank of British South Africa. The imperial banks adhered to the 
classic banking functions of making and receiving payments, issuing loans, and taking in deposits.5 
At the time, the bulk of the capital used in South African banks was not introduced as foreign 
investment but originated within South Africa.6 As part of the late influx of imperial banks, 
Barclays seized control of the National Bank in 1926 when it became part of Barclays Bank 
Dominion, Colonial and Overseas (D.C.O.). When the news broke, the Financial News described 
the appropriation as part of the ‘real romance of Empire.’7 This depiction resonated with Barclays’ 
motivation to enter the South African market, which – according to Margaret Ackrill and Leslie 
Hannah – was founded in part on ‘imperial sentiments’ and a wish to ‘ensure wider Empire 
shareholding.’8 As late as 1971, Barclays D.C.O. of London published a booklet entitled 
‘Emigrating to South Africa,’ which sought to recast South Africa’s history of imperialism in 
idealized and historically inaccurate terms by stating that the ‘Bantu moved south into what is now 
South Africa, arriving there at about the same time as the first whites were establishing themselves 
at the cape.’9 
There is no doubt, however, that Barclays’ decision to expand to South Africa also made financial 
sense: the National Bank had been on the brink of insolvency yet Barclays’ South African business 
quickly became one of the most important divisions of the bank, accounting for half of D.C.O.’s 
revenue during the first 50 years.10 While the proportion of DCO offices in South Africa accounted 
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for more than half of the total DCO offices, Barclays’ South African business became less 
important in relative terms as this number declined from 83 per cent in 1926 to 54 per cent in 
1971.11 In terms of profit, the numbers tend to reiterate the significance of political and economic 
stability; thus, Barclays’ share of profits declined from 49 per cent to 27 per cent during the early 
years of apartheid (1948-1962) due to skepticism by foreign investors of the implications of the 
string of new measures implemented by the South African government.12 Yet after most signs of 
visible resistance to apartheid had evaporated with the banning of the ANC and the PAC, and as the 
myriad of newly introduced apartheid laws entered into force, South Africa was increasingly 
perceived by foreign investors as a stable and profitable environment for investment. 
During the first two decades of apartheid, Barclays DCO was not a particularly liberal-minded 
company: even where South African law did not forbid equal pay for equal work, the bank 
differentiated between white and non-white employees. Yet in 1971, Barclays DCO changed its 
name to Barclays National Bank of South Africa Ltd. (BARNAT), conceivably as part of a move to 
rid the bank of its colonial connotations. BARNAT immediately introduced the principle of equal 
pay for equal work not only to deflect mounting criticism in Britain but also to counter the shortage 
of skilled labour by promoting non-white employees to lower clerical positions.13 This was a 
progressive decision by contemporary standards: only three of the 45 South African companies that 
had publicized their wage rates in 1971 operated with a single wage-scale.14 Also, as parent-bank 
Barclays publicly criticized the apartheid system in clear terms as ‘morally and economically 
indefensible’ and Sir Anthony Tuke, Chairman of the Board, requested a briefing on the situation in 
South Africa.15 In the note, Sir Tuke was told that ‘”petty” apartheid is less in evidence’ than would 
be imagined and that a cabinet minister had told a Barclays delegate that the government policy was 
‘talk tough – act soft.’16 The note further explains that ‘Urban Africans do indeed, as apologists 
explain, seem contented.’17 Contrary to such positive descriptions of apartheid South Africa, the 
note also concludes that ‘evidence of the pass laws is depressing to a stranger’ and cautions that 
‘Nationalist Government supporters are, because of the system, reluctant to voice aloud misgivings 
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they privately admit.’18 While it is impossible to determine the significance of such internal 
briefings to Barclays’ strategy in South Africa, they are nonetheless indicative of the management’s 
concern both with circumstances in the country and the potential backlash on the domestic front. 
Not only anti-apartheid activists and other critics of the role of foreign investment, however, posed 
a threat to Barclays’ operations in South Africa. Aiming to reduce foreign control of the South 
African market, the apartheid government appointed the so-called Franzsen Commission to present 
suggestions for a smooth transition to increased self-sufficiency. In 1971, the Commission proposed 
that foreign banks – including Barclays – should reduce their holdings to 50 per cent ‘over a 
reasonable period,’ which was determined to be approximately ten years.19 After the first ten-year 
period, the bank would be required to further reduce its holding to 10 per cent; a proposal that 
Barclays, according to an internal document, found ‘disturbing’ and which meant that the Barclays 
name would have to be discontinued.20 In the bank’s view, such a policy would discourage much 
future foreign investment in South Africa. The document speculates that the purpose of this move 
by the South African authorities was to diminish the influence of foreign interests not founded on 
‘sound business principles,’ which referred to business conduct aligned with the interests of the 
South African government.21 Despite Barclays’ entreaty that the requirement to reduce foreign 
shareholding below 50 per cent should be abandoned, the government began to implement the 
proposals outlined by the Franzsen Commission, which complicated Barclays’ business in South 
Africa considerably. 
In many respects, the 1970s became a transformative decade for the South African economy since 
the growth that had been sustained for decades now began to show clear signs of decline. As a 
consequence of the framework established by the Franzsen Commission, the share of direct 
investment out of the total foreign investment decreased from 64 per cent to 41 per cent by 1976, 
though direct investment increased by 66 per cent over the following years.22 Conversely, indirect 
investment such as bank loans increased by more than four-fold, meaning that from the middle of 
the decade financial influx into South Africa consisted almost entirely of loans rather than foreign 
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companies setting up new businesses.23 The principal recipient of foreign lending was the South 
African government, which sought to finance military spending and large-scale domestic 
investment programs.24 One year after the Soweto Uprising began, total borrowing from foreign 
banks had fallen so drastically that the South African government was compelled to borrow from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The riots in Soweto, however, were merely a symptom of 
more deeply rooted developments in South Africa; far more devastating to the South African 
economy was the rapid rise in population coupled with the restrictive and – increasingly – 
economically counter-productive apartheid laws. Internationally, the turn towards short-term 
lending effectively made South Africa more vulnerable to outside influences such as sanctions and 
disinvestment efforts. Also, the substantial rise in the gold price from 1979-1980 kept the rand at an 
artificially high level. The developments of the 1970s, Stuart Jones and Jon Inggs suggest, meant 
that the ‘stage was being set for the imposition of financial sanctions in the 1980s that led directly to 
the constitutional changes of the 1990s.’25 
Similar to most other foreign-owned banks, BARNAT did not manage to steer clear of the recessive 
repercussions of the Soweto Uprising, the death of Steve Biko, and South African military 
involvement in Angola and Mozambique. In 1977, the managing director of BARNAT failed to 
raise two small loans from Barclays in London, which was hesitant, on the one hand, about 
demonstrating what could be construed as a contribution to the South African economy and, on the 
other hand, about further investing in an unstable market.26 At the end of 1977, the Board of 
Barclays convened to discuss the future of BARNAT. A meeting brief prepared by the Planning 
Department for the Board encouraged deliberation on the conceivable though ‘unlikely’ scenario in 
which the South African government would wish to buy out Barclays.27 More realistically, perhaps, 
the brief urged the Board to consider ‘whether they would like to go down to 51 per cent as soon as 
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possible’ or whether ‘they feel that we should aim at getting into a minority position?’28 In the end, 
the Board decided that the bank would confine itself to short-term activities. 
Not long after the investment scare occasioned by the Soweto Uprising, confidence appeared to 
have returned to the South African market. Misled in part by the spike in the gold price and 
perceived political stability, many South African public and private actors began to borrow 
excessively in the form of international capital. British lenders were more than willing to provide 
this capital and the South African market was second only to the US in terms of investor 
profitability during the early 1980s.29 The South African government saw a considerable advantage 
in private lending as opposed to engaging with the IMF or other public international credit that was 
often conditional upon certain arrangements. Thus, by January 1977, BARNAT announced that it 
had no longer any difficulties in terms of raising loans.30 This return to favourable conditions for the 
bank was highly beneficial to the South African economy since the link between British parent 
banks and their South African subsidiaries constituted a vital access to foreign capital. A UN report 
from 1982 singled out Barclays as the foremost British bank lending to South Africa and the 
estimated loan total more than doubled from 1982-1985 by which time Barclays’ involvement was 
divided between £300 million in direct lending to state corporations and £450 million in financing 
from Barclays to BARNAT.31 
The favourable economic circumstances of the early 1980s, however, were soon exposed as 
untenable. From an economic point of view, South Africa had not over-borrowed nor did the 
country experience severe economic problems. With the rioting that broke out from 1984, the mass 
popular protests led by the UDF, and a severe drought, however, foreign investors began to reassess 
the country’s political climate and deemed it too risky.32 This new state of affairs caused many 
foreign investors not to renew their loans and ratings agencies downgraded South Africa’s 
creditworthiness leading the rand to plummet by a third within a year from June 1984.33 South 
Africa’s heightened exposure to short-term foreign capital meant that 50 per cent of the country’s 
debt was to be repaid within a single year, which led a financial report from March 1985 to refer to 
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South Africa’s external debt as being in ‘absolute chaos.’34 When the Botha administration 
introduced the first State of Emergency in July 1985, most foreign investors were further 
discouraged by the bleak prospects of South Africa’s socio-political stability as well as concern 
about the ability of the government to repay its loans. 
In response to the increasingly risky South African investment environment and the political 
instability evidenced by the State of Emergency, the American bank Chase Manhattan declared that 
it would not renew its $500 million short-term loan to South Africa. The bank was the second 
largest American lender to South Africa and the bank’s chairman stated that the decision was 
motivated by economic factors and that it should not be regarded as politically motivated.35 Chase 
Manhattan’s decision is now commonly perceived to have instigated a ‘bank run’ since a substantial 
number of institutions and investors followed suit within a short period after the bank’s 
announcement. The result was an almost complete halt in new foreign investment, a further 
depreciation of the rand, and a decision by the Botha government to proclaim a partial moratorium 
on repayments of foreign debt.36 This desperate solution generated widespread criticism from the 
international community and it served to unite the nearly 300 major foreign creditors around the 
common purpose of terminating further credit to South Africa.37 
By September, shortly after Botha’s ‘Rubicon speech,’ the rand had fallen to thirty-four cents to the 
dollar or what Robert Massie asserts was its ‘lowest point ever.’38 In 1983, the exchange rate system 
had optimistically been liberalized and a unification of the exchange rate had been introduced yet 
Botha re-established a two-tier exchange rate system in response to a national economy in free-fall 
in the wake of the Rubicon speech.39 Barclays’ own calculations at this time indicate that South 
Africa was set to repay more than the total sum of the country’s gold and foreign exchange 
reserves.40 The reintroduction of the two-tier exchange rate system was intended to retain foreign 
capital in South Africa since the financial value of the rand was set to half the value of the 
commercial rate, which meant that disinvestment would be costly for Barclays.41 At the same time, 
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the South African government hinted at Barclays that the bank might be permitted to preserve a 
majority holding in BARNAT. 
Interrelated with these developments, however, was the growing international pressure. Ackrill and 
Hannah explain that Barclays’ ‘commercial decisions were soon driven no longer by calculations of 
profit or by South African politicians, but by British opponents of apartheid.’42 Anti-apartheid 
campaigning in combination with other forms of pressure had by way of direct economic costs 
connected to management resources and loss of accounts begun to take a heavy toll on the bank and 
its image. The perceived propensity towards increased sanctioning by the international community 
further lead Barclays to fear that BARNAT would try to evade any new restrictions in collaboration 
with the South African government. In light of the ongoing domestic protests against the bank, 
Barclays did not want to be involved in such activity, which explains why the bank chose to reduce 
its shareholding in BARNAT to 40.4 per cent in 1985.43 Simultaneously, Barclays invited Oliver 
Tambo from the ANC to a meeting in London while Chris Ball, Chief Executive of BARNAT, met 
with the party in Lusaka. Towards the end of the following year, Barclays divested itself entirely of 
BARNAT shares. 
A multitude of coinciding factors precipitated the decision by Barclays to leave South Africa. 
Important was the mounting public pressure: already in 1975, Barclays noted that ‘bad publicity is 
simply bad business. Barclays is a global concern, operating in seventy nations around the world, so 
it is wary of courting criticism over the activities of just one of its subsidiaries.’44 Defending its 
involvement in South Africa for nearly two decades, Barclays gradually improved conditions for 
BARNAT employees and engaged in social programs aimed at the non-white population. Despite 
these efforts, however, Barclays chose to disinvest in November 1986. I would argue that the major 
contributing factors to the bank’s decision include the instability after the riots breaking out in 1976 
and 1984, the unpredictability of the Botha administration, an increasingly risky South African 
market due to an explosion in short-term lending and artificially high gold prices, and concerted 
international pressure on foreign capital to withdraw. It is not difficult to qualify the view that 
Barclays might have contemplated disinvestment regardless of the anti-apartheid campaign waged 
against the bank; as prescribed by the Franzsen Commission, Barclays’ involvement was already 
being phased out, and the bank’s extensive operations across the African continent were threatened 
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by protests from countries opposed to any kind of business in South Africa. Furthermore, many 
anticipated a British or EEC equivalent to the CAAA. Within the banking industry specifically, the 
watershed moment might have occurred when Chase Manhattan decided not to renew its loans. The 
following sections nuance the motivation by Barclays to disinvest and trace the involvement of 
CSR in this decision by examining the campaign by the AAM against the bank. 
 
Establishing the Campaign, Late 1960s to Mid-1970s 
The formal campaign lasted nearly two decades and involved a number of actors, groups, and 
organizations each with different motivations for participation. While it may be more accurate to 
refer to several campaigns, I deploy the singular for purposes of simplicity. The focus of the 
campaign shifted in accordance with developments in South Africa and internationally, and the 
activists were aided by the increasing attention towards CSR. Yet while the anti-apartheid activists 
and Barclays were engaged in dialogue throughout the campaign, their correspondence indicate that 
little common ground could be found apart from condemnation of the apartheid system. ‘There 
could be no meeting of minds,’ Ackrill and Hannah write unequivocally; ‘to the campaigners, 
Barclays’ shareholding in BARNAT and BARNAT’s participation in South African life, no matter 
what modest and gradual contribution they made to black advancement, were simply wrong.’45 
Conversely, Sir Frederic Seebohm, Chairman of Barclays Bank DCO, lashed out at the activists by 
remarking that they were ‘prepared to see all the good things of life disappear in order to achieve an 
anarchical society’ and that ‘one of their objects is to bring about bloody revolution.’46 
Due to the multi-facetted and protracted nature of the campaign against Barclays, I would argue that 
my analysis benefits from a grounding in some of Markoff’s historically attentive social movement 
perspectives as discussed in chapter one. ‘Duration,’ for instance, stresses the intervals with which 
the campaign was successful in terms of mobilization of support and pressure on Barclays. The 
campaign might have been affected by societal ‘trends,’ which – in addition to technological 
innovation and progress in the campaigning tactics of the AAM – includes the gradual acceptance 
of CSR among both companies and the public. We have already seen how ‘punctual’ events such as 
the Soweto Uprising or the ‘Rubicon speech’ had a drastic impact on the conditions under which 
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Barclays did business in South Africa, and such abrupt events also tended to provide impetus for the 
anti-apartheid activists. Similarly, I have referred to how the ‘causal dependence’ of events such as 
South Africa’s frantic short-term lending coupled with the spike in gold prices significantly altered 
the foreign investment environment, which in turn made it easier for the AAM to argue that 
continued operations in South Africa would be untenable. Markoff’s categories provide a structured 
conception of campaigning aspects that are central to the interaction between Barclays and the anti-
apartheid activists. While his framework will not explicitly guide my further analysis, my 
discussion of the campaign against Barclays reflects points of connection elucidated by Markoff. 
The campaign against Barclays was marked by the debate on sanctions and disinvestment that 
continued throughout the apartheid era. I want to reiterate, however, the distinction between the 
general debate on foreign investment and the specific targeting of the banking industry. In the US, 
George M. Houser, a member of the American Committee on Africa, had already in 1966 produced 
a report occasioned by boycott campaigns against the American banks First National City and 
Chase Manhattan. Houser argues that few activists imagined that the campaign alone would 
precipitate the disinvestment of the banks. What they did rely on, he suggests, was that the ‘issue of 
American financial support for South Africa can be raised, that a large number of individuals will 
be faced with a decision about where they should bank, and a growing number of organizations and 
institutions will seriously debate where their funds should be banked.’47 The most important 
criteria, Houser concludes, was to ‘help to make the issue a public one.’48 With regards to the 
targeted banks, a ‘trend would be set’ as public pressure generated by the campaigns would cause 
the banks to reconsider their involvement in South Africa, which in turn could influence the outlook 
of other companies.49 These tenets similarly came to form the basis of the British campaign against 
Barclays.50 
During the 1960s, the AAM expanded its action repertoire and built relations with other groups and 
organizations. While the movement set up campaigns against fruit or even South African products 
in general, however, it grappled with how to target a single company. Despite the simplistic allure 
of a single-company campaign, the fact that most major British companies did business in South 
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Africa made it difficult to justify the selection of any particular target. In this endeavour, an 
opportunity arose for the AAM in the late 1960s when news broke that Barclays, among other 
British companies, was involved financially in the construction of the Cabora Bassa dam in 
Mozambique. By entreaty from the ANC, the AAM helped establish the ‘Dambusters Mobilizing 
Committee,’ which targeted British companies connected to the building of the dam.51 Two major 
criticisms were aimed at the Cabora Bassa dam project: first, any financial support of the 
Portuguese minority-rule in Mozambique effectively contributed to the perpetuation of unjust 
colonialist policies; second, the construction project was believed to displace around 24,000 black 
Mozambicans and bring upwards of one million migrants from Europe within a 30-year period.52 
Central to both criticisms was the idea that the project would serve to maintain positive relations 
among neighbouring racial minority rules and thus ‘entrench white supremacy in southern Africa.’53 
The Dambusters Committee was largely made up of student activists from the NUS, the Movement 
for Colonial Freedom, the Haslemere Group, and local AAM groups. The Committee soon began to 
narrow in on Barclays mainly on account of it being the largest high street bank in South Africa and 
perhaps the most visible in Britain.54 Thus, the campaign was not solely about racial oppression in 
Mozambique but was also intended to tie in with the ongoing anti-apartheid activities targeting 
South Africa as the most powerful country in the region. The activists were less concerned about 
the comparatively minor involvement of Barclays in the Cabora Bassa dam project than with the 
strategic benefits of choosing the bank as a target for a single-company campaign. 
In response to the campaign, Barclays was quick to hire a consultancy firm called the Pegasus 
Group to help formulate a suitable strategy. In a report entitled Focus on Subversion: Communist 
Bid to Dominate Africa?, the Pegasus Group attempts to discredit critics of the bank by arguing that 
the Cabora Bassa project had aroused ‘intense opposition from LEFT-WING extremists’ and that 
the participating groups of the Dambusters Committee had all been ‘infiltrated by Communists.’55 
Barclays also allocated much time and effort to countering the allegations that the dam project was 
harmful to the non-white population of Mozambique and that the bank was involved in any 
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significant way. Shortly before Barclays terminated the financing of the dam in 1971, Sir Frederic 
Seebohm, Chairman of Barclays Bank DCO, stated that the ‘only connection we can trace is that an 
important contractor of long standing in one of our South African branches has taken on a sub-
contract for part of the early work on the dam.’56 He further stressed that the construction of the 
Cabora Bassa dam would be of ‘immense value to all races.’57 
Barclays also obtained a letter by Miguel Artur Murupa, a black Mozambican explaining that while 
at first he was antagonistic towards the project, he opposes the charge by anti-apartheid activists and 
others that the dam project would ‘constitute a crime against humanity’ and a ‘threat to world 
peace.’58 Further solidifying the impression that Barclays’ involvement in the Cabora Bassa dam 
was cloaked in distorted narratives was the exposure of a fake advertisement in the Portuguese 
magazine Journal Portuguese de Economia & Financas, which asserted that ‘Barklays Bank’ 
retained a presence in the region of Cabora Bassa despite the fact that no banking divisions existed 
in the area.59 The Sunday Telegraph was later able to conclude that the advertisement had been 
placed by ‘an international trickster seeking to establish false evidence against the bank.’60 
Prefiguring the later ‘war of representation’ between Barclays and the AAM, then, the beginnings 
of the campaign against Barclays was tainted by conflicting information. 
The Cabora Bassa controversy represents Barclays’ first public encounter with the unintended 
negative side-effects of its operations in apartheid South Africa. The bank now figured as the 
antagonist in a narrative involving racist oppression, perpetuation of colonialist structures, and 
social responsibility. At this early stage in the campaign, the response – as we have seen – was not 
intended to accommodate the criticism leveled at the bank as much as defend the policies of 
BARNAT and discredit the agenda of the anti-apartheid activists. Occasionally moderated, this 
counter-strategy would form the template for later interaction between Barclays and the activists. 
A distinction should be made between communication by the AAM aimed at Barclays, on the one 
hand, and activists and prospective participants on the other hand. Balsiger substantiates this 
distinction by arguing that social movement communication not ‘only target[s] corporations 
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instrumentally; it is designed to address different audiences, and especially potential political 
consumers, who are used as leverage to make pressure, but who are also an audience in their own 
respect.’61 While briefings among the anti-apartheid activists tend to be pragmatically oriented, 
communicative efforts intended for individuals external to the inner circle were designed to be 
emotive and galvanizing. Thus, a leaflet by the Haslemere Group combatively declares that ‘money 
earned in South Africa is BLOOD MONEY: and your government, your friendly bank manager, 
your Barclay account and YOU are all implicated in this set-up.’62 As opposed to merely targeting 
the bank, the emphatic ‘YOU’ is used to foster awareness about the connection between the 
apartheid system and banking with Barclays as well as to motivate individual action directed at this 
connection. By applying this approach, the message communicated in the leaflet exemplifies 
Young’s theorization and positioning of the individual within a framework of responsibility through 
the social connection model. The premise, again, is that particular social structures facilitate 
injustices and that the individual is responsible for preserving those structures; in this case, banking 
with Barclays is perceived to perpetuate the involvement of the bank in South Africa. 
Throughout the campaign against the bank, Barclays urged a differentiation between the apartheid 
system and the involvement of the bank in the South African market. This connection, however, 
was precisely what the anti-apartheid activists sought to explicate: by demonstrating a chain of 
responsibility between Barclays and the policies of the South African government, first, and 
subsequently between Barclays and its British customers, the anti-apartheid activists individualized 
accountability for mobilization purposes. Revisiting my discussion of political consumerism in the 
introduction, we can recognize this approach to mobilization as an example of what Pellandini-
Simányi refers to as the ‘delegation of responsibility for global problems to the individual level,’ 
also labeled by Beck as the ‘privatization of risk.’63 In this capacity, the allusion to individual 
accountability often employed by the anti-apartheid activists in campaign material is indicative of 
one of the most contested aspects of political consumerism. Gauging anti-apartheid activism from a 
more comprehensive perspective, however, enables us to identify the proposed remedy to the 
problems of individualized responsibility: coordinative action through anti-apartheid groups with 
the aim of amplifying the symbolic message and economic impact of boycotting. 
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Despite a contentious first phase, the campaign against Barclays persisted and gradually came to 
occupy a more long-term position on the British anti-apartheid agenda. To the NUS, the campaign 
involved demonstrating against recruitment staff from Barclays to the extent that the bank itself 
referred to the beginning of each semester as the ‘anti-apartheid season.’64 The students also closed 
or avoided accounts with the bank in great numbers; according to Barclays’ own figures, the bank’s 
share of student accounts in England and Wales declined from well over 30 per cent in the 1960s to 
17 per cent in the mid-1980s.65 As Ackrill and Hannah suggest, this tendency did not have ‘much 
immediate effect on profitability, but it did not promise well for the future.’66 Finally, the more 
radical sections among students and other activists were responsible for spray-painting and 
vandalizing 125 Barclays’ branches as well as allegedly assaulting a member of staff during an 
organized protest.67 It was often difficult to distinguish activists from the NUS and the AAM since 
many were involved in both organizations, such as Mike Terry who moved from a position as NUS 
Secretary to AAM Executive Secretary. 
Another group working in close collaboration with the AAM was ELTSA, a vocal critic of British 
banks with subsidiaries in South Africa. Formed in 1973 by Reverend David Haslam and a few 
others, the purpose of the group was to conduct research and campaign for sanctions against South 
Africa, particularly within the areas of finance, oil, and gold.68 When asked about the source of 
inspiration for the group, Reverend Haslam points to the instrumentalism of the ICCR.69 At first, 
ELTSA focused on Midland Bank where, according to Reverend Haslam, the group ‘put down the 
first shareholder resolution in modern times on a social justice issue’ in the mid-1970s.70 Echoing 
this assertion, Nerys John refers to ELTSA’s obtainment of three million votes at the Midland Bank 
AGM in 1975 in favour of a proposal to end lending to South Africa as the ‘first shareholder 
resolution on a moral/social responsibility issue to have been formally proposed and discussed at 
the AGM of a British company.’71 When Midland terminated its existing lending policy towards 
South Africa the following year, ELTSA turned its attention to Barclays, Hill Samuel, and Standard 
Chartered. Among the tactics used by the group were the placing of counterfeit giro forms in 
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selected banks throughout Britain and the suspension of massive banners from the roofs of the 
banks.72 The NUS and ELTSA were important partner organizations to the AAM that helped put 
pressure on Barclays from different angles: the NUS exerted its leverage primarily in terms of a 
refusal to open accounts with the bank, while ELTSA conducted research on the extent of the links 
between Barclays and South Africa and published this information through a series of Shadow 
Reports. While my focus is on the campaign by the AAM, any meaningful analysis would include 
the parallel and often collaborative efforts of the NUS and ELTSA. 
In the wake of the Cabora Bassa dam controversy, the AAM was searching for arguments that could 
rationalize a continued campaign against Barclays. Among the advantages discussed was the benefit 
of not having to build parallel campaigns against multiple companies. Among the disadvantages 
were the potential problems of appealing to ‘non-radical boycotters,’ of reconciling those who 
supported disinvestment with those who advocated constructive engagement, and finally of 
convincing the public of the fairness in singling out one particular company.73 There appears to 
have been no disputes within the movement about the significance of the bank’s involvement; Sarah 
Darling, a projects officer, noted in 1971 that Barclays’ ‘involvement in Southern Africa is in fact 
so huge and fundamental, that once that fact has been established, there is very little more to say.’74 
In the end, the activists agreed to extend the campaign indefinitely in order to bring attention to the 
role of the foreign banks and lending to South Africa. 
The management of Barclays had hoped to see the campaign expire with the conclusion of the 
Cabora Bassa affair since they had become aware that some employees had begun to feel 
uncomfortable about the possible links between the bank and the apartheid system, and staff morale 
was being affected by the continuous need to defend against criticism from activists and concerned 
customers.75 In the main, however, there was no real sense of alarm within the bank: a note to 
members of the Chair and General Managers from June 1970 explains that ‘there is no sign of 
massive withdrawals’ and that the ‘campaign did probably reach its zenith between May and 
June.’76 The note further claims that the ‘national demonstrations timed for 3rd June seem to have 
been something of a “flop.”’77 These observations appear to have formed the basis for Barclays’ 
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response to the campaign during the first half of the 1970s when the bank chose to largely ignore 
the activists due to a conviction that the campaign would in time disperse unnoticed. An internal 
note symptomatically contends that the bank has ‘weathered the worst of this storm and that we 
should now be prepared to ride it out quietly.’78 The basis for Barclays’ strategy, the note proposes, 
should be to deny the activists publicity. 
This strategy proved more difficult than the bank had anticipated: at the 1971 AGM, for instance, 
around 30 activists prolonged the meeting to over four hours, while the 1972 AGM received 
substantial media coverage. By December 1973, The Times reported that Barclays had lost an 
estimated £10 million in deposits on account of the boycott campaign.79 These events were not 
sufficient to compel the Barclays management to seriously consider withdrawing from South 
Africa; according to an internal letter to the local directors, the failure of the campaign to reach the 
national level and to pose a serious threat to the bank was ‘largely because the Bank has resisted the 
temptation to mount a counter-campaign, thereby denying the protesters the publicity they so 
desperately need.’80 Barclays’ strategy was calculated to avoid what the bank itself referred to as a 
‘David and Goliath situation’ that would complicate the bank’s efforts to win over public 
sympathy.81 The proactive measures taken by the bank comprised an effort to make public 
Barclays’ intention to continue to do business in South Africa. More subtly, the bank aimed to 
separate the most radical protesters from the moderate critics in order to weaken the boycott 
campaign. This strategy involved, for instance, encouraging critics from religious groups to engage 
in conversation with more pro-apartheid South African colleagues or, as was also suggested, 
promoting a lecture tour by the President of the South African Institute of Race Relations.82 
As part of the ‘war of representation,’ the AAM and the Haslemere Group produced a joint 
pamphlet by Michael Bailey entitled Barclays and South Africa that sought to explicate the 
connection between Barclays and the apartheid system. The main findings in Bailey’s pamphlet 
were that less than two per cent of the bank’s clerical staff was non-white and that wages for some 
of the cleaning staff were below subsistence level.83 This was a setback to Barclays whose policy 
had been to declare the number of non-white employees at BARNAT without – as proposed in an 
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internal note – ‘mentioning the total number of staff which slightly weakens the argument.’84 More 
broadly, Bailey’s pamphlet criticized Barclays for recognizing the South African occupation of 
Namibia, helping break sanctions in Rhodesia by not exercising control over its employees in that 
country, and finally increasing Britain’s stakes in the apartheid system by promoting British trade 
and investment in the region. Discussing the pamphlet, an internal Barclays note submits that 
‘actually in some ways it’s not a bad bit of research and certainly all the quotes are fairly accurate 
although some have been taken out of context to create a misleading impression.’85 A substantial 
volume of communication within Barclays pertaining to the pamphlet suggests that the bank was 
alert to developments in the tactics used against the bank as well as alterations in the public opinion. 
This degree of attention is not unique to Bailey’s pamphlet but rather indicative of the effort by 
Barclays to remain cognizant of the criticism levelled against the bank. 
In addition to the consumer boycott campaign, the series of articles in The Guardian by Adam 
Raphael (referred to in chapter two) contributed to the shift in the bank’s response to criticism. The 
articles generated a great amount of attention to the role of British investment in South Africa, and 
Barclays – a figurehead of British companies operating in southern Africa – was concerned about 
the repercussions. An internal note explains that Barclays’ response to the campaign had been 
‘almost entirely defensive’ and suggests that it is ‘necessary to reconsider the public relations 
approach on South Africa and apartheid.’86 By the mid-1970s, Barclays began to change its strategy 
based on a perceived need to address and accommodate criticism from the AAM and its partner 
groups and the public. A report by Christian Concern for Southern Africa (CCSA) argues that from 
1974 the bank ‘publicly recognized the legitimacy of their protests even though it has not agreed 
with their prescriptions.’87 With the publication of the ELTSA shadow reports, Barclays was no 
longer able to dismiss criticism of the bank as unsubstantiated or false claims but had to become 
increasingly involved in discussions on ethics and politics. According to an internal note, other 
causes of concern for Barclays included newfound doubt among some Church leaders as to the 
effects of constructive engagement, the employment of a fulltime campaign organizer at Swansea 
University College, increased pressure from the London Co-Operative Society on the Co-Operative 
Bank’s use of the so-called Barclaycard, and the threat of continued disruptive activities at the 
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AGMs.88 From the activists’ perspective, Barclays appeared to pay little attention to the boycott 
campaign yet internally there was mounting distress about the fact that the ‘resources for dealing 
with critics’ arguments are limited both by existing public relations policy and by material 
available.’89 
During the early years of the campaign against Barclays, the activists had been moderately 
successful in attracting media attention with experimental tactics such as the disruption of AGMs. 
The strategy of conducting a visible campaign was grounded in the perception that Barclays was 
‘extremely sensitive to publicity.’90 Nevertheless, this publicity had not been translated into tangible 
results and the bank had not made any real concessions. The foundations of the campaign, Nerys 
John argues, ‘had been laid under difficult circumstances, putting British banking links with South 
Africa on the agenda at a time when there was little overt opposition to apartheid South Africa 
itself.’91 Examining the onset of the campaign from an anti-apartheid perspective, however, fosters 
an alternative perception: in 1970, the AAM was emerging from a period of intense campaigning 
that entailed demonstrations against rugby teams and the success of the ‘Stop the Seventies’ 
campaign. The movement was further gaining political traction as evidenced by its more frequent 
communication with the Prime Minister’s Office a few years later. More importantly, anti-apartheid 
activists had managed to draw attention to Barclays on a number of occasions such as in connection 
with the Cabora Bassa project and the AGMs. While the AAM had not succeeded in compelling 
Barclays to disinvest from South Africa, then, the activists had set up a campaign propelled by the 
momentum of recent achievements that would gradually build up pressure on the bank. 
 
Sustaining the Campaign, Mid-1970s to Mid-1980s 
Following the two publicity crises related to the Cabora Bassa dam project and the articles series in 
the Guardian, Barclays hoped to see voices critical of the bank’s South African connection quieten 
down. When the EEC Code of Conduct was established in 1977, BARNAT and Barclays 
immediately adopted the guidelines. Yet in the aftermath of the Soweto Uprising in 1976, a 
controversial decision by BARNAT to purchase 10-15 million pounds’ worth of South African 
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defence bonds once more reflected back on its parent bank.92 By most accounts, the purchase was 
made in order to appease the South African government, which had rebuked BARNAT for its 
‘unpatriotic stance.’93 In fact, banks operating in South Africa were required by law to hold a 
certain quantity of government stock, which BARNAT subsequently used as an argument that any 
such holding could be used for military purposes irrespective of its specific affiliation. This 
rationalization of the purchase, however, was not aided by the fact that the bonds had been acquired 
by ceremoniously handing a cheque to a South African military general.94 Furthermore, the bank 
had produced an advert that encouraged potential customers to ‘tackle inflation like a bayonet 
charge with a Barclays Savings Account. Come on you soldiers, bank with Barclays.’95 
Reproaching BARNAT’s actions at the Barclays AGM in 1977, Chairman Sir Anthony Tuke stated 
that the ‘purchase of these Bonds was entirely within the discretion of the people on the spot but, 
having said that, I do consider that it was handled in an insensitive way showing a lack of 
appreciation of the reaction in many other parts of the world.’96 Sir Tuke further emphasized 
Barclays’ policy not to lend foreign currency to the South African government, which he argued 
severely limited the capacity of South Africa to purchase foreign military equipment. 
The explicit connection between BARNAT and the South African military signified by the defence 
bonds precipitated an outcry from the various anti-apartheid groups as well as parts of the 
international community and the British public. An article in the South African Financial Mail on 
15 April 1976 explains that while condemnation of foreign corporate involvement was not a novel 
phenomenon, the ‘opposition nowadays is more substantial as well as being more vocal.’97 The 
Nigerian government, for instance, withdrew its deposits from Barclays and expelled a third of the 
expatriates employed at the Nigerian subsidiary of the bank.98 The Haslemere Group was quick to 
frame the defence bonds as a ‘Fighting Fund’ intended for military aggression towards South 
Africa’s neighbours.99 ELTSA accused Barclays – among other banks – of being willing to ‘turn a 
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blind eye’ to the implications of the bank’s policies and decisions.100 At a parliamentary session in 
the House of Commons on the defence bonds, Robert Hughes, Chairman of the AAM, proclaimed 
that ‘in the past we have described the multinationals and British companies that had such 
investments as the accomplices of apartheid. With hindsight and in view of what has happened 
recently, that is too charitable. It is perfectly clear that they are the bulwark of apartheid.’101 
The barrage of criticism pertaining to the defence bonds appears to have caused considerable 
concern at Barclays since the bank had to try to curtail the negative effect on its public image, hold 
meetings with anti-apartheid activists, and spend time and resources on internal communication on 
the issue. At a BARNAT board meeting on 1 July 1977, Sir Tuke referred to ‘these tiresome 
Defence Bonds’ and noted that ‘I think it is true to say that all of us were surprised at the strength of 
reaction in England .’102 At the meeting, the public reaction to the defence bonds prompted 
discussions on whether they should be sold and even on the future of Barclays’ investment in South 
Africa. Sir Tuke explained that the bank’s gross exposure to South Africa was ‘not less than £820 
million, not all that far short of the capital and reserves of the Group as a whole.’103 Concluding his 
statement, he urged the members of the board to ‘bear in mind that the main Barclays investment is 
still in England and the action of the South African subsidiary has done great harm.’104 Soon 
afterwards, the bank rid itself of the bonds. 
ELTSA reacted to this decision by claiming that the ‘victory of the Defence Bonds sale shows the 
importance of public pressure being brought to bear on British-based enterprises with investments 
in South Africa.’105 While pressure on Barclays was the decisive factor in the bank’s decision, I 
would argue that the response by ELTSA can be characterized as an attempt to frame the event in 
its favour. By generalizing from the concrete sale of defence bonds, the group engaged in what 
McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald label a ‘conscious strategic effort […] to fashion shared 
understandings of the world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.’106 
Establishing a narrative of success in the confrontation with Barclays would serve to rationalize the 
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continuation of the campaign and facilitate mobilization efforts. In general, the anti-apartheid 
activists were adept at converting concessions by the bank into successes for the anti-apartheid 
cause (as evident in the aftermath of Barclays’ disinvestment discussed in the following section). 
The efforts by Barclays to depict itself as a responsible company and to disassociate itself from the 
apartheid policies of the South African government had been undermined, first, by BARNAT’s 
purchase of defence bonds and, second, by its public remarks that the purchase had been done as 
part of the bank’s ‘social responsibility.’107 While the anti-apartheid activists largely perceived of 
Barclays as a single entity, incidents such as the defence bonds controversy demonstrated the 
discrepancy between BARNAT, which operated in a South African context, and Barclays, which 
had other concerns. Thus, the opposition to apartheid in Britain and the workings of the South 
African banking industry collided in the harsh public condemnation of a business decision made by 
Barclays’ South African subsidiary; this reaction by the public is indicative of the assertion by Beck 
that the ‘how’ of business is increasingly politicized.108 Illustrating the passive subpolitics of the 
bank, the perceived link between Barclays and the military suppression of the non-white population 
in South Africa was exceptionally tangible in the case of the acquisition of the defence bonds. 
As an appendix to this controversy, Barclays invested R20 million in 1979 in the development of 
the parastatal South African Coal, Oil and Gas Corporation (SASOL) refinery that was designed to 
produce oil from coal.109 At the Barclays AGM in 1980, Sir Tuke noted that while the defence 
bonds had indeed been controversial, there was ‘no insensitivity about the SASOL issue’ since all 
the major banks were involved.110 As explained during a debate in the House of Commons, 
however, the refineries were ‘built to enable the regime to resist international sanctions.’111 This 
incident further attests to the complexities of transnational business operations linking Britain and 
apartheid South Africa as well as the neglected ramifications of passive subpolitics. 
Having already decided to engage with its critics more proactively shortly prior to the controversy 
pertaining to the defence bonds, a shift in Barclays’ strategy had now been further necessitated and 
the scene was set for a new phase in the interaction between the bank and the anti-apartheid 
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activists. Towards the end of the 1970s, the campaign had increased in scope and the organization 
of events had become more ambitious. The AAM scheduled a month of action in March 1978, for 
instance, in conjunction with the UN International Anti-Apartheid Year. It was proposed that the 
first week should focus on banks with Barclays as the figurehead of the industry.112 In a press 
release from 28 February that year, the AAM and ELTSA called for 10,000 accounts to be 
withdrawn and it was further announced that over 200 Barclays’ branches would be picketed on a 
single National Day of Action on 1 March.113 The press release stated that the campaign had now 
‘extended to the international level’ by way of the divestment of the All-African Council of 
Churches, the stern criticism from the Caribbean Conference of Churches, and the growing 
campaign against Barclays in the US. At this point, the AAM and ELTSA claimed to be in contact 
with 1,000 organizations and individuals concerning the prospect of divesting from the bank.114 
ELTSA wavered between dedicating itself fully to the bank campaign and merging with the labour 
movement in order to gain added leverage.115 Funding and staffing were identified as the most 
important elements affecting the ability of the group to sustain the campaign.116 After some debate, 
the decision was made to conduct more thorough research on Barclays through the appointment of a 
Barclays Shadow Board; the aim was to contribute with information to the campaign against the 
bank that could help the activists gain the upper hand in the ‘war of representation.’ Not only would 
a more carefully researched campaign offensive complicate Barclays’ counter-efforts, it would also 
imbue the anti-apartheid cause with a greater sense of legitimacy among the public. 
The inaugural meeting of the Shadow Board was held in London on 26 January 1981, and 
according to ELTSA it was the ‘first time that a shadow board has ever been established in this 
country to monitor the activities of a multi-national company.’117 The main task of the Shadow 
Board was to produce an annual Shadow Report on Barclays’ involvement in South Africa; this 
report was distributed not only among anti-apartheid activists and at public rallies but also among 
the shareholders at the Barclays AGMs. Sir Tuke, who was retiring as Chairman of Barclays at the 
time, noted that ‘there are various strange things about this Shadow Board Report’ such as the fact 
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that it only covered the bank’s South African connection while appearing to report on the bank as a 
whole.118 Also, the report was dated from 1981 whereas it was in fact pertaining to the activities of 
1980, which presented a source of confusion.119 Despite some inaccuracies in the report, ELTSA 
announced that it had ‘sold like hot cakes,’ which indicates a demand for a more elaborate and 
professionalized approach to the bank campaign and, perhaps, to anti-apartheid activism more 
broadly.120 The steps taken by the AAM and ELTSA in this direction – such as the publication of 
the Shadow Reports and the nomination of Archbishop Huddleston as President of the AAM – 
indubitably enhanced the legitimacy of the anti-apartheid cause among parts of the British public, 
which made it increasingly difficult for Barclays to dismiss the activists as radical or fringe 
idealists. 
Cognizant of the activists’ emphasis on condemnatory information, Barclays distributed Head 
Office circulars to the local directors and managers in advance of anti-Barclays demonstrations 
stressing the need to publish counter-information. ‘The over-riding aim,’ one memorandum 
specified, ‘is to ensure […] that our words appear in print alongside the demonstrators’ sentiments, 
not in a later issue.’121 Barclays had learnt from previous episodes such as the Cabora Bassa 
controversy that it could be difficult to sway public opinion once the activists’ perspective had 
gained currency in the public imagination. A tactic repeatedly deployed by the bank was to 
relativize the significance of circulating information by asserting that ‘since the facts are constantly 
changing, and are subject to various attitudes, much of what is said is inaccurate, out of date or out 
of context.’122 Establishing doubts about the accuracy of the activists’ criticisms could potentially 
undermine their efforts which, as we have seen, were reliant on legitimacy among the public. 
As part of the ‘war of representation,’ Barclays began distributing a folder entitled Barclays in 
South Africa: the Philosophy and the Facts.123 The bank further presented its own explanations of 
the motivations for the boycott campaign by situating anti-apartheid activism within a socio-
historical context. Thus, a review describes how ‘social and commercial history has created close 
links between South Africa and the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth countries which 
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complicate the issue, not least because they introduce an emotional element into the debate which 
can then become less concerned with the facts themselves than with the attitudes to those facts.’124 
In addition to historical ties, the review emphasizes the role of ideology as an impediment to the 
propagation of accurate information. Political views, it is argued, ‘even as fundamental as the 
conflict between capitalism and socialism, also enter the arena and add to the problem for those 
who wish to decide fairly between withdrawal or constructive engagement as the better course for 
British and other foreign investment in South Africa.’125 Barclays was well aware that the 
movement’s far left-wing affiliations was a cause of concern among many who harboured 
sympathies towards the anti-apartheid effort. 
Despite the fact that Barclays had already become more proactive in its response to the anti-
apartheid campaign, the early 1980s saw an internal discussion on potential further resources 
allocated to handling this issue. ‘I am sure I am not alone,’ J.H.C. Wicker writes in 1981, ‘but I am 
getting more and more concerned about what I believe is the increasing strength of the anti-
apartheid lobbyists.’126 He explains that it was generally necessary to deal with the anti-apartheid 
activists on a weekly basis, which is indicative of the amount of management resources spent as a 
consequence of the campaign. Finally, Wicker asks whether Barclays is ‘sufficiently aggressive in 
combating the anti-apartheid lobby? It seems to be that we take a low-key stance, a purely defensive 
posture, and tend to react to events or to poor publicity.’127 A letter from the same date, however, 
cautions Chairman Sir Timothy Bevan that ‘to move over to the offensive at this time could be 
fraught with danger.’128 The letter argues that a more pro-active strategy can only be justified ‘if 
some positive development took place in South Africa which could definitely be attributed to 
pressure from us, or any other international group (thus showing that the policy of constructive 
engagement does work).’129 I discuss Barclays’ policy on constructive engagement in more detail 
later in this chapter. 
Collectively, the two sentiments expressed above convey Barclays’ quandary between unease about 
the mounting pressure on the bank, on the one hand, and on the other hand a hesitancy – as a bank – 
to engage in the public debate on political issues. A 1981 assessment of Barclays’ response to the 
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boycott campaign notes that the bank spent substantial resources on being up-to-date on 
developments in the campaign, meeting with prominent figures such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, 
producing material for the newly enrolled college students, maintaining a dialogue with 
‘responsible critics’ (among whom were only listed religious groups), responding to inquiries and 
criticism from institutions such as universities and local councils, and finally avoiding ‘any dialogue 
with the Haslam/Bailey type of extremist who merely twists whatever we say against us – often out 
of context.’130 Avoiding this type of dialogue was in fact difficult due to the recurrent participation 
by anti-apartheid activists at the Barclays AGMs to the pronounced annoyance of many 
shareholders present at the meetings. Sir Tuke introduced the 1977 AGM, for instance, by 
acknowledging that ‘our Annual General Meetings have been taken up almost entirely by what can 
be described as a series of questions and statements concerning our involvement in South Africa.’131 
By the 1981 AGM, one shareholder commented ironically that ‘my question isn’t about South 
Africa, I hope that’s alright!’132 
Among the activists, however, some were beginning to feel disillusioned about the impact of the 
activities at the AGMs. An activist from ELTSA noted at a meeting in 1979 that she ‘felt strongly 
the AGM’s were now becoming a waste of resources. […] It was time to consider how its limited 
resources could be used most effectively, and continuation of large numbers of mailings to people 
often without reply was not the best way of using those resources.’133 Despite such propositions, 
however, attendance at the AGMs continued. ELTSA’s stated priorities for 1983 provide a sense of 
the progressively more extensive efforts by the activists who – though still far from achieving their 
goal of compelling Barclays to disinvest – appear to have become more optimistic about the 
realization of this goal towards the final years of the campaign. At this time, the activists engaged in 
ELTSA were concerned with sustaining the boycott against Barclays, which also included 
producing a range of leaflets, newsletters, and reports, as well as a Shadow Report for the coming 
year. They would also monitor other banks such as Standard Chartered, Hill Samuel, NatWest, 
Midland and Lloyds. Regarding the organization of activists, the group would seek to expand the 
network of anti-apartheid-related bank campaigns that were being conducted outside of Britain, and 
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to collaborate with the campaigns for oil sanctions. Finally, ELTSA would initiate a campaign 
against the IMF for its loans to South Africa.134 
With all these activities in mind – in addition to the escalating debt crisis in South Africa and an 
international community increasingly supportive of sanctions – the campaign against Barclays 
appeared to be gaining momentum as it moved into the 1980s; as N. Craig Smith notes, the 
campaign ‘at least appear[s] to have created a climate of possibility.’135 Already in 1981, a briefing 
by the AAM claimed that Barclays had been ‘hurt by the Boycott – a fact to which their strenuous 
efforts to counter our campaign attests.’136 This assertion is not to be mistaken for a conviction that 
the campaign would be successful within the near future and though it should also be perceived as 
an attempt to motivate and mobilize through deliberate framing, it is suggestive of a more confident 
approach by the activists. 
 
Barclays’ Disinvestment 
Considering the political turmoil in South Africa in the mid-1980s and the risky investment climate, 
Barclays’ decision to disinvest ought to have come as no surprise. In fact, the bank’s shareholding 
in BARNAT had been reduced from 100 per cent in 1971 to 64 per cent in 1978, before a further 
reduction to 40.4 per cent in 1985. Moreover, Barclays had repeatedly affirmed that it ‘is our policy 
to continue these reductions.’137 By the end of 1986, however, the anti-apartheid activists had not 
anticipated the bank’s announcement and were caught off guard by this sudden ‘victory’ for their 
campaign. Only a couple of months prior to Barclays’ announcement, activists had complained that 
a picket outside of a Barclays’ branch had received ‘scarce publicity.’138 Around the same time, 
Deputy Chairman John Quinton avowed in a letter that ‘we shall persevere in pressing for change, 
in the knowledge that we have already achieved more positive results in this direction than any of 
our critics.’139 While it appears that the optimism of the early 1980s had generally prevailed, I 
would suggest that the bank’s failure to disinvest in the immediate wake of the Langa shootings or 
the first State of Emergency, when Chase Manhattan withdrew its investment, may have affected 
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some activists’ hopes of a similar decision by Barclays in the near future. In this section, I examine 
the political, economic, and social factors that contributed to Barclays’ decision to leave South 
Africa in November 1986. My analysis extends the historical outlines and conceptual discussions of 
the previous chapters and sections, though I pay special attention to the influence of the anti-
apartheid campaign in my assessment of the bank’s decision. 
At the 1985 AGM, Sir Bevan noted that ‘when talking of disinvestment, it seems to me the burden 
of proof is on the disinvestors to show how much more it would achieve than we have achieved by 
our policy of constructive engagement.’140 Any uncertainty concerning the impact of disinvestment, 
I would add, was favourable to Barclays in the sense that it fenced off some of the bank’s critics 
while postponing concrete political measures. Comparable to the activists’ reference to the ANC as 
justification for their call for sanctions and disinvestment, the bank saw a strategic advantage in the 
use of sources that would be perceived as morally legitimate voices independent of private sector 
interests. As discussed in chapter two, this strategy can be characterized as ‘discursive antagonism’ 
since it constitutes an effort to confront and repudiate criticism from the AAM.141 Thus, the bank’s 
reliance on external sources for legitimation signifies an escalation in the discursive conflict 
between Barclays and the activists. 
One such source was Dr. Ellen Hellman, President of the Institute of Race Relations, whose 1971 
article entitled Boycotts and the Economy regarded the potential success of foreign disinvestment 
and the imposition of sanctions as ‘extremely questionable.’142 Hellman argued – in moral terms – 
that where the ‘boycotters misconceive the situation is, I suggest, in their disregard of the massive 
extent of poverty in South Africa, and their failure to appreciate the effect of this widespread 
poverty on the quality of the lives of the people concerned.’143 Such contributions to the debate on 
constructive engagement were welcomed by Barclays where an internal note advised that ‘we 
should, of course, try to use it to our advantage.’144 It was proposed that the article should be cited 
in the annual report, public statements on the anti-apartheid campaign, and the bank’s ‘Fact Sheet.’ 
Furthermore, copies should be sent to all regional managers and local directors.145 Another 
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important source of legitimation for Barclays was the controversial Gatsha Buthelezi, Chief 
Minister of Kwazulu and Chairman of the South African Black Alliance, who stated as late as in 
1984 that ‘no matter how repugnant apartheid appears to the world; no matter how indignant the 
international community becomes about South Africa’s internal policies, disinvestment is a wrong 
strategy, a misguided strategy and a strategy which does not aid the struggle for liberation at 
home.’146 
Apart from referencing sources sympathetic to constructive engagement, Barclays also drew on 
substantive research. In a large report entitled Foreign Investment in South Africa – The Policy 
Debate, several papers examined whether ‘external investment – in its broadest sense – [is] a 
significant factor in the maintenance (or erosion) of apartheid?’147 Each study was categorized in 
terms of its stance towards constructive engagement and a note concerning the report concludes that 
the ‘most interesting aspect of the papers, taken together, is the difference in approach and 
conclusions between equally devoted opponents of apartheid.’148 
One of the papers in the report was particularly convenient for the bank as it asserted that if the 
South African government began to feel threatened on account of disinvesting foreign companies, it 
would seek to impede the flow of funds out of the country.149 As explained earlier, the South 
African authorities chose to do just this when they issued a moratorium on existing loans in the 
mid-1980s. The paper further concluded that the ‘case for withdrawal must be a political one. 
Certainly, the economic arguments seem to indicate that withdrawal is not a very effective 
strategy.’150 This emphasis on politics is echoed by Barclays in a review from 1980 of the debate on 
disinvestment and constructive engagement, which contends that ‘in the end it can only be a matter 
of opinion whether Barclays are wrong to adopt a policy of constructive engagement and are 
therefore objectively supporting the South African government.’151 As we have seen, sources 
questioning the outcome of full-scale disinvestment could easily be located. Presenting the debate 
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as a matter of political standpoint, however, also constituted a strategic advantage to the bank since 
it relativized any divergent opinions. 
As discussed in chapter two, the barring from foreign capital was intended to harm the South 
African economy and thus compel the government to abandon its apartheid policies. Proponents of 
disinvestment, however, tended to concede that the non-white population would be victims of this 
strategy in the short term. Presenting an overview of the role of foreign-owned banks in South 
Africa, an extensive report by the CCSA from 1978 posits that large-scale disinvestment would not 
be an ‘exercise in hand-washing but will generate powerful economic and political pressures on the 
South African government to change its policies.’152 Concerning banks in particular, the report 
further asserts that ‘capital scarcity might reverse the trend towards greater mechanization, and 
exclusion from foreign markets (through lack of trade finance) could stimulate greater interest in 
meeting the needs of the country’s black consumers.’153 The duration of the democratic transition, 
the report argues, would ‘depend on the speed with which the white minority appreciated the 
radically altered nature of their position and began to take new political and economic 
initiatives.’154 In other words, an assessment of the implications of disinvestment was not 
exclusively a matter of remaining in or leaving South Africa but should take account of factors such 
as the duration and severity of the economic impact on the political elite and its constituents. While 
this understanding of disinvestment contains important nuances, the debate as it played out between 
activists and companies tended to rely on more distinct demarcations between disinvestment and 
constructive engagement. Evaluating the effects of constructive engagement up until the late 1970s, 
the report by CCSA concludes that ‘little substantive evidence can be found’ that this strategy has 
‘been of benefit to the black community let alone been of a magnitude commensurate with that 
obtained by the whites.’155 In fact, it is asserted, ‘British banking relations do more to sustain the 
status quo in South Africa than to change it.’156 
Together with other activists at the Barclays AGM in 1983, Reverend Haslam sought to convey the 
economic risks inherent in a South African investment. Importantly, these risks not only pertained 
to the turmoil in South Africa but were also noticeable on the domestic front: at the AGM, Barclays 
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conceded that seven local authorities had divested of their holdings in the bank during the previous 
year, while only two new accounts had been gained. 157 A survey from March 1985 concludes that 
fifteen local authorities had either divested from Barclays or changed their policies on banking 
involved in South Africa.158 Known for his long and confrontational remarks, Reverend Haslam 
spoke directly to the shareholders in an effort to make them reconsider their stake in the bank. 
Reverend Haslam asserted that the ‘reasons why all Shareholders should be concerned about 
Barclays’ business in that part of the world is because 10 per cent of the Bank’s assets are actually 
found in South Africa and Namibia and 20 per cent of the Bank’s profits came from that part of the 
world last year.’159 The activists presumed that non-activist shareholders might also be persuaded to 
sell their shares in Barclays by fostering awareness about this trend and conveying the risks 
associated with investing in the bank. 
While the AAM and ELTSA may have had an interest in exaggerating this risk, Barclays was in 
fact faced with a series of factors that, collectively, complicated the presence of the bank in South 
Africa. In 1987, Robert A. Bennett compiled a list of the potential threats that loomed over Barclays 
just prior to its decision to disinvest, which is consistent with the factors that I discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter: first, South Africa’s private sector had begun to borrow heavily from 
foreign investors; second, the social protests appeared to be increasing in magnitude and vehemence 
as did the international media coverage; third, a number of large foreign banks had begun to transfer 
their loans to smaller banks; fourth, the announcement by Chase Manhattan to terminate its lending 
was an eye-catching statement to other foreign banks about the risks involved in the South African 
market; finally, Botha’s ‘Rubicon speech’ ended the confidence of many foreign observers in the 
ability of the South African government to stabilize the political situation.160 In addition to these 
factors, the artificially high gold prices, the requirement formulated by the Franzsen Commission 
that Barclays should reduce its shareholding in BARNAT, the general anticipation of a British 
equivalent to the CAAA in the US, and concern with the bank’s branches elsewhere in Africa 
further problematized a continued commitment in South Africa. Already in August 1985 – 
immediately after Chase Manhattan’s announcement – Barclays declared that it would soon remove 
the name ‘Barclays’ from its South African subsidiary.161 
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One factor that might have postponed Barclays’ decision for a short period, however, was the debt 
owed by the South African government. According to the bank, this debt totaled just under £800 
million and it was caught in the moratorium imposed by the Botha government on 2 September 
1985.162 The bank was set to lose this sum in the event of complete disinvestment, which meant that 
in effect Barclays would have to pay to leave South Africa. An ELTSA report entitled Apartheid’s 
Debt to the West seized the opportunity to proclaim that ‘South Africa’s dependence on foreign 
borrowing is now exposed for all to see.’163 The moratorium was a consequence of a decision by 
many foreign banks to terminate lending to the government and to call for the immediate repayment 
of the outstanding loans. According to the report, this left the South African government with $24 
billion in debt, which it did not have the funds to repay. Approximately half of this debt consisted 
of short-term lending by foreign banks, which had quadrupled between 1980 and 1984. ELTSA put 
forward the case that the debt crisis provided a ‘unique opportunity for the international financial 
campaign against apartheid. Foreign capital has been revealed as a vulnerable foundation of white 
power in South Africa.’164 The report concludes that ‘unless or until a final settlement is reached, 
bankers will continue to have an unparalleled degree of political leverage over South Africa. The 
international community must exercise its own leverage over the bankers.’165 The fact that the 
Botha administration was compelled to make a move as drastic as a unilateral freeze on debt 
repayment indicates the extent of South Africa’s political and economic predicament. 
A letter correspondence between the AAM and Chairman Sir Bevan demonstrates the differences in 
opinion as to what designated Barclays’ responsibility in terms of the debt moratorium: in Sir 
Bevan’s view, the primary responsibility of the bank was with its shareholders and he argued that 
‘when a Bank is owed money it has a duty to get that money back.’166 Archbishop Huddleston, 
conversely, replied that ‘it is your responsibility to refuse to have further dealings with the South 
African authorities and to refuse to take part in its debt negotiations. While your funds remain in 
South Africa’s hands, its defence budget rises and its oil and arms purchases, designed to 
circumvent the international embargoes, increase.’167 Once again, the AAM emphasizes the passive 
subpolitics of its boycott target and the structural injustices associated with its operations in South 
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Africa. It is important to reiterate that within the South African context even a purely economic 
motivation by the bank to call for the repayment of its loans was likely to be based in part on an 
assessment of the political stability of the country. Moreover, the political implications of foreign 
investment in South Africa become manifest particularly when examining Barclays’ decision to 
disinvest – located at the nexus between the political and the economic – since the bank’s demand 
of repayment of outstanding loans would inevitably induce significant political consequences. 
Then, on 24 November 1986, Barclays publicly announced its decision to sell its remaining shares 
in BARNAT to Anglo-American. The principal reasons listed included Barclays’ holding in 
BARNAT, which was beginning to seriously affect the bank’s international customer base, and the 
bank’s newly unveiled plans to expand in North America, Europe, and the Pacific region, which 
would be considerably easier without ties to South Africa.168 These were reasonable assessments of 
the value of BARNAT to Barclays, which at the time accounted for merely 2.5 per cent of the total 
Barclays Group profits. It was noted in the annual report that BARNAT would continue its strategy 
of constructive engagement, which indicates that Barclays had not abandoned its previous political 
position and thus reaffirmed the economic explanations submitted by the bank. Upon its 
announcement, the value of the bank’s shares increased considerably.169 
In his immediate remarks after the announcement, Sir Bevan predicted that ‘although this is a 
commercial decision, inevitably the general moral issue will be raised.’170 Irrespective of the ample 
amount of economic justifications for disinvesting, much of the British press did indeed speculate 
on the extent of the influence of the AAM on this decision. In the Financial Times, David Lascelles 
and Jim Jones describe how politicians and anti-apartheid activists in Britain ‘hailed Barclays’ 
move as a significant victory in the struggle against racism.’171 The article cites Chris Ball, 
Managing Director of BARNAT, who noted that the bank had sold ‘for the wrong reasons’ and 
ventured that external pressures had hastened the commercial decision to disinvest.172 In a separate 
article, Lascelles challenges Barclays’ explanations and states that ‘no matter how much Barclays 
Bank ascribes other reasons to it, the decision announced yesterday to pull out of South Africa will 
be seen as a major capitulation to world opinion, and as such one of the most important victories yet 
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for the anti-apartheid lobby.’173 Not only was it insinuated that the activists were largely responsible 
for Barclays’ decision to disinvest, Lascelles further concludes that the decision marked the bank’s 
‘final retreat from its argument - held tenaciously throughout the apartheid controversy - that it 
could do no more to help South African blacks by staying than by leaving.’174 This directly 
contradicts Barclays’ own statements as well as the fact that BARNAT would reportedly continue 
to pursue a number of CSR programs, albeit within the confines of South African law. 
In The Guardian, Andrew Cornelius inferred that the ‘no confidence vote by supportive and 
influential Barclays has hammered another nail in the coffin of the apartheid regime.’175 
Emphasizing the impact of the boycott campaign on the bank’s decision, Cornelius contemplates 
that the ‘underdog can win in the face of sophisticated and heavily funded opposition from a 
multinational.’176 Emblematic of the general coverage of Barclays’ announcement in the British 
press, such a depiction of the campaign was exceptionally valuable to the AAM. Whereas at times 
the movement had been criticized for its prevalent communist sympathies, its obstruction of store 
entrances, harassment of customers etc., it was now commended by many for its supposed 
contribution to a more socially responsible business environment. The AAM claimed in a press 
release that ‘today’s news will be a tremendous source of encouragement to the international 
campaign for sanctions and disinvestment.’177 If the press was any indicator of the public opinion, 
then, the activists had succeeded in establishing a cognitive association between Barclays and the 
apartheid system as well as in convincing people that constructive engagement was not a sensible 
strategy. 
Barclays’ announcement to disinvest even became the centre of debate in a number of sessions at 
the Houses of Parliament, which attests to the domestic importance of the bank as well as the scale 
of publicity attained by the consumer boycott campaign. In the House of Lords, Lord Cledwyn of 
Penrhos wanted to know whether the Thatcher government supported Barclays’ disinvestment and 
whether it was prepared to support other British companies that chose a similar course of action. In 
response, Baroness Young stated that the ‘action of Barclays Bank is a matter for Barclays. It is a 
                                                          
173 David Lascelles, “High Risks and Low Returns; Barclays and South Africa.” 25 November, 1986. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Andrew Cornelius, ”Frontiers (Item One): Morality in the balance / Barclays Bank’s decision to quit South Africa.” 
The Guardian, 27 November, 1986. 
176 Ibid. 
177 Press release: Bod.MSS.AAM 1593. 
129 
 
commercial decision for them.’178 This remark led to some discussion concerning the bank’s 
motives with Lord Hatch of Lusby inquiring whether Barclays had not stated that the ‘decision 
taken was not taken solely on commercial grounds, but also on political grounds?’179 The debate at 
the House of Commons was equally marked by uncertainty concerning the most important factors 
in Barclays’ decision. Mr. Winnick asked if the Foreign Secretary was ‘going to congratulate the 
anti-apartheid movement on the way in which it has persuaded Barclays bank to withdraw its 
holdings in South Africa?’180 Mrs. Chalker, in response, asserted that the ‘decision by Barclays 
bank was an entirely commercial decision.’181 
Barclays itself, by way of its chairman, did not concede any moral secessions as a result of anti-
apartheid campaigning. According to the official history of Barclays, the decision to disinvest had 
been made on ‘politically driven, broader business grounds.’182 In a letter to Archbishop Huddleston 
a few months after the announcement, Sir Bevan addressed doubts expressed by the AAM on the 
motivations by Barclay to disinvest by explaining that if the bank’s stated reasons ‘appeared to give 
less weight to the moral factor than you and your colleagues would have liked, I can only point to 
our acknowledged reputation of being robust campaigners against apartheid, and of taking far more 
positive action against that evil than some of those who have criticized us for being in South 
Africa.’183 Ackrill and Hannah further argue that those within Barclays who had wanted to retain a 
shareholding in BARNAT ‘simply could not understand the naivety of campaigners who felt that 
the quasi-forced sale, cheaply, of BARNAT shares to powerful white South African interests could 
bring the white community to its knees.’184 
Barclays may not have been persuaded by moral argumentation yet the consumer boycott campaign 
was felt most urgently by the bank in the form of a decline in profits as evidenced by the marked 
reduction in Barclays’ share of the student market. This view is corroborated in Andrew Cornelius’ 
analysis that the most significant part of the campaign against Barclays was ‘not winning over the 
management of the bank on moral grounds, but hitting the bank where it hurts most... in the 
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pocket.’185 I advocate a less rigid dichotomy between economics and ethics when assessing the 
impact of anti-apartheid boycott campaigns on account of at least two circumstances: first, the 
activists’ moral arguments were converted into economic pressure through boycotting; second, the 
moral arguments in favour of constructive engagement were preoccupied with the economic 
improvement of the non-white population of South Africa. I suggest that the examples listed above 
demonstrate the unfeasibility of maintaining a sharp distinction between economics and ethics in 
studies both of the intended and actual impact of surrogate consumer boycotts. As noted in chapter 
two, the activists’ perception of Barclays as a surrogate target for the South African government 
curtailed activist concern with effecting a sustained transformation in the policies of the bank. In 
this capacity, the contribution of the boycott campaign to Barclays’ attention to CSR is the product 
of passive subpolitics (I return to this discussion later in this chapter). 
Having attained the primary aim of the campaign, the AAM and ELTSA now had to make sure that 
Barclays would not drag out the disinvestment process. In December 1986, the groups collectively 
drafted a document entitled Boycott Barclays Campaign – the Current Situation, which discusses 
potential strategies for the final phase of the campaign. The document emphasizes the fact that 
Barclays would still be involved in BARNAT in the near future by maintaining correspondence, 
providing assistance, reinvesting nearly £90 million from the sale of shares in the South African 
market, being a member of the Technical Committee that aided the South African government in 
rescheduling its debt, and finally by not insisting on immediate repayment of this debt.186 The AAM 
and ELTSA declared that they would continue the current strategy and they ‘pledged to intensify 
the boycott campaign’ if Barclays did not provide ‘categorical guarantees’ of its complete 
disengagement from South Africa within six months.187 Setting a time frame was perceived as 
important to the ‘wider campaign for disinvestment, sanctions, and the total isolation of apartheid 
South Africa.’188 
In a letter to Archbishop Huddleston the following March, Sir Bevan noted that ‘we do feel most 
earnestly that we are being unjustly treated by being singled out as a continuing boycott target when 
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we have done all we can to withdraw.’189 Barclays applied for assistance from the ANC to help 
terminate the boycott campaign and the bank emphasized its claim that the disinvestment was 
‘genuine.’190 A meeting between the activists and Barclays on the prospects of ending the campaign 
was followed by some discussion within the AAM. Archbishop Huddleston was convinced that it 
would be ‘wholly counter-productive to continue the boycott against Barclays when we know that 
they are doing everything possible to implement a complete pull-out.’191 He further argued that ‘we 
have not the right to judge whether their motives are purely commercial or moral. I personally think 
they are a mixture of the two and that the public statement they put out was (in their Bankers terms) 
an attempt to reassure their present and future clients.’192 
The activists who opposed this view were more skeptical of Barclays’ commitment to disinvest and 
they were hesitant about ending the campaign should the bank choose to remain in South Africa. 
Some expressed understanding of Barclays’ quandary yet proposed a broader perspective in 
accordance with the argument proposed by Xavier Carim, Audie Klotz, and Olivier Lebleu that the 
short-term nature of South Africa’s foreign debt provided banks and other major companies with 
extraordinary leverage in terms of pressuring the government to abolish the apartheid system.193 In 
a letter from the AAM, ELTSA, and the NUS to a number of British banks, the activists reasserted 
their view that ‘international banks cannot escape the political consequences of their actions.’194 
With regards to the banks’ outstanding loans, it was predicted that the their ‘agreement to any new 
rescheduling terms can only have the political result of relieving the pressures on Pretoria to 
negotiate with the real leaders of South Africa for an end to apartheid.’195 This preoccupation with 
the potential political influence of the foreign banks became the centre of discussion at a series of 
meetings orchestrated by Fritz Leutwiler, the former President of the Swiss National Bank, who had 
been employed by the Botha administration to mediate between itself and its creditors. According to 
Massie, the main question was ‘whether and to what extent the bankers would impose political 
conditions on the South African government as part of the debt agreement.’196 While this would be 
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an unusual move for the banks, Robert Massie argues, the ‘lines between economic and political 
decisions disappear’ in a context in which the banks’ predicament was caused by political decision-
making.197 Thus, the foreign private sector bank loans intended to have no political conditions 
attached were transformed into a source of political vulnerability for the South African 
government.198 As analogized in a document by ELTSA, the banks’ ‘herd instinct which had 
previously worked in South Africa’s favour, now began to operate against it.’199 The passive 
subpolitics of Barclays, then – which until the bank’s disinvestment had been a source of criticism 
by the activists – now worked in favour of their cause. Massie concludes that this observable 
dependence on foreign investment changed ‘many people’s assumptions about the power of 
economic measures to affect apartheid.’200 
At the Barclays AGM on 22 April 1987, Sir Bevan tried to ensure the skeptics by stressing that the 
disinvestment of the bank was ‘not cosmetic, but a total severing of the investment link.’201 He also 
made clear that Barclays did not support the moratorium issued by the South African government 
and that the bank actively sought to retrieve its remaining funds when he claimed that the ‘South 
African Government has gained something of a propaganda coup by claiming that international 
banks have agreed a rescheduling of its external debt. What in fact has happened is that the South 
Africans unilaterally stopped repaying capital and then dictated the terms on which they would 
pay.’202 Barclays, then, was caught between the demands of the activists and the whims of the 
Botha administration. 
By May, however, the AAM published a report in which it was confirmed that the ‘Boycott 
Barclays campaign has achieved its stated objective’ and that ‘we will no longer be pursuing this 
campaign.’203 Instead, new campaigns would be launched against Standard Chartered as well as 
against any ‘British and British-based banks’ with existing loans to South Africa in order to ensure 
the termination of these loans.204 Finally, the activists would advocate publicly in favour of 
declaring South Africa bankrupt. Already in August, however, Standard Chartered followed in 
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Barclays’ footsteps and sold its remaining shares in its South African subsidiary.205 Shortly 
afterwards, a number of other banks followed suit. By 1989, a report by the Commonwealth 
Secretariat labelled South Africa a ‘perceived high risk borrower’ and referred to the risks of being 
caught by a unilateral rescheduling of loans similar to that of the mid-1980s.206 South Africa’s 
economic situation deteriorated during 1989 and in April the AAM and ELTSA rebooted their ‘no 
debt rescheduling’ campaign, which aimed to prevent banks from negotiating new loan conditions. 
Despite their efforts, however, approximately $8 billion were rescheduled in October.207 An ELTSA 
strategy paper from 1989 indicates that the activists found it difficult to sustain the campaign, and it 
was agreed that the failure to prevent the rescheduling emphasized the ‘importance of better longer-
term planning’ and that they were at loss as to how to ‘best maintain the momentum.’208 I 
demonstrate in chapter four how the campaign against Shell underwent a similar development. 
In their assessment of Barclays’ disinvestment, Ackrill and Hannah conclude that ‘history favours 
the campaigners: their action led to one more source of pressure forcing the white South African 
government to negotiate with the black majority and forge a democratic consensus for stable 
government.’209 Those who gained from this decision, they continue, include the South African 
government’s exchange management account, predominantly white pension funds, and other 
investors in the bank; this was ‘an outcome neither desired nor intended by the anti-apartheid 
campaigners who forced it.’210 Ackrill and Hannah hypothesize that a profitable sale in the 1970s 
would have been the best solution for Barclays since it could have spared the bank years of having 
to deal with the boycott campaign as well as the negotiations concerning a rescheduling of South 
Africa’s debt. Put more bluntly, the disinvestment ‘benefited blacks politically, whites financially, 
and Barclays not at all.’211 
This analysis, however, does not take into account the new market possibilities or the sudden rise in 
student accounts after the end of the boycott campaign. Barclays’ disinvestment caused no 
perceptible harm to the South African economy yet according to Sampson it ‘marked a withdrawal 
not so much of technology or management but of confidence and credit, in the literal sense of trust, 
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which is the bankers’ life blood.’212 Vella Pillay, a founding member of the AAM, suggests that 
‘what broke the back of the apartheid regime, within the context of the ungovernability campaigns 
of the youth in the townships, was the refusal of the international banks to renew South Africa’s 
bank loans.’213 The British government was thus out of tune with developments in the private sector 
as it continued to be the largest foreign investor and lender in South Africa in the mid-1980s.214 
Drawing on the notions introduced by Monroe Friedman, I would argue that Barclays’ 
disinvestment was a ‘micro-victory’ but a ‘macro-defeat’ to the activists in the sense that – while 
their surrogate target acted in accordance with their demands – the overall aim of ending apartheid 
was not elicited directly by this event.215 I would maintain, however, that the bank’s disinvestment 
contributed not only to the concerted economic pressure on South Africa’s government but also in 
terms of changing public and corporate perceptions of CSR as the boycott campaign – in 
conjunction with the highly publicized announcement to disinvest – became vehicles for increased 
attention to the infusion of social responsibility into business conduct. According to an analyst cited 
by Fieldhouse, the Barclays campaign made ‘Apartheid relevant to British people by showing them 
manifestations of the regime on their doorsteps, in their high streets in their recreation.’216 While the 
primary aim of the campaign was Barclays’ disinvestment, the numerous allusions by the activists 
to the social responsibility of foreign companies signal the significance to the activists of the wider 
ethical implications of the boycott campaign. In this capacity, then, the campaign’s normative 
promotion of greater sensibility towards CSR-related issues could also be deemed a ‘macro-
victory.’ 
 
Barclays and Social Responsibility 
Speaking on the issue of sanctions and the role of foreign investment, Winnie Mandela once 
declared that the non-white South Africans did not want to become ‘fat slaves.’217 In using this 
description, she visualized the perceived negative consequences of constructive engagement, which, 
as a starting point, proposed to work for change within the confines of South African apartheid law. 
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The dispute between Barclays and its critics had a dual component: part of the criticism was 
centered on the premise that any form of association with the South African economy, as phrased 
by N. Craig Smith, ‘clearly flouts the democratic principles’ taken for granted within a British 
context.218 Another part of the criticism went beyond reproving on the basis of association and 
accused the bank of actively perpetuating the structures of apartheid. Such criticism might be met 
by substantiating claims regarding the pragmatic benefits of constructive engagement yet as the 
previous sections suggest, Barclays was unable to demonstrate any positive large-scale effects of 
this policy. Instead, the bank periodically affirmed its conviction that ‘our presence in South Africa 
can no more be interpreted as political support for the government than our presence in Great 
Britain can be construed as political support for the government of the day over here.’219 An internal 
Barclays document further explains that the dispute between the bank and the activists was ‘not 
about apartheid, which is clearly an evil we all deplore, but what should be done about it.’220 
In the previous sections, I have traced the development of the campaign against Barclays that 
culminated in the bank’s disinvestment. The remainder of this chapter is preoccupied with how 
Barclays managed demands for more socially responsible conduct as well as with changes in the 
bank’s perception of what constituted socially responsible conduct within a South African 
apartheid-era context. 
When examining internal communication within Barclays and correspondence between the bank 
and other actors, two shifts in the narrative of the bank’s relation to CSR emerge: first, the name-
change of Barclays D.C.O. to BARNAT in 1971 and the immediate introduction of improved 
conditions for non-white employees. While based on inconclusive material, it is my impression that 
this decision was made partly as an effect of the controversy concerning the Cabora Bassa dam 
project and the initiation of the campaign by the AAM in Britain. Second, the late 1970s saw 
adjustments in Barclays’ lending policies followed by an increase in communication regarding 
constructive engagement and the social responsibility of the bank. Coinciding with these 
developments were the aftermath of Raphael’s articles in The Guardian, the publicity crisis relating 
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to BARNAT’s purchase of defence bonds, and the introduction of formal guidelines for CSR in the 
form of the EEC Code of Conduct and the Sullivan Principles. 
The campaign spearheaded by the AAM by no means represents the bank’s first engagement in 
discussions on social responsibilities: at the opening AGM in 1926 at Barclays D.C.O. in South 
Africa, it was announced that the bank was ‘not concerned with political questions or political 
differences of opinion, its object being to promote the business interests of those with whom it may 
come in contact and the development of those arenas in which it is established.’221 While Barclays 
dissociated itself from any political ramifications and decision-making already at this early stage, 
the commitment of the bank to contributing to the development of ‘arenas’ affected by its 
operations indicate a preliminary and vague conception of CSR. Accepting the assertion by 
Seidman that ‘external pressures on a corporation defined its societal obligations, not the moral 
instincts arising from within,’ I would deduct that Barclays had not at this point been subjected to 
substantial pressure pertaining to its social responsibility since the bank did not perceive the need to 
define or express its policies in this regard.222 The intricacies of Seidman’s proposition, however, 
are disclosed when considering the fact that external pressures from activists, politicians, 
shareholders, and other foreign companies pulled Barclays in opposite directions; I return to this 
notion later in this chapter. 
The attitude outlined at the 1926 AGM remained a guiding principle for Barclays over the 
following sixty years, though it was gradually moderated. From 1969, when the bank became 
involved in the debacle relating to the Cabora Bassa project, a newfound attention to the social 
responsibility of the bank emerged. With the intensified campaigning against the bank and the 
name-change from the colonial-era D.C.O. to BARNAT, it is clear that Barclays engaged itself 
actively in the debate concerning the role of the bank in South Africa and that considerable 
resources were allocated to counter the arguments of its critics. Most notably, the AGMs became a 
platform for face-to-face interaction between the bank and the activists. On these occasions, the 
management had the opportunity to reply directly to antagonistic positions and to assure a large 
number of shareholders of the benefits of the bank’s policies. Already at the 1970 AGM, Chairman 
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John Thomson addressed social responsibility issues by asserting that the bank played an ‘important 
part in the advancement of the well-being of all 19 million inhabitants.’223 
In an attempt to make sense of this emergent concern with stakeholders beyond the shareholders, 
one shareholder inquired at the 1971 AGM how the bank would be able to ‘run a business 
overlooking all moral issues?’224 Two years later, a shareholder admonished the management by 
stating that ‘you are in banking; you are not Parliament.’225 At a later AGM, yet another shareholder 
protested that ‘this absurdity in relation to a trading company which is out to make money 
internationally should just stop. […] It is just no use to us all.’226 Based on the transcripts from the 
AGMs, there was broad skepticism throughout the extent of the campaign towards the explicit 
connection between Barclays’ operations and the idea that the bank ought to be concerned with 
stakeholders other than its shareholders. Present at every AGM throughout the campaign, it was 
almost exclusively the anti-apartheid activists who advocated this connection and who maintained, 
as one activist did, that ‘you cannot possibly separate politics and economics.’227 While the activists 
managed to make a spectacle at the AGMs vis-à-vis the social responsibility of the bank, I would 
argue that the CSR-related debates in these forums should not be viewed as isolated acts of pressure 
but rather as part of the cumulative anti-apartheid consumer boycott efforts to promote an agenda of 
social responsibility. 
As previously discussed, the activists targeted Barclays partly as a form of surrogate boycotting 
aimed at precipitating the disinvestment of the bank in South Africa. Barclays on its part, however, 
entirely rejected the premise behind this strategy. In a letter to Reverend Haslam in 1975, Chairman 
Sir Tuke compared surrogate boycotting to arguing that if ‘you stopped eating Cadbury’s chocolate 
in this country you will somehow prevent Cadbury’s selling chocolate in South Africa.’228 In his 
dismissal of the activists’ boycott strategy, Sir Tuke seeks to distance Barclays in Britain from 
BARNAT in South Africa and by rhetorically downplaying the ties between the two, the activists’ 
strategy was similarly weakened. Considering Young’s social connection model, Sir Tuke’s rebuke 
of the activists’ surrogate-based disinvestment strategy problematizes the emphasis of the model on 
structurally engendered injustices as the basis for activism. If we permit the implications of Sir 
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Tuke’s allegory, we also accept the accentuation of the organizational structure of the bank as a 
decisive element that refutes the rationalization of the boycott campaign. Pursuing this reasoning, 
considerably more attention should be given to the extent of the ties between Barclays and 
BARNAT. The reason why the interaction between the bank and the activists did not develop in this 
direction, however, is that the activists were preoccupied with whether or not there was any link 
between Barclays and BARNAT as opposed to the extent of this link. In terms of concrete incidents 
initiating debate on the socially responsible policies of BARNAT such as the purchase of defence 
bonds, any demonstration of the possibility of Barclays to influence the policies of BARNAT would 
suffice for the activists in terms of mobilizing pressure; the fact that Barclays had a majority 
shareholding in BARNAT is evidence of this potential influence. At a more fundamental level, 
however, the boycott campaign was not dependent on demonstrating channels of influence between 
Barclays and its subsidiary since the aim of the campaign was to compel Barclays to withdraw from 
South Africa and not to perpetuate the debate on constructive engagement. 
In a further attempt to erode the basis for the activists’ strategy, Sir Tuke noted that ‘what we and 
others have in South Africa is an investment and if one takes the absurd position that the banks lost 
all their deposits they would still keep their South African investments.’229 I would argue that the 
position referred to here is not economically viable since the activists targeted Barclays as a 
surrogate for BARNAT, first, and second and more importantly for the South African government. 
The boycott campaign would terminate when Barclays withdrew its investment from BARNAT, 
which means that the choice presented by the activists stood between losing British deposits or the 
South African subsidiary of the bank. While in Sir Tuke’s hypothetical situation the most sensible 
choice for Barclays would be to sell its shares in BARNAT, a crucial difference between the bank 
and the activists – as actors engaged in the same conflict – can nevertheless be extrapolated from 
the rationale behind his observation: the bank acts in pursuit of profit, while the activists may 
disregard the economically optimal option and open an account with another bank on moral 
grounds. As political consumers, in other words, profitability is ‘de-centered as the paramount, 
guiding value.’230 Applying the concept of political consumerism to the interaction between 
Barclays and the activists thus stresses the perspective that they were not two actors with conflicting 
economic solutions to a problem but rather two actors that differed profoundly in their assessments 
of as well as their approaches to the problem. While this perspective does not offer a comprehensive 
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understanding of the interaction between the bank and the activists, it does direct attention towards 
the tension inherent in this interaction. Despite the fact that this divergence in standpoints may 
appear obvious, it nevertheless constitutes one of the main impediments to the development of CSR 
since the idea of Barclays having any form of social responsibility required, as a minimum, 
considerations by the management on the implementation of policies and programs that might not 
appear to be guided by profit-oriented motives. 
Ten years after Sir Tuke’s letter to Reverend Haslam, Chairman Sir Bevan essentially 
acknowledged the premise behind the surrogate boycott – albeit in reverse – when he suggested that 
‘those who want to improve the lot of the black population should be opening accounts with 
Barclays, not protesting outside our branches.’231 Contrary to Sir Tuke’s ‘cadbury argument,’ Sir 
Bevan’s remark indicates close ties between Barclays and BARNAT. The purpose of the remark, 
however, is to emphasize Barclays’ commitment to the strategy of constructive engagement. As we 
have seen in the previous sections, the bank remained convinced of the benefits of this strategy 
throughout the campaign. The activists, conversely, characterized constructive engagement as a 
form of ‘double-speak’ in the sense that companies ‘claim that by operating in South Africa they are 
working against apartheid.’232 
Regardless of such observations, Barclays remained supportive of the constructive engagement 
approach. From immediately after the controversy relating to the purchase of defence bonds in 
1977, the amount of social initiatives by the bank accelerated when it was decided that loans to the 
South African government would only be provided ‘where the money could be seen to be used in 
improving the living standards of the black population.’233 To advance the perception of the bank, 
Barclays produced a brochure entitled The Anti-Apartheid Bank, which explains that BARNAT was 
a ‘multi-racial, equal opportunity company’ and that it ‘acts a force for justice in South Africa, 
helping to break down discrimination and to push back the barriers of apartheid.’234 The brochure 
emphasizes the bank’s history of challenging apartheid laws by, for instance, appointing the first 
black cashier and the first black bank manager and by introducing multi-racial training. ‘Black 
business,’ the brochure continues, received ‘help from a specialist development unit as well as 
through bursaries for black businessmen and students to attend management courses at universities 
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throughout South Africa.’235 More substantially, BARNAT earmarked 5 per cent of its after-tax 
earnings to a ‘Social Responsibility Programme’ that focused on educational, medical, and welfare. 
The bank had further earmarked £1 million between 1983 and 1988 for housing projects.236 These 
initiatives were presented in the recently launched annual social responsibility reports. Finally, 
Barclays claimed to have called for a number of reforms as well as the release of Nelson 
Mandela.237 In a 1980 document, Barclays referred to a list published by the UN Special Committee 
against Apartheid stating that Barclays was not included among the top twenty banks lending to 
South Africa.238 
Further showcasing Barclays’ commitment to the constructive engagement thesis was its active 
involvement in the EEC Code of Conduct: compliance was voluntary yet the bank reported 
annually. Already in 1980, Barclays asserted that it had ‘led the field in the implementation of the 
EEC Code of Conduct.’239 At the 1985 AGM, Sir Bevan expounded on this assertion by noting that 
adherence to the code ‘must surely represent a substantial force for peaceful, evolutionary 
change.’240 As discussed in chapter two, Williams attributes special significance to the introduction 
of the codes in terms of changing attitudes towards CSR, and his claim that the ‘implicit social 
contract between business and society was being rewritten’ from the late 1970s is largely based on 
an analysis of the impact of codes on foreign investment in South Africa.241 While I agree with the 
view that the codes represent a milestone – if not in practical terms within a South African context 
then as an important contribution to the development of CSR – I remain skeptical of the impact of 
the EEC Code of Conduct on Barclays’ socially responsible programs. The fact that the bank had 
implemented some of the most progressive policies among the banks in South Africa already before 
the introduction of the EEC Code of Conduct and, additionally, that Barclays was so eager to 
comply with the code indicates that rather than guiding Barclays’ socially responsible activities, the 
code provided Barclays with a platform from which to publicize its CSR initiatives. 
By the end of the campaign, both Barclays and BARNAT had become more categorical in their 
rhetoric pertaining to socially responsibly policies. In the final annual report by BARNAT prior to 
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the announcement by its parent bank to disinvest, Managing Director Chris Ball and Chairman 
Basil Hersov emphasized the political potential of the private sector: 
 
The private sector in South Africa is in an unusual position. It has a cohesive view of 
the need for fundamental change and it has a real contribution to make in the analysis 
of the issues and in their solutions. It does have a role to play at this time in helping to 
evolve and implement fundamental change.242 
 
This increasingly pro-active approach to CSR is far removed from the more defensive and cautious 
strategy deployed by Barclays during the early days of the boycott campaign when – in the wake of 
the Cabora Bassa controversy – the bank was content with having ‘weathered the worst of this 
storm.’243 Barclays’ gradual recognition of the unintended ramifications of its business and the 
socially responsible role it could assume undermined the charge by the activists against the bank as 
the figurehead of British investment and as negligent of its social responsibilities. The bank began 
to acknowledge and address the passive subpolitics of its daily operations that had originally served 
as part of the activists’ rhetorical repertoire. At the AGM of Barclays in April 1987, the £6 million 
annually located by the bank to CSR initiatives became the object of discussion when a shareholder 
suggested that ‘if the Directors are intent on this sort of thing will they do it out of their own pocket 
rather than out of the Shareholders.’244 Sir Bevan replied that he believed that ‘large businesses do 
have a responsibility for the communities in which they operate’ and that a ‘bank, particularly a 
retail bank, is bound to be a mirror of the society in which it operates and I think that it is right that 
we try and put things back into that society and that is what we are endeavouring to do.’245 
Regarding Barclays’ eventual disinvestment, I want to stress the fact that this decision was 
economically motivated and that it should not be grouped together with the bank’s CSR policies 
and programs. In their discussion of the disinvestment of the bank, Ackrill and Hannah address this 
distinction: 
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Within Barclays the lesson was not (as opponents saw it) the need for morality in 
business, for each side of the internal Barclays debate had no doubts about its own or 
the other’s moral rectitude. It was a powerful signal to Barclays and other 
multinational companies of the importance of public opinion and political judgement 
in shaping – and often reshaping – the boundaries of acceptable corporate behaviour 
in ways which made the board’s personal opinions of past commitments irrelevant.246 
 
The implications of the lesson related by Ackrill and Hannah for anti-apartheid activism is that 
company-oriented campaigning may function as a catalyst for a transformation in corporate 
policies. Thus, rather than the specific content of the change advocated by the activists, it is the 
mechanism by which this change is induced that is of central concern to the targeted company. 
Setting aside for a moment the host of other factors influencing the decision by Barclays to 
disinvest, interaction between the bank and the activists stimulated reflection within Barclays on the 
extent of the CSR policies necessary to accommodate stakeholder expectations; in turn, the 
intensified commitment to CSR by the bank – in combination with the publicity attracted by the 
campaign – helped advance perceptions of CSR at a time when few companies were preoccupied 
with the notion of a social responsibility. 
I want to make clear that the moral demands issued by the anti-apartheid activists were aided by 
decades of prior debate on the social responsibility of companies, which renders an isolated analysis 
of the campaign wanting of contextual influences. The development in the commitment of the bank 
to CSR was far from the product of interaction with the activists alone but should also be attributed 
to contemporary advances in research on the area, the competitive proliferation of initiatives within 
the business community, and public and institutional expectations. Nevertheless, the impact of the 
interaction with the activists should not be disregarded since, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, 
the management at Barclays was compelled to allocate a substantial amount of time and resources 
to defend its operations in South Africa. Even by the end of the campaign, the South African 
businessman Tony Bloom noted that the ‘evolution and acceptance of a doctrine of social 
responsibility [was] relatively new and still controversial.’247 In my view, the development of 
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Barclays’ relation to this ‘doctrine’ validates the assertion by Seidman that ‘external pressures on a 
corporation defined its societal obligations, not the moral instincts arising from within.’248 This 
notion is further corroborated by Smith’s proposal, as quoted in chapter two, that the early years of 
CSR should not merely be defined in the abstract but from the viewpoint of conflict resolution.249 
Through pressure by the activists, the abstract notion of social responsibility was continuously 
renegotiated and reinterpreted in order to provide suitable solutions to the concrete problems that 
accompanied Barclays’ operations in apartheid-era South Africa. 
 
Conclusion 
By including a historical overview of Barclays’ involvement in South Africa in the first section of 
this chapter, I emphasized the industry and corporate opportunity structures that conditioned the 
tactical repertoire of the AAM and the responses by the bank. The chronological sections detailed 
the progression of the campaign, changes in strategy by both actors, and interaction between the 
two. The concentration on significant events such as the Cabora Bassa controversy and the purchase 
of defence bonds provides more elaborate glimpses into the dynamics of the campaign. Upon 
Barclays’ disinvestment, the AAM had undergone a transformation from a comparatively small 
SMO in the late 1960s – albeit with close ties to South Africa and some degree of resonance within 
parts of the British public – to an agenda-setting social movement in the mid-1980s. The 
comprehensive examination of Barclays’ decision to disinvest in section four is closely tied to my 
assessment of the bank’s relation to CSR, which is discussed more explicitly in the final section of 
this chapter. On the basis of my analysis of the campaign, I assert that pressure by the anti-apartheid 
activists was a notable factor among the influences that prompted Barclays to reflect on and escalate 
its role as a socially responsible company. 
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Chapter 4: The Campaign against Shell 
 
The protracted campaign against Barclays had been an instructive experience for the AAM, which 
emerged with more support than ever before as well as confidence and momentum in terms of 
initiating a new single-company campaign. As this chapter demonstrates, Shell had been targeted 
for many years prior to the establishment of the formal campaign by the AAM in 1987, which 
meant that the company was better prepared and more accustomed to interaction with pressure 
groups than Barclays had been at the time of the Cabora Bassa controversy. Early in the campaign 
against Shell, the activists were compelled to concede that targeting the oil company presented new 
challenges and a more confrontational style of response. 
In the first two sections of this chapter, I review the history of Shell in South Africa and examine 
some of the early anti-apartheid action aimed at the company. The purpose is to contextualize the 
AAM’s campaign against Shell, which I explore in the subsequent two sections. The third section is 
dedicated to the first year of the campaign and the tactics deployed by both actors, while section 
four traces the gradual decline of the activists’ commitment. Finally, I discuss the implications of 
the campaign against Shell for the company’s relationship to CSR by examining its interaction with 
the AAM and by extending my perspective a few years beyond the termination of the anti-apartheid 
effort. 
 
Shell in South Africa 
‘Oil is often touted as the ideal economic weapon,’ David Rowe asserts, ‘because no modern 
economy can function without a stable supply of petroleum products.’1 Inextricably linked to the 
motivation to boycott Shell on the basis of its operations in South Africa was the particular 
significance of foreign oil supplies to the apartheid government. Moreover, Shell was a major 
presence in South Africa as the company’s involvement goes back even further than Barclays’ with 
the first barrels containing Shell oil arriving in Cape Town in 1902.2 In 1907, Royal Dutch Shell 
was established with the merger between the British-based Shell Transport Trading Company and 
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the Netherlands-based Royal Dutch Petroleum Company.3 During the early years of the company in 
South Africa, Shell worked with agents through subsidiaries such as the British Imperial Oil 
Company SA (Ltd). 4 In 1926, the same year that Barclays assumed control of the National Bank, 
the Shell Company of South Africa Limited was registered in London. 5 Two years later, Shell and 
BP joined forces through the Consolidated Agreement, which ensured joint ownership of the two 
companies’ market interests in Southern Africa. 6 Similar to the investment of foreign banks, the 
presence of multinational oil companies became vital to the South African economy during the 
apartheid years and the ‘industry opportunity structure’ enveloping Shell conditioned a substantial 
part of the interaction between the company and the AAM. Before examining the campaign against 
Shell, I want to situate the company’s South African operations within historical and political 
contexts relevant to my analysis. 
The first formal call for oil sanctions against South Africa was issued at the Second Conference of 
Independent African States in June 1960.7 On 13 November 1961, an oil embargo was proposed at 
the UN and two years later a UN General Assembly resolution on Namibia pushed for an oil 
embargo against South Africa. In July 1964, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) made a 
similar call.8 These early proposals are indicative of the crucial role that many attributed to the 
foreign supply of oil with regard to the maintenance of a national economy built on apartheid 
policies.9 Cutting off oil supplies to South Africa would affect – among other sectors – agriculture, 
transportation, chemical and plastic industries, military and security forces.10 
Apart from domestic facilities aimed at enhancing the self-sufficiency of South Africa’s oil needs, 
the government was highly dependent on imported oil throughout the apartheid era.11 Already from 
the 1950s, the government began to take comprehensive measures to alleviate its dependence on the 
import of foreign oil in anticipation of a potential embargo. While it is common for states to build 
up an oil reserve in order to manage irregularities in the foreign supply, the South African 
government was alert to the very real possibility that the country might be subjected to an 
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international embargo. In 1955, SASOL put to use a newly constructed parastatal refinery called 
SASOL 1 that was designed to produce oil from coal.12 Following the international outcry 
occasioned by the Sharpeville Massacre in 1960, SASOL was perceived by the South African 
authorities as an increasingly important part of the strategy to phase out the country’s dependence 
on imported oil.13 When SASOL 1 had recently come into use, Eric Louw, the Minister of 
Economic Affairs, claimed that there was ‘enough coal to meet South Africa’s requirements for the 
next 500 years.’14 In 1964, the government established the Strategic Fuel Fund, which aimed to 
ensure oil sufficiency irrespective of economic and political developments.15 Due to the low oil 
prices, however, no extensive expansions were made in the strategic oil program throughout the 
1960s.16 
Until the mid-1960s, the international community paid little attention to South Africa’s neighboring 
states. This changed in 1965 when white Rhodesians led by Ian Smith issued a Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence (UDI) signaling its sovereignty from British rule. The declaration was 
followed immediately by the imposition of economic sanctions by the UN in an effort to help bring 
about the eventual democratization of Rhodesia.17 At first, the economic sanctions imposed by both 
Britain and the UN did not include an oil embargo.18 Strategically, however, it made for an obvious 
measure since foreign oil was imported into Rhodesia using the Mozambican port of Beira, from 
where a pipeline was used to transport the oil into Rhodesia. Conversely, the moderate quantities of 
oil required by the Rhodesian government and market meant that a single breach in the embargo 
could render the policy ineffective. In order to impose a successful embargo, in other words, Britain 
would have to cut off supply to the entire Southern Africa. The principal reason why Britain at first 
omitted an oil embargo was due to an assessment of the broader geopolitical consequences 
positioning South Africa as a ‘very credible threat to retaliate against any measure that affected its 
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own supplies of oil.’19 Similar to SASOL in South Africa, the new Rhodesian government set up the 
parastatal authority GENTA in order to secure the steady supply of oil.20 
After a few weeks, Britain decided to impose oil sanctions against Rhodesia despite the possible 
economic and political repercussions. Upon this announcement, Shell immediately informed the 
Rhodesian government that the company would terminate all oil delivery to the country, a decision 
that was lauded by the British Minister of Power.21 Within a few of weeks, however, the South 
African subsidiaries of foreign-owned oil companies – including Shell – reversed this policy 
because ‘South African law took precedence over home country directives.’22 Louis Walker, 
General Manager of Shell South Africa, elaborated on this decision by arguing that ‘if we really did 
carry out the spirit of the Order in Council we might as well shut up shop in South Africa.’23 In the 
face of British efforts, the South African government was able to ensure the continuation of oil 
supplies to Rhodesia who was perceived as an important ally in the region. 
In December 1966, the UN Security Council voted to follow Britain’s example and impose 
mandatory oil sanctions against Rhodesia. While these sanctions entailed more extensive 
restrictions on oil supply than previously, Rhodesia managed to circumvent the embargo through 
sanctions-busting over the next decade. A 1976 report by the Center for Social Action of the United 
Church of Christ entitled The Oil Conspiracy claimed to ‘reveal – for the first time – how oil seems 
to be getting through and keeping white rule alive in Rhodesia.’24 Two years later, the so-called 
Bingham Report demonstrated how both the British government and several oil companies had – in 
the words of Keetie Sluyterman’s official history of Shell – acted ‘perhaps not against the law but 
certainly against the intentions of the oil sanctions against Rhodesia.’25 Despite these controversial 
circumstances, David Rowe asserts that the oil sanctions imposed against Rhodesia did contribute 
with significant pressure on the Smith regime. ‘From UDI onward,’ he argues, ‘Rhodesia’s single 
most important foreign policy goal was to end sanctions – either by making sanctions irrelevant 
through sanctions-busting or by reaching an acceptable agreement with Britain.’26 While the 
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embargo may not have prevented oil from entering Rhodesia, in other words, the process was 
complicated to the extent that the embargo had a sizeable impact on the government’s resources. 
Among other oil companies, Shell expressed its dissatisfaction with the sanctions, which had 
resulted in a loss of confidence by the South African government in the ‘British and American oil 
companies as reliable long-term suppliers independent of domestic political pressure from their 
home governments.’27 Having witnessed an international oil embargo up close, the South African 
government was encouraged to accelerate its programs aimed at oil independence. 
Parallel to the events pertaining to Rhodesia and further impelling the South African government to 
prioritize oil independence was the 1973 oil crisis. During the subsequent years, Iran became the 
country’s primary source of oil.28 Already in 1974, another oil-from-coal refinery that was to be 
much larger than SASOL 1 was scheduled for construction.29 The same year, Shell and BP 
announced their joint marketing organization in South Africa, the timing of which suggests that the 
two companies anticipated new opportunities for the import of oil to the South African market.30 
While it was clear that the international community favoured of a comprehensive oil embargo, Shell 
was correct in its assessment that mandatory sanctions would not be imposed any time in the near 
future. In 1975, the UN General Assembly encouraged the member states to initiate oil sanctions 
against South Africa yet these measures had no legal implications.31 Among the factors 
complicating oil sanctions were concern about the dependence of land-locked countries such as 
Lesotho, Swaziland, and Botswana on oil supplies from South Africa.32 
In an assessment of the potential consequences of full-scale oil sanctions from 1979, Professor Arnt 
Spandau from the University of Witwatersrand explains that the greater part of South Africa’s 
energy needs was met by coal at the time; in fact, oil constituted one fifth of the country’s 
requirements.33 The country’s principal bulwark against oil sanctions, Spandau argues, is the 
government’s ‘technical and financial ability to support commercially viable oil-from-coal plants.’34 
In the case of the implementation of international sanctions, he estimates the probable short-term 
effects to be rationing of private petrol consumption, the use of crude oil reserves stored away by 
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the South African government, and an increase in the production of the SASOL refineries.35 
Spandau concludes that apart from the transport sector, an ‘oil boycott would leave South Africa’s 
industrial infrastructure largely undamaged.’36 
Coinciding with the publication of Spandau’s calculations came the Iranian revolution, which put 
his assessment to the test when South Africa’s crude imports dropped by 40 per cent during the first 
quarter of 1979 in relation to the previous year.37 Critics of the apartheid government were quick to 
seize this opportunity to renew the call for mandatory oil sanctions and on 8 June 1979, Martin 
Bailey, who has written extensively on the significance of foreign oil supplies to South Africa, 
made a testimony to the UN Special Committee Against Apartheid. Bailey clarified that only a 
single country, Brunei, was shipping oil to South Africa and that this was made possible by way of 
Shell International Petroleum.38 Yet despite this line of supply, he argued, ‘every day the South 
Africans are paying around $5 million more than they did in 1978 for their oil.’39 The UN General 
Assembly approved a resolution calling for an oil embargo yet similarly to the call in 1975 it was 
not mandatory.40 A later UN conference called Conference of West European Parliamentarians on 
an Oil Embargo against South Africa outlined the measures required for a country wishing to join 
the voluntary oil embargo: the country should prohibit the supply of its own crude oil, crude oil 
imported from other countries, and refined oil products whether of own production or imported; 
also, the country should prohibit the involvement of its own citizens and companies in the sale or 
transportation of either crude or refined oil regardless of the country of origin, and finally 
involvement in such activities by foreign subsidiaries of its own companies.41 
Already by September of 1979, the South African government had implemented procedures such as 
the opening of a new large storage facility with the capacity of 45 million barrels that aided the 
country’s main supply.42 The government also partnered with controversial private traders – 
including John Deuss and Marc Rich – who were able to secure oil shipments through alternative 
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measures involving changing the names and registry of the tankers to evade detection.43 In a process 
referred to by Stephen Sparks as a ‘case of privatization by panic to meet the apartheid state’s 
strategic priorities,’ the SASOL refinery began a process of privatization that was intended to 
provide additional funds for two new massive oil-from-coal plants.44 
SASOL 2 began operations in March 1980, thus further bolstering the South African economy 
against sanctions by the international community.45 At this time, however, a substantial threat to 
South Africa’s oil supplies came not from outside the country but in the form of domestic liberation 
movements. The colonial administrations of Mozambique and Angola had recently been replaced 
by governments sympathetic to the anti-apartheid cause and these countries now hosted Umkhonto 
we Sizwe (MK) bases that allowed for swift cross-border operations.46 Already in June 1980, three 
months after the opening of SASOL 2, MK managed to set off explosives at both the SASOL plants 
and a refinery in Natrof.47 According to Arthur Klinghoffer, the ‘struggle against apartheid entered a 
new stage as oil installations came to be considered prime targets.’48 He further suggests that the 
ANC perceived ‘oil as synonymous with South African military power’ since the security forces 
were highly dependent on oil.49 The number of ‘men under arms’ had indeed increased from 39,000 
in 1961 to 255,000 by the early 1980s, and some proposed that the existing UN arms embargo 
banning the supply of arms and ‘related material’ should be extended to include oil.50 The response 
by the South African authorities to these acts of sabotage was to intensify the cooperation between 
the state and the private sector, which resulted in the formation of privately owned militias that 
would guard central facilities across the country. In this sense, Jones argues, the ‘oil embargo thus 
reinforced the burgeoning military‐industrial complex that eventually undergirded the Botha 
regime.’51 
At a House of Assembly debate in March 1983, K.W. de Klerk, the South African Minister of 
Internal Affairs, warned of attempts by the international community to restrict the supply of oil. 
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‘Active groups,’ he argued, ‘are attempting to embarrass South Africa… attempting to monitor 
ships plying around the Cape in order to determine which of them deliver oil here.’52 The secrecy 
referred to by de Klerk denotes the high level of confidentiality with which the government treated 
matters pertaining to South Africa’s oil stock and the foreign supply of oil. He concluded that ‘any 
relaxation in respect of secrecy, however, can help to spotlight the target and enable our enemies to 
identify our friends and partners who deliver to us. Secrecy is essential.’53 The Strategic Fuel Fund, 
which managed many of the storage facilities, put a lot of effort into making sure that as little 
information as possible would leak and this strategy appears to have been successful since most 
outside estimates underestimated the capacity of South Africa to withstand a comprehensive 
embargo.54 The Petroleum Product Acts of 1977, 1979 and 1984 made the disclosure of any 
information regarding the ‘source, manufacture, transportation, destination, storage, quality or stock 
level of any petroleum products acquired or manufactured for or in the (South African) Republic’ 
punishable by up to seven years of imprisonment.55 The South African journalist Kevin Davie 
explains how the ‘basic rule for editors was: on oil we do not write.’56 
Similarly, oil companies were required to comply with the Petroleum Product Acts, which meant 
that the subsidiary companies were not allowed to share information covered by these Acts with 
their parent companies.57 With regards to Shell, however, it has later been revealed that the 
company’s tankers were supplying South Africa with crude oil, predominantly from Oman, until 
mid-1981.58 Over the following years, Brunei Shell Petroleum – jointly owned by Shell and the 
government of Brunei – became the major supplier of crude oil to South Africa.59 Until 1984, 
Brunei was a British protectorate, which prompts Klinghoffer to argue that ‘London must bear some 
of the responsibility for fueling South Africa.’60 
Government sources further demonstrate how in 1983 Shell South Africa affirmed that it was able 
to import the required crude oil through intermediation with its parent company.61 Despite the 
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secrecy efforts of the South African government, however, substantial amounts of information were 
acquired by foreign actors such as anti-apartheid groups and government agencies. An article in the 
Sunday Express from 18 March 1984 labels the foreign supply of oil ‘one of the worst-kept secrets 
of the decade as published lists of companies and tankers breaking United Nations sanctions against 
selling oil to South Africa are widely available overseas.’62 A briefing document on the supply of 
oil to South Africa from the mid-1980s by the AAM notes that the country’s oil expenses are nearly 
‘double the real “world” price for the oil because of the huge cost of the SASOL programme and 
the numerous bribes and premiums that South Africa is obliged to pay oil companies to break 
existing oil embargoes.’63 The document estimates that the country’s stock of oil would last no more 
than two and a half years in the event of a successful oil embargo. In such a scenario, South Africa 
could ‘only last this long by running down its industry and commercial activity so severely that 
political tensions might break the country well before this time.’64 Such assessments were used to 
justify and motivate the boycott and disinvestment campaigns conducted by the anti-apartheid 
activists. 
As discussed, the UN General Assembly overwhelmingly favoured an oil embargo against South 
Africa. Similar to the proposal of other kinds of trade sanctions, however, a few countries (in this 
case the US, Britain, and France) used their veto power to prevent adoption by the Security 
Council.65 In an attempt to circumvent the non-binding resolutions passed by the UN General 
Assembly, the EEC member states adopted an oil embargo against South Africa in September 1985. 
In order for it to be approved, however, the embargo had been limited to the sale of crude oil 
produced within the EEC or imported for purposes of re-sale, which meant that it did not pertain to 
oil held in ‘bonded storage’ or in transit.66 While the embargo was adopted at EEC level, the vast 
majority of individual member states did not make the appropriate arrangements in time for the 
proposed deadline on 31 January 1986.67 
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Taking effect in mid-1986, the American sanctions package CAAA included an oil embargo that 
remained in force until 1991.68 Recognizing the tendency towards stricter measures by the 
international community, in late 1986 the South African government made it illegal to disclose the 
name of any ships calling at their ports; also, no trade statistic were made public from this time 
onwards, including the country of origin of imports.69 The response by the European Parliament was 
to propose another resolution the following year which would underline the need for stricter control 
yet no concrete actions were taken.70 Writing in 1989, Klinghoffer explains that South Africa’s 
suppliers of oil included Saudi Arabia, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Kuwait.71 
In the four years between de Klerk’s announcement in 1990 of democratic elections and the actual 
casting of ballots, the oil embargoes were gradually phased out. In April 1992, the EEC oil embargo 
was lifted, which many perceived as too early in the democratic transition.72 In a statement at the 
UN in September 1993, Mandela urged the member states to end the economic sanctions imposed 
against South Africa yet he singled out ‘arms, nuclear matters, and oil’ as areas that should remain 
sanctioned until the formation of a new government. ‘We would leave the issue of the oil embargo,’ 
he continued, ‘to the discretion of the Committee of the General Assembly responsible for the 
enforcement of this particular sanction.’73 Three months later, the UN oil embargo was lifted.74 
Regardless of the perceived success of the oil embargoes, the South African government was forced 
to pay a heavy cost to ensure the continuous supply of foreign oil. 
Already in 1986, President Botha conceded that the price of oil between 1973 and 1984 had been 
R22 billion more than it would otherwise have been.75 He explained: 
 
There were times when it was reported to me that we had enough oil for only a week. 
Just think what we could have done if we had that R22 billion today… what could 
have been done in other areas? But we had to spend it because we couldn’t bring our 
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motor cars and our diesel locomotives to a standstill as our economic life would have 
collapsed.76 
 
By the mid-1990s, it was estimated that the direct costs alone of importing foreign oil had more 
than doubled due to the oil embargoes.77 Assessing the UN embargo, Enuga Reddy argues that 
despite the refusal of the Security Council to impose mandatory oil sanctions, the ‘persistent efforts 
of the Special Committee and resolutions of the General Assembly, as well as actions by the OAU 
and anti-apartheid groups, led to more oil producing states taking action to stop the supply of oil to 
South Africa.’78 Jones suggests that the oil embargoes were counterproductive in the short term 
since they consolidated South Africa’s ruling coalition rather than weakening it.79 However, from 
the mid-1980s, he argues, the escalating political and economic crises in South Africa reinforced the 
impact of the oil embargo, which contributed to the aggregate pressure on the country’s economy.80 
Shell on its part emphasized the fact that both the UN and EEC oil embargoes lacked the proper 
legislative measures and that the company had not been informed about any guidelines for 
complying with the embargo.81 Shell further claimed that it was not familiar with its South African 
customers and that the company was not in a position to cut off supplies to South African security 
forces in case they were among the company’s customers.82 At the beginning of the British anti-
apartheid campaign against the company in the late 1980s, the worth of Shell’s investment was 
estimated at $400 million. This included 50 per cent ownership of South Africa’s largest oil refinery 
in Durban, joint ownership of an offshore receiving dock outside Durban to where most of the 
imported crude oil was shipped, the operation of an oil pipeline, involvement in the chemical and 
other industries, 50 per cent equity in a coal mine in Transvaal, and finally more than 850 gas 
stations throughout the country.83 
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Early Anti-Apartheid Action against Shell, Early 1970s to Mid-1980s 
While the British boycott campaign against Shell was only formally launched after Barclays had 
announced its decision to sell its remaining shares in BARNAT, coordinated anti-apartheid action 
against Shell had begun in the early 1970s at roughly the same time as the commencement of the 
campaign against Barclays. Similar to this campaign, the practical purpose of the campaign against 
Shell was not only to compel the company to disinvest but to put pressure on the South African 
government to abandon its apartheid policies and issue democratic elections. Conversely, the 
principal symbolic implications of the campaign were to demonstrate support for the South African 
liberation movements as well as international condemnation of the apartheid system. The 
interaction between the anti-apartheid activists and Shell revolved around the same major issues 
involved in the campaign against Barclays such as constructive engagement and whether or not the 
company had a responsibility towards stakeholders other than its shareholders. As I discuss in the 
following sections, statements by both Shell and the activists often transitioned from concrete 
measures aimed at improving the conditions of the non-white population in South Africa to more 
abstract reflections on the social responsibility of transnational companies. 
Dutch activists were the first to launch a campaign against Shell and two of the main groups 
involved were Kairos and the Shipping Research Bureau. Kairos had been established in 1970 
largely by members of protestant churches and the group sought to direct the attention of the 
churches to socio-political developments in Southern Africa.84 Kairos perceived the oil industry as 
the most strategic target in terms of economic pressure on the South African regime since this 
industry employed a comparatively small amount of people, which meant that few jobs would be 
lost in the event of full-scale disinvestment by foreign oil companies.85 Established in 1980, the aim 
of the Shipping Research Bureau was to conduct research and public reports on oil imports to South 
Africa; these reports, Klinghoffer argues, ‘must be ranked as highly accurate because [the Shipping 
Research Bureau] painstakingly distinguishes between actual and suspected deliveries as it tracks 
the tankers, shipping companies, charterers, oil companies, and producing states involved.’86 
The first major step taken by the campaigners was to attend the AGM of the Royal Dutch Petroleum 
Company where they pleaded with the management and the other shareholders to sever all ties to 
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South Africa.87 In this initial part of the campaign, the Dutch activists were mainly preoccupied 
with researching the foreign supply of oil and entering into dialogue with Shell.88 Despite the fact 
that extensive conversations were held annually between 1973 and 1976, it became increasingly 
evident that such interaction would not bring about the intended results.89 In 1976, Kairos published 
a report together with the Ecumenical Study and Action Centre on Investments (OSACI) entitled 
Shell in South Africa, which revealed that while wages at Shell South Africa were ‘comparatively 
high and discrimination relatively mild,’ the company’s minimum wage was ‘below the effective 
minimum level for African families.’90 The report was damning to Shell’s reputation and it posed a 
strategic problem to the company’s policy of ‘quiet diplomacy.’91 A further point of embarrassment 
for Shell was its possible supply to Rhodesia, which had become an issue of growing international 
concern. In its meetings with the Dutch activists, Shell had affirmed that the company was not 
involved in oil deliveries to Rhodesia yet in 1977 Shell sent a letter to the Council of Churches 
stating that such deliveries could ‘not be verified from the statistics, because it concerned a small 
portion.’92 
In what Erik van den Bergh characterizes as the ‘second phase’ of the campaign, extending from 
1977-1985, the activists expanded their action repertoire.93 During this period, the oil embargo 
against Rhodesia prompted British anti-apartheid activists to become engaged in the issue of oil 
supplies to Southern Africa. In an interview in 2013, Reverend Haslam recalled that while sporadic 
research had been conducted on Shell’s role in the mid-1970s, the AAM and ELTSA ‘broadened 
[their] interest into the oil embargo’ from 1977.94 In March 1977, for instance, the AAM produced a 
pamphlet entitled Shell and BP in South Africa, which caught the attention of Parliament. At a 
debate at the House of Commons, Ivor Clemitson was particularly alarmed by the implications of 
the ‘allegations and evidence that British oil companies have been involved in breaking sanctions.’95 
A few weeks after this session, the Haslemere Group and the AAM presented a joint Submission to 
British Government Inquiry on Allegations of Sanctions-Busting by Shell and British Petroleum, 
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which specified that Shell’s South African subsidiaries were controlled by the London-registered 
Shell Petroleum Supply but that responsibility seemingly lay with both the British and Dutch 
companies due to their organizational structure and close collaboration.96 It is my impression that 
the embargo against Rhodesia incited intensified action among anti-apartheid activists on this issue 
since it provided them with concrete measures by which to hold Shell and other companies 
accountable. 
A similar process can be identified when examining – as King and McDonnell have recently done – 
how the companies most closely associated with a strong CSR commitment tend to be those most 
heavily targeted by activists precisely as an effect of this commitment.97 The presumption is that the 
justification of activist strategies is facilitated by demonstrating the failure of the target company to 
comply with a given set of requirements. Whereas Barclays could be accused by the activists of 
morally illegitimate – and not illegal – conduct, Shell’s involvement in oil deliveries to Rhodesia 
allowed the activists to level more concrete charges against the company. 
After the end of the Rhodesian UDI and the Smith regime in 1979, the AAM found itself at a 
junction resembling the aftermath of the Cabora Bassa controversy since the activists had to decide 
whether or not to continue the activities against Shell. Fieldhouse discerns the concern among the 
activists that the ‘successful completion of the Rhodesia campaign would lull supporters into a 
sense of having achieved their goal and fulfilled the Movement’s role, thus allowing the 
Government to use the opportunity to lessen the international pressure on South Africa.’98 At the 
AGM of the AAM in 1980, considerable distress was also generated by the newly instated Thatcher 
administration that was believed to have intensified ‘Britain’s collaboration with the apartheid 
regime.’99 At the meeting, the activists agreed to ‘campaign to expose the role of Shell, BP and 
other oil companies operating in South Africa, secure a total embargo by Britain on the supply of 
North Sea oil to South Africa’ and ‘mobilize support for the imposition by the United Nations 
Security Council of a mandatory oil embargo.’100 An international day of action against Shell was 
organized on which British and Dutch activists, among others, aimed to disrupt the company’s 
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AGM.101 According to Kairos, ‘half of the attending voters’ at the Dutch AGM had been highly 
critical of Shell’s operations in South Africa.102 
During the first half of the 1980s, the different national campaigns gradually expanded and plans 
were made for a more formal international campaign against Shell in particular. From 1984, 
representatives from the ANC established a dialogue and met with the management of several oil 
companies operating in South Africa, and the party also organized meetings between the various 
groups that had expressed an interest in participating in a campaign against Shell.103 There is some 
discrepancy in views as to when the international campaign against the company was initiated: 
some suggest March 1985 when the presidents of the South West African People’s Organization 
(SWAPO) and the ANC issued a joint call for an international oil embargo against South Africa, 
while others point to the conference of Maritime Unions against Apartheid in London in October 
1985.104 Most anti-apartheid movements and groups, however, were not fully engaged in the 
campaign before 1986-1987. 
At the AGM of the AAM on 1 December 1985, potential future campaigns and strategies were 
discussed in consideration of the marked increase in membership numbers as well as the perceived 
momentum enjoyed by the movement. Central to this meeting was the ‘need to identify the main 
priorities of the AAM for the next 6-9 months’ since this was seen as a ‘critical period’ for the 
movement.105 The activists also discussed whether or not to properly launch the British campaign 
against an oil company and as noted in a working paper, ‘Shell is the likely candidate.’106 Shortly 
thereafter, the AAM entered into collaboration with the British anti-apartheid group Embargo, 
which had been formed in late 1985 as a development of the group Christian Concern for Southern 
Africa.107 The group was a collective of ‘church, union, welfare rights and anti-apartheid activists 
dedicated to exposing how the evils of South Africa’s regime are sustained by a continual flow of 
oil and oil products.’108 Similar to the AAM, Embargo’s strategy involved campaigning for a ban on 
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oil deliveries to South Africa by both the British government, the EEC, and the UN, and researching 
the role of British-based companies in these activities.109 
The two anti-apartheid groups quickly settled on Shell as the target of their campaign and the choice 
was substantiated in a document entitled 10 Reasons to Boycott Shell. The main reasons listed 
include an alleged $200 million in profit by the company in ‘secret incentive payments by the South 
African government’ for violating the international oil embargo.110 As previously discussed, Shell 
had a sizeable investment in the country in the form of refineries etc., and the company’s South 
African subsidiary was 100 per cent owned by Royal Dutch Shell.111 Moreover, the company was 
obliged by law to supply the South African police and military with fuel and lubricants, and it also 
operated in illegally occupied Namibia.112 Finally, Shell supposedly paid some of its employees 
below the minimum wage.113 In addition to these stated reasons to boycott Shell, I want to 
emphasize the significance of the specific industry in which the company operates, or the ‘industry 
opportunity structure.’114 The oil industry is controversial, Shuili Du and Edward T. Vieira, Jr. 
assert, ‘because there has been persistent, widespread engagement in unscrupulous business 
practices that entail adverse social, environmental, and ethical consequences.’115 From the 
perspective of the AAM, negative connotations among the public pertaining to such business 
practices – in addition to Shell’s role as supplier of services and products to the South African 
authorities – would facilitate mobilization efforts. 
Prior to the Shell AGM in May 1986, it was proposed that British and Dutch campaigns should be 
initiated simultaneously for optimal effect and that activities should be organized and new 
campaign material produced.116 This early framework for the campaign, it was noted, ‘envisages a 
major locally based campaign to expose the role of Shell in fueling the apartheid system.’117 During 
the month of January, Boycott Committees had been established in ten major US cities with the 
purpose of ‘organizing a campaign to force Shell out of Namibia and South Africa’ and local 
authorities began to establish ‘Shell-free zones’ in which Shell products and services were 
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systematically boycotted.118 The company was particularly concerned about such initiatives since 25 
per cent of its profits were generated in the US, while only one per cent could be attributed to the 
South African market.119 This intensification of the campaigns initiated what van den Bergh defines 
as the final phase (1986-1991) in the activity against Shell, which saw more radical activity by the 
activists.120 
The campaign effectively began on 21 March 1986 – the anniversary of the Sharpeville Massacre 
and the Langa Killings – when an ultimatum was sent to the board of directors at Shell stating that 
several national campaigns would be launched if Shell had failed to announce its complete 
disinvestment by the end of the AGM, starting with a month of boycott during the summer of 
1986.121 A few weeks later, Shell objected in a letter to ELTSA: 
 
It is obviously up to you to judge the effectiveness and value of such a campaign but 
we regard it as highly unfair – partly because it seeks to coerce us into one particular 
view as to the course which will be most beneficial to the black community, and partly 
because we strongly reject the charge that ‘Shell’ is supporting apartheid.122 
 
At the Shell AGM in May, Chairman Peter Holmes devoted ten minutes of his opening statements 
to the situation in South Africa.123 Since the company had not announced its disinvestment from 
South Africa, however, the plans for a month of boycott proceeded and in July local anti-apartheid 
groups published a Shell Shadow Report and picketed Shell stations and the Shell-sponsored British 
Grand Prix.124 A few months later, anti-apartheid groups from more than twenty countries had 
signaled their support for the campaign against Shell. 
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While the economic impact of the international campaign on Shell was not immediately perceptible, 
the management was starting to get concerned about the continuous negative publicity. In order to 
address the barrage of reproach generated by activists and other critics, the company decided to 
become more active participants in the debate on foreign investment and oil supply to South 
Africa.125 This change in strategy was similar to the change from Barclays’ reticent response to the 
first controversy regarding the Cabora Bassa dam project to the increasingly pro-active strategy 
during the course of the campaign. Whereas Barclays had employed the Pegasus Group to help 
formulate the proper strategy against the activists, Shell correspondingly contacted Pagan 
International – a consulting firm based in Washington – to assist the company primarily in the 
confrontation with American boycott activists.126 A strategy paper by Pagan International from June 
1986 asserts that the ‘boycott coalition targeting Shell and Royal Dutch/Shell is currently very 
large, and has organized at a surprisingly rapid pace.’127 The paper lists the main allegations 
directed against Shell as presented by the activists and notes that the ‘way the issues have been 
framed by the critics is an attempt to force the company to play by the critics’ rules. In order to 
respond directly, the company is put on the defensive.’128 The allegations were used by the activists, 
it is argued in the paper, as ‘persuasive tools to mobilize opinion against the company.’129 Pagan 
International further warned Shell that the ‘first impressions’ generated by the activists’ campaign 
would be difficult to erase.130 
Based on this assessment of the status of the campaign, the objective established by Pagan 
International was to prevent Shell from ‘becoming the focal point of media activity on South Africa 
and to minimize the credibility of the allegations of the anti-Shell forces by emphasizing post-
apartheid planning’ by the company.131 To attain this objective, Shell was to develop a ‘perception 
of openness with the media by addressing their concerns before viewpoints become settled and shift 
the focus of debate from Shell to disinvestment and other issues.’132 This strategy should be seen as 
a continuation of the activists’ ‘war of representation’ against Barclays, which denotes the efforts of 
both actors to promote their particular framing of the campaign in the media. In essence, the 
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strategy presented by Pagan International emphasized the need to change the public perception of 
Shell rather than the policies that generated the criticism in the first place. Summarizing Shell’s 
strategy from 1985 onwards, van den Bergh notes that the company cautiously acknowledged that it 
had been too passive in pressing for democratic change in South Africa and that it would endeavour 
to become more pro-active on this area.133 Rather than acquiescing with the activists’ demands and 
disinvesting, Shell would advocate more strongly for the benefits of constructive engagement.134 
Moreover, the company would ‘isolate radical critics as much as possible’ while continuing 
dialogue with what was perceived to be more moderate groups and organizations.135 
Embargo responded by stating that the ‘fact that Shell are prepared to […] spend an estimated one 
million dollars in public relations to counter the boycott illustrates both the moral bankruptcy of 
their activities in Southern Africa and how worried they are about the consequences.’136 A 
document by the ICCR entitled The Shell Game: Shell Oil’s Secret Plan to Counteract the Anti-
Apartheid Boycott predicted that ‘ironically, Shell’s efforts through Pagan International to undercut 
the Shell campaign will have exactly the reverse effect.’137 In the Netherlands, it was noted by the 
research bureau of the Christian Democratic Party that the purpose of the strategy presented in a 
report by Pagan International was ‘not to find a morally responsible direction for Shell in regard to 
South Africa’ and that it was ‘purely based on economic company interests which are in no way 
relativized with respect to other considerations, for example, those of a social or moral nature.’138 
During the following years, the gist of this criticism would come to form the basis of the interaction 
between Shell and the British anti-apartheid activists. 
Despite years of sporadic anti-apartheid action against Shell in Britain, a sustained campaign was 
not established until early 1987. I propose that a contextual analysis of the British campaign 
between 1987 and the early 1990s may help explain both the strategies deployed by the activists and 
Shell’s reasoning in its response to the boycott campaign. From the perspective of the activists, 
Markoff’s reference to a ‘causal dependence’ between movement decisions elucidates the 
significance to the campaign of early action against Shell that – to some extent – guided the 
subsequent selection of tactics. While I promote a historically sensitive analysis of the boycott 
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campaign, I am conscious of the risk of unintentionally constructing ‘causally plausible stories’ that 
over-accentuate particular influences or points of comparison.139 While cautious of such analytical 
facets, however, I do want to emphasize the contribution of the appropriate contextual factors in 
furthering an understanding of the interaction between the activists and Shell. Thus, the activists 
constructed their own narratives when – simultaneously looking back on the previous campaign and 
forward to the activities against Shell – a popular slogan during the transitional period optimistically 
announced that ‘1986 was the year of Barclays, 1987 will be the year of Shell.’140 
 
The Onset of the Campaign, Mid-1980s to Late 1980s 
‘The situation is not comfortable. Shell’s position is not comfortable. The threat of disinvestment is 
real. It is important that everyone accepts that. It is important that every member of staff realizes 
that the survival of this company depends to some extent on their own commitment to the 
company’s stance.’141 This blunt cautioning was issued in August 1986 by John Wilson, Chairman 
of Shell South Africa. From early 1987, action against Shell accelerated substantially when it was 
decided at the AGM of the AAM that a permanent boycott campaign would be conducted against 
the company.142 As we have seen, sporadic activities had taken place for many years yet no 
organized and continuous effort had been sustained. The announcement by Barclays in late 
November 1986 that it would disinvest freed up resources within the movement and the strategic 
considerations that had restricted the activists to lead no more than one single-company campaign at 
a time now allowed for Shell to be targeted instead. From the mid-1980s, the company had become 
more openly critical of the Botha administration and it even closed its offices on 16 June in 
commemoration of the Soweto Uprising.143 To the activists, however, any action short of 
disinvestment was insufficient and Shell’s recurrent statements that a boycott would not compel the 
company to leave South Africa was widely received as ‘a challenge to continue’ the campaign.144 
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‘Strategically,’ John Wilson, Chairman of Shell South Africa, stated at the onset of the boycott 
campaign, ‘one could not choose a better or bigger target.’145 The company was the largest non-
American corporation in the world in terms of assets and the largest single investor in South 
Africa.146 At a meeting of the World Council of Churches in August 1988, it was emphasized that 
‘in an international context, Shell’s visibility is undeniable and it is easy to identify.’147 The fact that 
the company’s South African investment accounted for a mere one per cent of its global revenue 
was further taken as an indication by the activists that it was possible to compel Shell to terminate 
its operations in the country.148 Finally, the comparison between the campaigns against Barclays and 
Shell was inescapable: a pamphlet by War on Want optimistically suggests that ‘an effective 
boycott against Barclays has forced it to disinvest; an equally effective boycott of Shell garages 
could have the same result.’149 
As we have seen, optimism was high among the activists at the onset of the campaign against Shell 
with 1987 declared as ‘Year against Shell’ by the AAM.150 A paper from May that year assessing 
the early stages of the campaign argues that the ‘quick, enthusiastic response to the AAM’s second 
venture into the arena of secondary boycotting to secure disinvestment, viz. the launch of the 
“Boycott Shell” campaign further demonstrated that, in the right conditions, such a boycott can give 
a clear focus, and a cutting edge, to a disinvestment campaign in a specific case.’151 At the 1987 
Shell AGM, one activist indicated that the ‘company image in this country is deteriorating much 
faster than did Barclays’ and the base is being laid for a much more thorough campaign.’152 Further 
cautioning against continued investment in South Africa, the activist suggested that ‘in view of the 
fact that the Times reported Barclays having lost millions of Pounds by not responding to the 
Boycott and pulling out sooner, surely it is in the interests of shareholders to break all links with the 
racist regime now.’153 Another point of persuasion by the activists was the prospect of Shell losing 
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its top status in market research surveys as the ‘most respected company in Britain.’154 By linking 
the company to apartheid, as had been attempted in the campaign against Barclays, the activists 
could target the brand and public reputation of Shell. 
With decades of campaigning experience in addition to a few years of sporadic action against Shell 
in particular, the AAM had developed a tactical repertoire that included a range of activities. I will 
briefly examine each type of activity and elaborate on their implications by deploying my 
theoretical framework. First, the activists aimed to put pressure on the company through letters to 
the headquarters, the press etc.155 Central to this strategy were the efforts, on the one hand, to 
‘hassle Shell management’ and, on the other hand, to consistently keep the ‘profile of the campaign 
reasonably high.’156 In terms of events scheduled to take place at Shell stations etc., ‘pre-publicity’ 
was deemed most important since this would ensure press attendance as well as greater number of 
participants.157 At the actual staging of the events, the local anti-apartheid groups were encouraged 
to ‘try to consider any eye-catching stunts or publicity-generating material and angles which may 
occur locally.’158 In an attempt to repeat previous successful practices, a brief emphasizes the 
importance of raising the ‘equivalent awareness to that reached in the Barclays campaign.’159 
Richard Tookey, Group Public Affairs Director at Shell International, cautioned the management in 
June 1988 that ‘activist groups are adept at attracting wide international media attention to their 
causes.’160 An internal assessment report by Shell further indicates that the company was concerned 
about the ‘potential support of professional academics’ who could provide ‘intellectual legitimacy 
to the boycott.’161 
From a social movement perspective, the instrumental benefits of attracting attention to the 
campaign can be assessed in terms of increased mobilization as well as pressure on Shell by way of 
media coverage. At a more abstract level, the purpose of disseminating information on the 
company’s economic ties to South Africa is to demonstrate Shell’s – and, in the final instance, the 
individual customer’s – complicity in perpetuating the oppressive apartheid system. Following 
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Young’s social connection model, ‘obligations of justice’ emerge from this complicity since 
awareness about the link between Shell in Britain and Shell in South Africa necessitates a critical 
look at the actors involved and their role in preserving the social structures that connect them.162 
The activists relied on publicity to frame Shell as an enabler of structural injustice and as an 
intermediary between the apartheid regime and the British consumers. Fostering awareness was 
thus an essential part of the campaign since it established the justification for targeting Shell. 
The second major action against Shell entailed urging individual and institutional shareholders to 
divest themselves of Shell shares and to accompany this sale with a condemnation of the company’s 
South African operations.163 Among these institutional shareholders, pension funds and local 
councils were generally perceived to be among the most important. Similar to the campaign against 
Barclays, students also figured as an important source of protest against Shell; an internal 
assessment report by the company submits that the ‘divestment movement on campuses was a sign 
of students’ frustration with their inability to directly pressure for change and of their desire to do 
“anything” they can to support the anti-apartheid movement.’164 The report concludes that ‘if the 
boycott captures the attention of students, Shell could face demonstrations and recruitment 
problems.’165 
Viewed in extension of the activists’ effort to explicate the structural link between Shell and the 
policies of the South African government, the call for divestment provides a remedy by 
circumventing parliamentary politics and allowing for individual and institutional shareholders to 
sever their connection to the company. The principles of divestment, I would argue, thus comply 
with Beck’s definition of subpolitics as ‘economically guided action in pursuit of interests.’166 
Divestment constitutes a form of active subpolitics aiming to engage with the socio-political 
grievances associated, in this case, with Shell’s operations in South Africa. By advocating 
divestment, the activists offered a pragmatic response to the problematization of Shell’s operations. 
In line with the second strand of the strategy deployed against Shell, a boycott was encouraged 
among individual consumers, organizations, and institutions.167 Bulk purchasers targeted by the 
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activists included local and health authorities, fleet operators etc.168 However, the ‘predominant 
activity that suggests itself for the Boycott of Shell,’ a campaign briefing suggests, ‘is that of 
picketing Shell station and leafleting passers-by and customers.’169 In order to heighten the visibility 
of the pickets, large banners were sometimes suspended from motorway bridges and celebrities 
were invited to attend.170 Also, bumper stickers were produced and the Shell logo was ‘smeared,’ 
according to the Australian Business Review Weekly, ‘by turning it into a politicized and hated 
symbol of apartheid.’171 In addition to the AAM, groups such as Embargo, ELTSA, and War on 
Want engaged in picketing outside of Shell stations.172 One estimate suggests that 200 local anti-
apartheid groups regularly conducted pickets, motorcades etc.173 Sean O’Donovan, Secretary of the 
Haringey anti-apartheid group, describes how when at one picket the activists were ‘outside Shell 
with our ‘Boycott Apartheid – Boycott Shell’ banner and placards, very few cars went into the 
forecourt.’174 He continues: ‘any drivers that did were handed a leaflet explaining Shell’s 
involvement with South Africa, this resulted in many of the drivers turning round immediately and 
leaving without buying any petrol.175 
Compared to the institutional emphasis of divestment, the boycott of Shell may – initially – be 
perceived as a more individualized subpolitical tactic. Having recognized the social injustices 
transmitted through the connection between the company and the apartheid regime, individuals can 
choose to avoid Shell stations entirely. By using their purchasing power as an expression of their 
support of the anti-apartheid cause or as an instrument of pressure on Shell, individuals may be 
labelled political consumers. As discussed in chapter one, however, social movement activity often 
functions as an ‘incentive, if not a determinant, of individual political consumption’ and the 
campaign by the AAM against Shell may thus be perceived as a framework within which individual 
consumers could contribute by boycotting the company.176 In addition to the act of boycotting, the 
rest of the activities listed above also accentuate the corporate properties of the target, which further 
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substantiates a discussion of these activities as part of a political consumerist regime. When 
problematized as such, the boycott-related activities aimed at Shell can be discerned as social 
movement activity distinctly targeting a company as opposed to more generic contentious politics. 
Similar to the campaign against Barclays, fundamental differences in the views of the activists and 
their target company were quickly distinguishable. In a letter to Holmes, Chairman of Shell UK, the 
AAM asserted that the company had an ‘obligation’ to contribute to the democratic transition in 
South Africa and the movement called on Shell: 
 
Announce that you are willing to support the oil embargo, as backed by the United 
Nations and the Commonwealth, as well as to co-operate with the UN oil embargo 
monitoring group […], and refrain from investing new foreign capital in South Africa 
until there is an international consensus that financial sanctions should be lifted.177 
 
As discussed, the oil embargo was a complicated issue since the UN General Assembly had passed 
non-binding resolutions while the EEC embargo was not implemented properly and could be 
circumvented by transnational companies in a number of ways. Persuading Shell to comply with the 
international oil embargo thus presented an uphill struggle since – as was made clear in a letter to 
the activists – the company did ‘not believe [it] is in place.’178 Shell did, however, follow the various 
restrictive measures set up by the EEC and the Commonwealth, which meant that the activists 
would have to concentrate their efforts on the morally illegitimate and not the illegal aspect of 
foreign investment in South Africa (as had been the case against Barclays).179 
Shell’s response to being targeted by the activists was to assert that the company’s South African 
subsidiary was ‘financially self-sufficient’ and that its ‘physical assets cannot be removed,’ which 
meant that the company would continue operations under different ownership in the event of 
disinvestment.180 This argument was similar to Barclays’ rationalization of constructive engagement 
and it did not dissuade the activists from using Shell as a surrogate boycott target. A slightly more 
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persuasive angle was raised by Shell when the company contended that the foremost impact of the 
British boycott would be felt by the ‘small businessmen who are Shell dealers and licenses around 
the country, and their employees.’181 This prospect was a cause of concern among many participants 
in the campaign who felt that it ran counter to the solidary character of anti-apartheid activism. In 
an attempt to circumvent this problem, the activists primarily targeted petrol stations owned by 
Shell as opposed to those only associated with the Shell franchise.182 
Shell further responded to the campaign by allocating a substantial amount of resources to 
countering the activity of the activists. Already from the 1970s, the company had engaged in 
occasional dialogue with its critics yet at the request of Shell in the US, Pagan International 
formulated a 264-page document entitled the Neptune Strategy, which was used to organize and 
streamline the company’s response to the boycott campaign.183 This strategy was built upon the 
notion that activists and civil society groupings had experienced an increase in political and 
economic leverage through transnational networks and cooperation.184 According to a brief by the 
AAM, however, the ‘plan backfired when a secret document outlining the strategy was obtained by 
anti-apartheid groups.’185 The brief further noted that the ‘Pagan tactics have enraged church leaders 
and others throughout the world and has actually strengthened support for the boycott.’186 
Part of Shell’s strategy in Britain also included legal action, which was characterized by the 
activists as a type of ‘heavy-handedness unseen during the Barclays campaign.’187 A report by the 
AAM from June 1987 asserts that Shell ‘decided to try and win the public debate about their 
presence in SA/Namibia, whilst resorting to legal action in cases where their failure to win their 
debate and head off the boycott threatens to cost them valuable customers.’188 Specifically, Shell 
initiated litigation against three local councils due to their formal support of the boycott of Shell: 
Lewisham in London, Oslo, and a Dutch town.189 Lewisham Council had organized an initiative 
called Joint Action Against Apartheid (JAAA), which involved close to twenty local authorities 
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from across the country.190 Similar to the AAM, JAAA advocated for divestment and disinvestment 
as opposed to establishing or complying with codes of conduct for foreign-owned companies in 
South Africa. In a letter to Sir John Harvey-Jones, Chairman of Imperial Chemical Industries PLC, 
Martin Day from JAAA explains that he notes the ‘details on education given in your latest EEC 
Code Report, but would ask what the company is doing by way of contributing to the end of the 
apartheid system which is the cause of gross inequalities in education provision in the first place.’191 
While the AAM had been resolute in its criticism of the Sullivan Principles and the EEC Code of 
Conduct from the beginning, others began to view the codes with increasing skepticism towards the 
end of the 1980s as evidenced by Sullivan’s rejection of his own code (as related in chapter two). 
While engagement in discussions on disinvestment by Lewisham Council was not illegal, however, 
its decision to formally boycott Shell and to attempt to persuade other local authorities to follow 
suit was deemed ultra vires.192 In a letter from October 1986 to Holmes, Chairman of Shell UK, 
Martin Day wrote on ‘behalf of a number of local authority and Shell shareholders who are 
extremely concerned about your company’s involvement in South Africa.’193 Day proceeds by 
acknowledging that ‘Shell is starting to voice its concern about apartheid and has started to argue 
for the establishment of political rights for the black majority’ yet he concludes by arguing that 
‘surely, it is now time for Shell to follow the example of other major international companies, and 
withdraw operations from a country perpetuating the system Shell claims it deplores.’194 In 
December 1986, representatives of the Council met with Richard Tookey, Group Public Affairs 
Director at Shell International, who was unable to guarantee the company’s disinvestment from 
South Africa.195 According to Day, Tookey had conceded that ‘if Shell had a choice, they would not 
go into South Africa now, but as they had been there for seventy years they would stay put.’196 After 
the meeting, Day was convinced that Shell would not disinvest unless pressured to do so and he 
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encouraged a boycott of the company ‘in view of the success that Councils’ boycotts have had on 
Barclays.’197 
From the spring of 1987, the decision by Lewisham Council to begin a formal boycott of products 
and services from Shell in cases that offered viable alternatives led Shell to pursue legal action.198 
The AAM sought to help the Council by publishing leaflets, for instance, which ran: ‘STOP 
SHELL! International giant Shell, worth £30 billion, is threatening Lewisham council with massive 
High Court legal fees.’199 In a letter to Miriam Jørgensen from the Danish South Africa Committee 
on 21 September, David Crane from Embargo claims that ‘we never witnessed that degree of 
aggressiveness even at the height of the Barclays campaign, but it could well backfire on Shell.’200 
The official verdict on the case from November 1987, however, concludes that the Council had 
‘acted in breach of their legal powers and have misused their powers by leading a political 
campaign to cause damage to a Shell company and thereby coerce the Board of Shell Transport, an 
English public company, into adopting a policy leading to disinvestment from South Africa.’201 
Soon after this verdict, a new piece of legislation was introduced called the Local Government Act 
1988 that banned politically motivated boycotts by local councils.202 
 
Losing Momentum, Late 1980s to Early 1990s 
After a year of campaigning against Shell, the activists were still largely optimistic about the 
prospects of compelling the company to disinvest. The disruption of the Shell AGM in 1988, for 
instance, signified the continued support of the campaign and it gave an indication as to the 
problems it posed to the company. A report by the activists asserts that the first seven questions at 
the AGM revolved around apartheid and disinvestment and that many regular shareholders ‘left 
before the end in disgust at the predominance of South Africa and Namibia questions.’203 It was 
proposed that the following AGM should be attended by ethnic minority shareholders, which would 
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serve to ‘underline the total unacceptability of a major company like Shell defying the feelings of an 
important part of the community.’204 
Assessing the impact of the campaign on Shell until this point, the activists claimed to have 
contributed to a decrease in the company’s share of the British market ranging from 3.3 to 6.6 per 
cent, according to various estimates.205 A letter from Shell to Embargo, however, disputes these 
figures and contends that the ‘boycott has had no measurable effect.’206 In Denmark, activist 
approximations venture that Shell had lost 7 per cent of its market share as well as a number of 
major heating contracts.207 The company explained that the total Shell sales had increased markedly 
yet it concluded that ‘we do not claim that this is due to the boycott campaign since sales go up, and 
down, for a whole variety of reasons and it is not possible to isolate the effect of one particular 
factor.’208 
This problematization of the impact on Shell is reflective of more general concerns pertaining to the 
use of boycotting, as discussed in chapter one. While the symbolic message of the anti-apartheid 
activists’ reliance on the surrogate boycott was of principal significance, the boycott was also 
intended to have pragmatic consequences for Shell in terms of a decline in profits. Doubts 
concerning the economic impact of the boycott would thus be counter-productive to the motivation 
and mobilization efforts of the AAM, which is why the activists were generally eager to proclaim 
the success of this tactic. As discussed in chapter three, this inclination was demonstrated in the 
response of the activists to Barclays’ announcement to disinvest, which they claimed as a ‘victory’ 
for their campaign.209 Acknowledging the threat of the boycott campaign, Desmond Watkins, 
Director of Shell International, conceded that if the ‘effect of the anti-apartheid pressure, boycotts, 
etc. were to bring about a position where a continuing investment in South Africa was to be or 
likely to be financially negative for the Group as a whole, with no probability of this position 
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changing, then there would be a clear case for consideration of withdrawal on business grounds.’210 
‘So far,’ he added, ‘that has not been the case.’211 
Erik Van den Bergh lists three of the company’s most central areas of concern: first, the 
profitability of retaining operations in South Africa was a powerful motive for Shell to resist the 
boycotters’ demands.212 Despite the fact that Shell’s South African subsidiary was responsible for 
approximately one per cent of the total group profits, it was valued as a highly lucrative business. 
Second, the company wanted to avoid making a precedent for future campaigns. According to the 
reasoning behind this concern, compliance with the activists’ demands – or even just a compromise 
– could serve as incentive for other groups or movements to initiate a boycott against Shell.213 
Finally, the company was highly protective of its ‘personnel and its corporate image;’ I elaborate 
on this point later in this chapter. In terms of valuable management resources, the president of Shell 
Nederland explained in an interview that he ‘spent one third of his time on the issue’ during a 
particularly hectic period.214 Such extensive distraction from other duties was not sustainable and it 
constituted a persuasive argument in favour of a proactive strategy by Shell tailored to terminate the 
campaign as quickly as possible. 
By mid-1988, two additional points of criticism were included in the allegations by the activists 
against Shell. First, the company was condemned for its participation in the development of a new 
offshore gas field at Mossel Bay by the Eastern Cape. The gas field was scheduled to provide ten 
per cent of South Africa’s fuel import needs, which would contravene the international oil 
embargo.215 From a legal standpoint, however, Britain was not fully committed to a ban on all oil 
products and related technology and a number of British companies took advantage of legal gaps in 
order to partake in the development of the Mossel Bay project.216 The second point of criticism was 
leveled at Shell’s alleged violation of the international coal boycott; on 17 April, an article in the 
London Observer asserted that Shell played a ‘key role in disguising South African coal as Dutch 
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coal’ and that ‘ships owned or chartered by Shell bring coal from the South Africa terminal, which 
it co-owns, to the Netherlands.’217 At the time, coal was the third-most profitable sector in South 
Africa.218 Shell wrote in response to these claims that ‘to suggest, as have the anti-apartheid 
movements in the Netherlands and here, that Shell is in some way trying to disguise the origin of its 
coal is typical of the deliberate vilification that we have been subjected to since the boycott 
campaigns started.’219 The company further stated that it was not engaged in illegal activity and 
referred to the OECD Guidelines for Multinationals and the UN Code of Conduct for Multinationals 
as the standards by which it operated.220 
This style of reply by Shell is indicative of a more general pattern by which the company was 
engaged in efforts to counter negative statements or contentions; in my view, Shell was even more 
proactive in such efforts than Barclays had been. In a letter by Shell to the AAM from June 1988, it 
is noted that the ‘Anti-Apartheid Movement feels free to publish false and deliberately misleading 
statements about the Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies without making the slightest attempt 
to offer a shred of supporting evidence, and yet refuses to believe our subsequent denials because 
we have not provided “any evidence to the contrary.”’221 The management at Shell was 
consciousness of the threat posed by the ‘war of representation,’ which Barclays had lost most 
clearly in the public reception of the bank’s announcement to disinvest. If Shell could successfully 
dismiss the major allegations by the activists before they gained traction among the public and the 
media, the most important tool in the boycott campaign had been severely weakened. In a letter by 
Shell to Archbishop Huddleston on the topic of distortion of information by the AAM, the company 
emphatically stated: 
 
Shell companies are not breaking any oil embargoes; they are not ‘passing South 
African coal off as Dutch coal’; Shell Oil South West Africa is not ‘plundering’ 
Namibia’s resource since no Shell company has been involved in the exploration or 
development of oil, coal or metals in Namibia; there are no plans to ‘become involved 
in blending ethanol-from-sugar’; no Shell company is contravening ‘the spirit of the 
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EEC ban’ on investment; there are no ‘splits within the Royal Dutch/Shell Group at 
board level’ over South Africa; company morale is not falling.222 
 
While I will refrain from attempting to verify these allegations against Shell, what is important in 
terms of the interaction between the activists and the company is the effort by both actors to 
institute their account of events. Shell, on the one hand, emphasized the legal nature of its activities 
and its conviction about the merits of constructive engagement. The activists, on the other hand, 
were interested in facts only to the extent that they would implicate Shell in conduct that could be 
construed as illegal or immoral. The company criticized the activists for this approach by 
characterizing them as the ‘sort of people who can only think in slogans, and who, as a mob, try and 
disrupt our Annual General Meeting.’223 Shell further admonished the AAM by suggesting that the 
‘end justifies the means seems to be the underlying philosophy!’224 Substantiating this criticism by 
the company were the frequent attacks of sabotage against Shell stations and the threats of violence 
against Shell employees. While such action was repeatedly condemned by the AAM and its 
affiliated groups, internal Shell documents suggest that acts of violence were of constant concern to 
the company.225 While no exact numbers exist, a Shell publication estimates that approximately ten 
attacks on petrol stations took place every week at the peak of the campaign and that the number 
had fallen to 76 by 1991.226 Attacks appear to have been more frequent in Denmark than in Britain: 
in a 1987 interview, Aaron Mnisi, representative of the ANC in Denmark, acknowledged the 
potential economic impact of sabotage yet he expressed the concern that the public might come to 
associate anti-apartheid activism with illegal destruction of property.227 
In terms of the company’s positive influence in South Africa, Watkins, Director of Shell 
International, maintained that the ‘call from Shell’s Black employees, dealers and customers is for 
Shell to stay in South Africa.’228 He continued to stress that ‘there is no Black boycott of Shell in 
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South Africa’ and that the ‘Black community increasingly looks to Shell for support.’229 According 
to Sluyterman’s official history of Shell, the company had managed to build a good relationship 
with the ANC.230 Regardless of the nature of their relationship, however, the fact remains that the 
call by the ANC for total disinvestment by foreign investors ran counter to Shell’s intents. The 
company allegedly placed two advertisements in South African newspapers in the late 1980s, the 
first of which stated that ‘we’re backing South Africa.’231 The second advertisement suggested that 
‘two is a company, eight is a commitment,’ which referred to the expansion of the company’s 
operations from petroleum and other oil products to gas, coal, wood, chemicals, and various 
strategic metals.232 
From a conceptual viewpoint, Shell’s insistence on actively contributing to political change invites 
us to revisit my discussion of subpolitics in the introduction. Active subpolitics is used to 
characterize the deliberate activities of social movements and civil society organizations, while 
passive subpolitics denotes the unintended side-effects of the business of, for instance, transnational 
corporations. The most conspicuous example of the latter is Shell’s supply of oil to the South 
African military, which is comparable to Barclays’ purchase of defence bonds. When Shell claims 
to be conscious of the side-effects of its business conduct and the company asserts that this conduct 
is beneficial to the non-white population of South Africa, however, the subpolitics engaged in by 
the company appears to be closer to the active than the passive type. The reason why I would 
maintain that Shell’s adherence to constructive engagement is an example of passive subpolitics is 
the fact that the principal motivation for the company to retain operations in South Africa is profit-
oriented and not intended to bring about socio-political transformation. In other words, while Shell 
may be conscious about the side-effects of its operations, their supposedly beneficial consequences 
are only secondary to the overriding aim of making a profit. To that effect, the Shell South Africa 
Social Report 1985-86 states that the company’s ‘primary objective in South Africa is that shared 
by any business concern; it is there to trade profitably over the long term.’233 Conversely, the 
foremost objective of the campaign by the AAM was to generate socio-political transformation. In 
essence, applying the active/passive division compels us to consider the intention behind Shell’s 
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activities, which in turn nuances our examination of the interaction between the company and the 
activists. 
Despite the early success of the activists in attracting publicity and their steady dialogue with Shell, 
the resolve of the activists began to falter by the end of 1988. ‘As it became clear during 1988 that 
Shell was not about to pull out,’ an internal AAM report states, ‘the question of how to sustain the 
campaign became increasingly important.’234 The extensive organizational resources required for 
the Freedom at 70 concert further resulted in late planning for a Week of Action in November, 
which did not have the intended impact.235 In a resolution for the AGM of the AAM in November, 
the activists committed themselves to ‘stepping up local group action through: more pickets, greater 
efforts to shift bulk contracts, more pressure on community and arts groups not to accept Shell 
sponsorship, more and broader publicity about the boycott throughout the community.’236 This 
escalation in activity should not be perceived as a testament to the accomplishments of the 
campaign until this point but rather as an acknowledgement of the dwindling commitment of the 
activists involved. Embargo proposed that higher priority should be given to activity by the local 
anti-apartheid groups and that new areas of vulnerability for Shell should be identified.237 
In June 1989, it was conceded that the ‘major challenge for the Shell Campaign in 1989 has been to 
sustain activity following the launch of the Campaign in 1987 and the intense activity throughout 
1988.’238 This acknowledgement was issued in the wake of the protest at the 1989 Shell AGM, 
which had seen a greater number of participants than before with 50 activists present.239 Despite 
such support, however, the event was overshadowed by an article in The Guardian on the same day 
criticizing the activists for ‘retaining the amateurism of student lobbies.’240 A few months later, a 
report to the National Committee on the Shell campaign insisted that ‘we need to dramatically 
intensify the profile of the campaign so that the Shell Boycott assumes at least the same significance 
as the Barclays Boycott.’241 The report further recommended that the constituencies of support for 
the Shell campaign should be expanded and that educational and campaigning material should be 
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subjected to stricter quality control.242 Regardless of such intentions, however, the campaign had 
seriously ‘lost momentum:’ no new material was produced for local groups for a couple of years 
and the scheduled status meeting and reboot of the campaign was postponed from late 1989 to early 
1990.243 
The principal reason for this reorganization was the election of President De Klerk in South Africa 
in August 1989 and his announced intentions to initiate the democratic transition. These political 
developments meant that much anti-apartheid activism was put on hold in anticipation of the release 
of Mandela in February 1990 and further proclamations regarding the abolishment of the apartheid 
system. Planned action against Shell in February 1990 was cancelled and an internal report explains 
how a ‘Day of Action on Shell on 7 May has still not been confirmed with under three weeks to 
go.’244 It was even suggested that the campaign was rapidly approaching a scenario entailing 
‘demobilization by default.’245 Considering the declining rate of activities already before the 
election of De Klerk, this development should also be attributed to a failure by the AAM to sustain 
the campaign. The activists debated whether to employ full-time campaign staff in order to 
resuscitate the campaign yet such proposals did not come to fruition.246 
Taking into account Markoff’s historically grounded approach to social movement analysis, the 
political transformation signaled by De Klerk can be characterized as a ‘punctual’ event, which 
substantially alters the prospect of mobilization and the choice of strategy. Due to the historical 
significance of the event, however, De Klerk’s announcements may overshadow other simultaneous 
factors contributing to the decline of the campaign against Shell. Markoff warns about this 
phenomenon when he discusses the risk of unintentionally constructing ‘causally plausible 
stories.’247 While the event had an undeniable impact on the sustainment of the campaign, we have 
seen how the level of activities had already begun to falter beforehand, precipitated by factors such 
as Shell’s unwavering support of foreign investment in South Africa and the overstretch of the 
AAM’s areas of activity. 
Concern arose among the activists that the developments in South Africa would embolden Shell’s 
resolve to retain its operations in the country and to ‘ride out the storm,’ which would complicate 
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the effort by the activists to compel the company to disinvest entirely.248 Substantiating this concern, 
the company did in fact claim that the changes in the political scenery ‘vindicated’ their policy of 
constructive engagement.249 The Shell AGM in May 1990 distinguished itself from the previous 
years in the sense that the company had come to an agreement with the activists that they would be 
granted the first 30 minutes of the time allocated for questions. This arrangement was intended to 
inhibit the disruptive nature of the previous AGMs and to lessen antagonism from other 
shareholders.250 Despite such advances for the activists, however, the campaign continued to lose 
momentum and a gradually decreasing number of activities were organized and executed. In an 
open letter by an aggregate of anti-apartheid groups in early 1991, the World Council of Churches 
and its member churches were encouraged to sustain their support of the boycott against Shell until 
the ‘representative organizations of the majority of South Africans, such as the African National 
Congress and the South African Council of Churches, call on them to be lifted.’251 This 
recommendation is consistent with the close alignment of the AAM with the programs of the ANC, 
which had served as a point of reference for much British anti-apartheid activism (as discussed in 
chapter one). 
In May 1992, Embargo issued a press release commending Shell South Africa’s public support for 
an interim government and for a ‘democratic base on which a new constitution can be built.’252 The 
group further welcomed statements by John Kilroe, Executive Chairman of Shell South Africa, that 
the company would contribute to the eradication of ‘socio-economic backlogs built up over 
decades,’ among other efforts, as well as the intention of Shell to ‘meet its “fair share” of the tasks 
ahead.’253 Concluding the press release, however, David Crane from Embargo emphasized that 
‘companies like Shell could still do more to combat the devastating effects of apartheid and its 
legacies of poverty and injustice.’254 Though still critical of Shell, the rhetorical vigour of the early 
days of the campaign appears to have faded as the activists progressively realized that the company 
would retain its operations in South Africa. 
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Assessing the Dutch campaign against Shell – the impact of which is comparable to that of the 
British campaign – van den Bergh argues that the company management and regular employees 
became personally affected, shareholders were provoked, the company brand was tarnished, and 
that ‘there was no significant support for the increasingly isolated company.’255 He further suggests 
that Shell was ‘prepared to accept a new policy in South Africa,’ that the company’s ‘public and 
political profile was changed radically’ and that it had never before ‘spent so much time and energy 
on extending information on a similar political problem.’256 Sir Mark Moody-Stuart, later Chairman 
of Shell, added in an interview that the most substantial impact of social movement campaigns 
against the company were not ‘on direct loss of sales or margin but on employee morale and the 
ability to attract and retain high-quality employees.’257 While such costs in time and resources were 
substantial, they do not present an adequate answer to the question of why the campaign was not 
successful in achieving its stated aim of compelling Shell to sell its South African subsidiary. 
I have discussed the waning vitality of the campaign, Shell’s motivations to retain its South African 
operations, and De Klerk’s conciliatory announcements as plausible interrelated reasons for why the 
campaign failed to have the intended impact on Shell. Donna Katzin argues that despite this 
apparent failure, the boycott was declared a ‘victory.’258 The success of the campaign, she suggests, 
is evident in the ‘boycott’s catalytic role in galvanizing the anti-apartheid movement and focusing 
its effective economic and psychological pressure on Pretoria at the height of the anti-apartheid 
movement.’259 Katzin further notes that the campaign helped consolidate transnational alliances, 
which ‘laid the foundation for ongoing work for economic justice and corporate responsibility in the 
emerging South Africa.’260 Considering the choice of surrogate boycotting as the main tactic in the 
campaign against Shell, Katzin essentially proposes that the success of the campaign should be 
measured in terms of its impact on the target for which Shell was a surrogate (the South African 
government). In chapter three, I drew on the notions introduced by Monroe Friedman to discuss 
how Barclays’ disinvestment was a ‘micro-victory’ for the activists in the sense that their surrogate 
target complied with their demands yet at the same time a ‘macro-defeat’ since the overall aim of 
ending apartheid was not precipitated by this event. If we accept Katzin’s assessment of the 
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campaign against Shell, the outcome in this case was the reverse: the activists did not manage to 
compel their surrogate target to withdraw from South Africa yet the campaign may nevertheless 
have contributed to the more fundamental aim of pressuring the South African authorities to 
abandon their apartheid policies. 
I agree with Katzin’s observation that the campaign helped concentrate the efforts of the AAM, 
which is the purpose of a single-target boycott campaign. I am hesitant, however, to support 
conclusively the understanding that the campaign had any notable impact on the political 
developments in South Africa, which by the late 1980s were affected by numerous more significant 
factors such as domestic organized pressure and resistance in addition to the recently imposed 
sanctions and embargoes by the international community. Without underestimating the 
consequences that a disinvestment signal by Shell might have had, even a full-scale withdrawal by 
the company in the very late 1980s might have been perceived as a late addition to the surge of 
disinvestment announcements by foreign-owned companies initiated a few years earlier. Rather 
than engage in a counterfactual analysis, however, I want to redirect my discussion to the 
implications of the interaction between Shell and the anti-apartheid activists for the development of 
CSR. 
 
Shell and Social Responsibility 
In contrast to the longue durée perspective characteristic of the campaign against Barclays and the 
gradual developments in the bank’s socially responsible policies, my focus on British anti-apartheid 
initiatives against Shell in the late 1980s does not lend itself to a similar analytical approach. 
Irrespective of the temporal variations, however, Barclays and Shell were both compelled by the 
activists to direct their attention towards the same basic problem areas. As echoed by Sluyterman, 
Shell’s dilemma consisted in the fact that ‘on the one hand, top management wished to send out a 
strong message that it was against apartheid and the apartheid regime, but on the other hand it also 
wanted to stick to the Group philosophy of not interfering in the political system of any country.’261 
The compromise, according to Sluyterman, was that John Wilson, Chairman of Shell South Africa, 
assumed the role of a more vocal critic of the apartheid system within South Africa.262 In the 
previous sections, I have provided an account of the campaign against Shell and discussed what I 
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believe to be the events and decisions most evocative of the process. For the remainder of this 
chapter, I want to expound on the dilemma referred to above and dissect the implications of the 
interaction between the activists and Shell for the development of CSR. 
Going back to the 1970s – before the onset of the British campaign – Shell was already confronted 
with ‘public concern about the power of large companies.’263 As discussed in chapter two, the 
academic and business communities had begun to pay attention to the idea of social responsibilities 
particularly of transnational corporations. A 1975 Trade Relations Report by Shell notes that 
‘transparency’ was becoming a key signifier of the general requirements and expectations of elected 
officials, and this trend would gradually sieve into the private sector.264 In 1976, the same year that 
the OECD published its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, Shell developed its own internal 
guidelines. Entitled Shell’s Statement of General Business Principles, these guidelines affirmed the 
company’s policy to always ‘act commercially, operating within existing national laws in a socially 
responsible manner, and avoid involvement in politics.’265 According to Sluyterman, the guidelines 
did ‘not debate issues, but clearly responded to criticisms raised by certain groups in society.’266 
Four main stakeholders were identified: shareholders, employees, customers, and society.267 Other 
oil companies such as Exxon and BP also published similar guidelines, which – together with the 
establishment of international codes of conduct – is suggestive of broader developments within the 
field of CSR in the late 1970s.268 From its introduction in 1977, Shell supported the EEC Code of 
Conduct in addition to the OECD guidelines and the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles.269 
Considering the timeline, an apparent connection can be discerned between attempts at establishing 
formal international guidelines for transnational corporations and Shell’s intensified CSR efforts. 
According to John Wilson, Chairman of Shell South Africa, domestic developments within South 
Africa played an even more crucial role in the advancement of the socially oriented aspects of the 
company’s operations. Discussing earlier decades of inaction on this area, Wilson asserted in 1986 
that the fact that the South African business community ‘failed to involve themselves in the broader 
political issues of South Africa was not owing to indifference, or lack of feeling on the part of 
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business leaders. It was rather the notion that the political arena was something divorced from the 
business world.’270 Wilson points to the Durban strikes in 1973 and the Soweto Uprising in 1976 as 
defining events that prompted the business community to reconsider the extent to which ‘politics 
began to hurt business, and to adversely affect the return on investments.’271 Whereas the 
government and the business community had always been engaged in dialogue on economic issues, 
a shift precipitated mainly by social unrest meant that socio-political topics were now highly 
prioritized. There should be no mistaking the fact, however, that for Shell the ‘South African 
problem is essentially a political one requiring a political solution.’272 
From 1978, the company began to report on its socially oriented policies in its annual reports. From 
1981, a ‘Shell in the Community’ section sought to explicate the company’s progressive 
initiatives.273 In the 1983 report, L.C. van Wachem, President of Shell, emphasizes the importance 
of executing the company’s ‘world-wide operations in a socially responsible and acceptable 
manner.’274 The 1984 annual report further demonstrates Shell’s attention to CSR-oriented business 
conduct by proposing that the ‘most important contribution that Shell companies can make to the 
social and material progress of the countries in which they operate is in conducting their business 
operations profitably and as efficiently as possible.’275 It is further detailed in the report that 
educational projects constituted a substantial part of Shell South Africa’s ‘community 
programme.’276 This rhetoric is consistent with the company’s adherence to the constructive 
engagement approach and it is evident from the annual reports that Shell not only paid attention to 
the development of CSR-related measures but that the company was also highly aware of the 
strategic benefits of having a strong profile within this area. In May 1985, Wilson noted: 
 
Business must accept that it cannot divorce itself from the social environment in 
which it functions. Business must recognize this and be prepared to play its role in 
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society. The businessman can no longer say “I am a businessman and not interested in 
the vital social and political issues of our times and of our country.” Business must 
assume these responsibilities and take the initiative.277 
 
By all accounts, such rhetoric was perceived as progressive at the time, particularly when compared 
to other transnational companies such as IBM (as discussed in chapter two). In addition to a stated 
recognition of the need for ethics in business, Shell increased its social responsibility programs by 
70 per cent in 1987.278 The intensified activity on this area, however, should also be seen partly as a 
response to a 1986 EIRIS report on the implementation of EEC Code of Conduct that listed Shell as 
paying some of its employees less than the minimum subsistence wage.279 In general, however, 
wages in the oil industry were above the South African average.280 Assessments of Shell South 
Africa’s personnel policy and the company’s relationship with trade unions also varied 
significantly: van den Bergh notes that the ‘upper echelons were completely white’ and that the six-
fold increase in the amount of non-white employees in management positions between 1977-1987 
should partly be attributed to a ‘general increase in personnel, while the total number of blacks 
remained extremely low.’281 
Assessing the changes made by Shell in the mid- to late 1980s, M.S. Adams suggests that the 
company ‘increases the skills base of the country, addressing its own skills shortages; distances 
itself and the business community from apartheid and disarms the disinvestment campaign, 
legitimizing the presence of multinational corporations in South Africa.’282 Furthermore, he argues, 
‘for its outlay Shell gains itself an enhanced corporate image, aiding its sales drive among black 
consumers.’283 Shell on its part maintained that ‘it’s not done to gain brownie points overseas but 
because we have a genuine commitment to social change within the country.’284 In a speech to Shell 
staff in 1988, Tookey, Group Public Affairs Director at Shell International, explained that ‘society 
is even less inclined than perhaps it once was to judge business on economic criteria alone, but 
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increasingly takes into account moral or ethical concerns.’285 Three years later, Tookey advised the 
management to ‘be human’ in its choice of business strategy: ‘the public will judge us not by how 
much we comply,’ he implored, ‘but by how much we care.’286 The newsletter Shell World 
concluded in 1990, however, that ‘oil wells dry up. Tankers rust and people die, but brands and 
trademarks live on.’287 While a poor choice of words in an apartheid-era context, a company’s 
adherence to ethical principles does not exclude profit-oriented incentives, although such ‘shared 
value’ might raise questions about the selection of concrete CSR programs.288 
The anti-apartheid activists largely disregarded Shell’s efforts to improve conditions for the non-
white population of South Africa since the main criteria of success for the campaign against Shell 
was the much more categorical demand of complete disinvestment. Despite the fact that Shell 
introduced several CSR initiatives, offered its employees shares in the company, and advertised on 
the front page of the Weekly Mail in support of a free press, freedom of assembly and movement, 
and other democratic rights, the AAM would only be content once the company was no longer 
involved in South Africa.289 Thus, by the end of 1989, David Crane from Embargo maintained in 
the face of intensified CSR commitment by Shell that it ‘is becoming increasingly clear that Shell’s 
stubborn refusal to “bow” to the growing international boycott of Shell products, shows a lack of 
commercial as well as ethical sense.’290 
Considering the determination by the company to retain operations in South Africa, it is possible to 
view Shell’s commitment to CSR – in combination with its support of constructive engagement – at 
least partly as a means to justify its continued investment in the country. While the activists 
acknowledged that constructive engagement might improve conditions for non-white employees, 
they maintained that it would not be sufficient to fundamentally transform the South African system 
of governance. The activists further argued that the urgency of the situation meant that the socio-
economic betterment generated by the social programs of the multinational corporations would be 
too slow. In a letter to Embargo occasioned by the publication of the company’s recent social 
report, Shell concedes that ‘progress towards a desired objective can never be fast enough.’291 
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Not only would disinvestment be immoral, Shell contended, it would fail to have any practical 
impact. The company’s arguments against the sale of its subsidiary are similar to those by most 
other transnational corporations (as discussed in chapter two). Shell repeatedly emphasized the fact 
that ‘Shell South Africa is a South African company’ and that the ‘operating company has to be and 
be seen to be acting in the interests of the country where its business is and where it is registered to 
carry out that business.’292 Another commonly held argument was that the ‘physical assets cannot be 
removed from the country: they would be taken over by a new owner and the corporations would 
continue.’293 In an effort to substantiate this claim, a confidential management brief entitled South 
Africa – the Case against Disinvestment from 1987 refers to the disinvestment by General Motors 
and the subsequent announcement by the new owners that they would not observe the Sullivan 
Principles.294 The brief asserted that the ‘foreign ownership of assets in South Africa is relatively 
small compared with those owned by the major South African corporations’ and that less than ten 
per cent of the ‘total fixed capital stock’ was foreign-owned by the end of 1985.295 Regarding the 
political and economic pressure generated by disinvestment, Shell suggested that supporters of the 
South African government in fact welcomed the withdrawal of foreign investment and 
businesses.296 The impact on the government, it is noted a 1987 Shell UK report, ‘would be nil.’297 
In correspondence to this bleak perception of the prospects for socio-political change in South 
Africa, Archbishop Huddleston received a letter from Shell in May 1988 pointing to the ‘growing 
realization that the struggle may yet be a long one’ and emphasizing that ‘disinvestment is not 
producing change.’298 
Apart from the condemnation of the apartheid system, then, little accord could be found between 
Shell and the AAM. What the two actors did agree on, however, was that transnational corporations 
could exercise considerable political leverage. Shell, on the one hand, used this insight to rationalize 
its adherence to the constructive engagement approach by arguing that the company’s socially 
responsible policies could influence workplace norms and eventually contribute to wider socio-
economic change. The Shell South Africa Social Report 1985-86 affirms that the business 
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community ‘commands great persuasive power, and can act as a stimulus, mediator and 
conciliator.’299 Wilson, Chairman of Shell South Africa, even cautioned that the ‘influence of the 
business community, and of foreign-owned companies in particular, must not be underestimated.’300 
More concretely, Shell perceived its subsidiary as a ‘channel through which international influence 
can be brought to bear on South African social and political mores.’301 Disinvestment, the company 
argued, would ‘obviously remove this channel.’302 In another letter, Holmes, Chairman of Shell UK, 
notes that ‘we feel we have a moral responsibility not to abandon our employees, of all races, and 
their families for the sake of what we believe would be little more than a symbolic, political, 
gesture.’ Recognizing the complexity of the issue, he adds that ‘how best to proceed is not an easy 
decision.’303 
The AAM, on the other hand, saw the advantages of this potential influence of transnational 
corporations in terms of their capacity to put direct pressure on the South African government by 
either threatening to disinvest or disinvesting entirely. Another course of action was for Shell to 
retain operations in South Africa but to actively contravene South African law. Comparable to the 
campaign against Barclays, there was a distinct divide between the activists’ perception of apartheid 
law as fundamentally illegitimate and Shell’s policy of compliance. The company argued in a letter 
that illegal activity ‘would be an extremely dangerous road to follow’ since the Shell Group 
‘operates in more than 100 countries of many different political complexions and its operations 
would be severely hampered […] if it was seen to be anything other than apolitical.’304 Wilson’s 
introduction in the Shell South Africa Social Report 1985-86 specifies that the company is 
committed to ‘doing all it can to eradicate apartheid, and to ensuring a free and equal society for all’ 
but that this ‘does not mean that Shell will embark on a campaign of law-breaking; that would, in 
our view, be wrong.’305 Wilson elaborated in an interview that ‘one’s got to remember first of all 
that government is the voice of the electorate.’ ‘There are those who will say it’s a minority voice,’ 
he added, ‘but be that as it may, the government is the voice that people democratically elected.’306 
According to Sampson, one high-ranking Shell employee affirmed that the company would ‘always 
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serve under the government, whatever it is. There’s one thing you must never ask a multinational to 
do: to choose.’307 
This discrepancy between the activists’ emphasis on the illegitimate, on the one hand, and Shell’s 
observance of the legal on the other hand was a major point of contention throughout the campaign. 
A letter by the company to Reverend Haslam, however, concedes that ‘your suggestion that Shell 
South Africa should contravene “the so-called ‘Law’ of apartheid South Africa” raises a difficult 
issue.’308 The anti-apartheid activists did not accept the resolve by Shell to operate within the 
confines of apartheid law as a valid justification of what the activists saw as an insufficient signal to 
the South African authorities. In a letter to Shell, Robert Hughes, Chairman of the AAM, retorted 
that ‘from a moral point of view it is surely inadequate to imply […] that Shell washes its hands of 
any responsibility for any military supplies your South African subsidiary may make, because of 
restrictions imposed by the Pretoria regime.’309 Hughes concluded by addressing the perceived 
inconsistency in Shell’s moral reasoning by arguing that ‘your position amounts to little more than 
“see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil” and is totally at odds with your public position of 
responsible opposition to the regime.’310 
According to Sluyterman’s analysis, the company’s interaction with the anti-apartheid activists was 
the primary motivation why the ‘vision of Shell shifted from the principle that it was enough to 
observe the national law in each country in which it operated, to the view that Shell companies 
should be able to follow Shell’s own Statement of General Business Principles in their own 
operations.’311 The company’s Public Affairs department was particularly observant of 
developments in the public expectations of Shell’s commitment to socially responsible conduct, and 
the idea of a moral ‘licence to operate’ attained prominence during the two decades of anti-
apartheid action against the company.312 ‘In 1972,’ Sluyterman notes, ‘reputation was considered 
necessary to enable Shell to operate, but by 1990 Shell was apparently supposed to need a public 
consent, permission to operate.’313 
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The consumer boycott campaign against Shell should be seen as a manifestation of the deficiency of 
this public consent. This campaign was motivated not by Shell’s general business platform but 
rather its association with the South African regime. Discussing this connection in his keynote 
address at a Senior Staff Conference in August 1986, Wilson posed the question: ‘does Shell need a 
corporate code of values, a code which would set out Shell’s approach and philosophy in the 
abnormal society which is South Africa?’314 Judging by the annual strategy meeting a few months 
earlier, the answer was ‘no.’315 The reasoning behind this attitude was that Shell’s general statement 
of business principles, which pertained to Shell companies worldwide, was an adequate response to 
the South African context. Nonetheless, a preamble was included in addition to the specification 
that ‘Shell South Africa has resolved to promote and actively contribute to the elimination of racial 
intolerance, unjust laws and unacceptable human rights practices.’316 In his explanation of this 
amendment to the company’s principles, Wilson conceded that ‘you would be justified in being 
highly skeptical and asking whether Shell’s change in direction is merely the result of external 
pressures, of the threat of sanctions and disinvestment, a reaction to the international boycott action 
against the group.’317 He added that ‘we would have difficulty in pretending that these factors have 
not contributed to our stance.’318 An internal note from Shell South Africa Public Affairs further 
affirms that ‘due to the increased pressure on Shell SA in respect of the Shell boycott and 
disinvestment it has been necessary to step up on our corporate advertising.’319 
Asked to sum up the motivation for Shell’s intensified commitment to social responsibility in one 
word, Wilson responded: ‘survival.’320 This admission suggests that rather than engaging in CSR-
related programs from a proactive and philanthropically grounded standpoint, Shell’s socially 
responsible initiatives were the product of influence from above – in the form of increasingly 
restrictive policies regarding foreign investment in South Africa – and from below – as embodied 
by the anti-apartheid activists. Substantiating this analysis, Erik van den Bergh concludes that ‘Shell 
appeared to be prepared and able, when put under pressure, to adjust its policies on various 
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levels.’321 I would be hesitant to accept van den Bergh’s analysis on the basis of Wilson’s address 
alone since – as discussed at the beginning of this section – his role as outspoken critic of the South 
African authorities and, effectively, as conciliatory figurehead of Shell’s socially conscious efforts 
problematizes his credibility as representative of the management’s actual motivations. 
Nevertheless, Wilson’s address by no means represents an anomaly in terms of the explanations 
provided by Shell’s management. In an unusually candid address entitled Business and South 
Africa: Reasons and Responsibility from October 1988, Watkins, Director of Shell International, 
discusses the call for disinvestment as well as the relationship of the company to the still emerging 
concept of CSR. Watkins introduces the topic by challenging the perception of the disinvestment 
issue as a ‘conflict between principles and profits.’322 Rather than accepting this divide, he proposes 
that it is the ‘very pragmatic businessmen who withdraw from South Africa’ based on an 
exclusively profit-oriented calculation of their operations in the country.323 
In September 1987, Tookey, Group Public Affairs Director at Shell International, reaffirmed Shell’s 
attitude that ‘disinvestment on moral grounds would not be a demonstration of moral rectitude or 
virtue but of moral weakness. It would be washing our hands of any further social responsibility.’324 
This was echoed by Watkins a year later when he asserted that ‘those who stay are not only trying 
to run a business in a profitable manner but are also having to wrestle with issues of principle 
involving a whole range of ethical, human, legal and corporate dilemmas.’325 While consistent with 
Barclays’ rationalization of its continued investment in South Africa a few years earlier, Watkin’s 
argument hints at a more nuanced understanding of CSR than offered by the bank. At the same 
time, however, he blatantly admits to the significance of external pressure for the implementation of 
socially responsible programs when he suggests that the ‘businessman’s problem in South Africa 
would be a great deal easier to deal with and to explain if we could rely on the Friedman view. 
However, in practice, society will not allow us to do so.’326 
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This conception of CSR brings us back once again to Seidman’s interpretation that ‘external 
pressures on a corporation defined its societal obligations, not the moral instincts arising from 
within.’327 While I concur with this understanding of CSR within the context of foreign investment 
in South Africa, Shell’s response seems peculiar when considering the fact that most external 
sources of pressure advocated the disinvestment of the company. Instead, Shell chose to retain 
control of its foreign subsidiary yet with a more clearly defined socially responsible profile. As 
argued on the basis of statements by Shell staff, I perceive the strategic reasoning behind the 
company’s CSR commitment as intended to appease the critics of the company. By demonstrating 
its recognition of ethical principles and social responsibility, Shell could deflect the activists’ 
attempts to depict the company as engaged in morally illegitimate conduct and establish itself as a 
responsible actor comparable to the AAM. Consequently, in Shell’s communication the debate on 
disinvestment between the activists and the company is often construed as a choice between two 
equally moral paths through the company’s insistence on its status as socially responsible. The 
almost complete disregard by the activists of Shell’s CSR programs, however, facilitated their 
continuous refusal to accept this representation of their confrontation with the company. 
Regarding the impact of the boycott campaign against Shell, I accept Katzin’s analysis that the 
‘victory of the Shell boycott may be the unprecedented international foundations it has established 
for promoting economic justice and corporate responsibility in a new South Africa.’328 While failing 
to compel the company to disinvest, the anti-apartheid activists’ campaign contributed to the macro-
narrative of emerging attention towards social responsibility for transnational corporations; not only 
in South Africa, as Katzin proposes, but more widely in both academic and managerial discussions 
on account of the campaign’s high level of publicity. I want to nuance this analysis, however, by 
examining more long-term effects of the campaign on Shell: viewed in isolation from later 
developments, the interaction between the AAM and the company suggests a gradual escalation in 
Shell’s CSR efforts, which appears to indicate that the management was attentive to the company’s 
role as a socially responsible business. Taking into the account the events of 1995, however, an 
assessment of the impact of the anti-apartheid effort is complicated considerably. 
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Shell after Apartheid 
Two significant events catapulted Shell into a major publicity crisis in 1995: the disposal of the 
Brent Spar platform off the coast of Scotland and the execution of – among others – the Nigerian 
activist Ken Saro-Wiwa. In addition to Shell’s own subsequent statements, most of the literature on 
these events suggests that the scandals surrounding the company during this period prompted Shell 
to carefully review its social responsibilities and what these might entail. Thus, Esther Hennchen 
refers to the Nigerian controversy as the ‘origin of Shell’s CSR agenda.’329 As we have seen in this 
chapter, however, years of prior anti-apartheid campaigning and interaction with activists on this 
issue had already generated substantial reflection within the company. In the following, I examine 
the two events in order to determine their implications for Shell’s relationship to CSR. A discussion 
of this perspective within the general framework of this dissertation occasions a comparative 
assessment of why the events of 1995 is widely considered to mark the beginnings of Shell’s CSR 
commitment when the previous interaction between the company and the anti-apartheid activists 
revolved around this same issue. 
In early 1995, Shell announced its decision to execute a deep-water disposal of the Brent Spar oil 
platform that had been towed into place almost twenty years earlier. Prior to the announcement, the 
company had consulted the Scottish Office, the British Department of Trade and Industry and other 
government departments. In February 1995, Shell’s decision was approved by Tim Eggar, the Trade 
and Industry Minister.330 In addition to official institutions, Shell reached out to those external 
stakeholders explicitly mandated by the British Petroleum Act of 1987.331 Between 1992 and 1994, 
the company had conducted comprehensive investigations into the optimal option for disposal in 
cooperation with engineering consultants from Aberdeen University.332 
Notably, the tactical repertoire developed by the AAM in its campaign against Shell included an 
effort to identify alternative areas of vulnerability for the company such as ‘environmental 
campaigns against chemical dumping,’ which could serve as additional pressure points.333 While 
this approach was downplayed in the anti-apartheid campaign, it constituted the basis for the 
campaign by Greenpeace that began to attract public and media attention from 30 April 1995 when 
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members of the group boarded the Brent Spar platform.334 The motivation behind this action can be 
found in the nearly ten years of lobbying by Greenpeace for a global ban on ocean dumping that had 
eventually been introduced in 1993 with the London Convention.335 
In response to the campaign initiated by Greenpeace, several Western European countries criticized 
the deep-water disposal of the platform and on 18 May the European Parliament adopted a 
resolution aimed to prevent Shell from executing its decision.336 At the Fourth North Sea 
Conference a few weeks later, most of the attending countries supported a similar 
recommendation.337 At this time, Shell was ‘caught in the middle between local communities, the 
national government and global public opinion.’338 This extensive political pressure was not 
sufficient for Shell to change its decision, however, and an international consumer boycott was 
launched instead. During the span of a few weeks, the campaign against Shell attracted widespread 
media coverage and Greenpeace ‘played a crucial role in providing visual images,’ Jesper Grolin 
proposes, ‘not least through their occupations of the platform.’339 Similar to the anti-apartheid 
campaign, petrol stations were now boycotted in a number of European countries with German 
petrol stations reporting up to 50 per cent decline in sales in mid-June.340 
Despite the fact that Shell had begun towing the platform in mid-June, only a few days later the 
company abandoned its scheduled offshore disposal. This reversal of its decision led British Prime 
Minister John Major to characterize Shell as ‘wimps’ for succumbing to the public pressure.341 
According to Sluyterman, Shell ‘concluded from the uproar over what they had considered to be a 
fairly technical decision, that public perception counted and that Shell needed to involve the views 
of external stakeholders in its decision-making.’342 While the Brent Spar incident may have elicited 
further reflection by the company, we have seen in this chapter that Shell was conscious about the 
importance of external stakeholders already during the anti-apartheid campaign. Although 
ultimately not effective, parliamentary debates on the involvement of the company in South Africa 
coupled with increasingly restrictive legislation on foreign investment had hinted at the potential 
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risk of conducting business in a controversial area. Moreover, public pressure spearheaded by the 
AAM had demonstrated the need to be perceived as a morally legitimate company. 
Extrapolating on the basis of the Brent Spar incident, Ulrich Beck points to the campaign initiated 
by Greenpeace as an event that ‘brought about a change in the political scenery: the politics of the 
first, industrial modernity made way for the new politics of the second, reflexive modernity.’343 
Beck lists a number of reasons for this transition yet the principal stimulus for his analysis is the 
disclosure of new forms of legitimacy derived not from institutional structures but from the moral 
appeals of ‘unauthorized actors.’344 To that effect, he argues, ‘Greenpeace only illuminated the 
existing vacuum of legitimation and power within the political system.’345 This understanding can 
similarly be applied to the AAM and its dual aim of lobbying the elected officials to implement 
sanctions against South Africa, on the one hand, and on the other hand of exposing the structural 
complicity of British companies in perpetuating the apartheid system. Extending Beck’s analysis, 
Grolin suggests that ‘Brent Spar marked a fundamental shift and decentralization in the location of 
the driving forces of politics from formal political institutions to groups and individuals of civil 
society, reflecting a process of subpoliticization.’346 While this may be a valid interpretation of the 
nature of the implications, I am hesitant to attribute this level of significance to the Brent Spar 
incident particularly when taking into account the anti-apartheid campaign against Shell. 
In 1993, a few years prior to the campaign by Greenpeace against Shell, massive protests were 
aimed at the company in Nigeria by the Ogoni people. The basis for the protests was the fact that 
the profit made from the extraction of oil in their land did not benefit the Ogoni people but rather 
devastated and polluted the area.347 When writer and activist Ken Saro-Wiwa was arrested by the 
Nigerian regime together with a few others as leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the 
Ogoni Peoples (MOSOP) in 1994, civil society groups put pressure on Shell internationally to use 
its political leverage to prevent the execution of the Nigerian activists.348 In response, Shell repeated 
its arguments used against the anti-apartheid activists that a company should remain politically 
neutral and refrain from interfering in the political decision of sovereign nations.349 In his closing 
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address to the tribunal before his execution in late 1995, Saro-Wiwa proclaimed that Shell was more 
on trial than he and his co-defendants were.350 The case engendered an international outcry and the 
company experienced a severe backlash in the wake of the executions, including ‘consumer 
boycotts in Europe and North America, shareholder activism through formal resolutions in Europe, 
increasing levels of community disruption in the Niger Delta, falling share prices, and 
hemorrhaging staff.’351 In terms of the consumer boycott, however, a greater number of participants 
had been mobilized during the Brent Spar incident; this may be related to the fact that the boycotts 
were only a few months apart.352 
In the 1995 annual report, C.A.J. Herkströter, President of Shell International, discusses both Brent 
Spar and the controversy pertaining to the company’s involvement in Nigeria: ‘whereas there are 
those who criticize the Group for non-interference in Nigeria,’ he notes, ‘there is also a long-
standing and considerable body of opinion that finds political interference unacceptable.’353 
Herkströter elaborates on this notion in an address in late 1996 when he asserts that ‘as a large 
commercial company, and a very successful one, we have economic weight. But, that is not 
political power. […] we have no social authority, we have no political authority and we have no 
ability to impose our views.’354 Reflecting on the strategic implications of the two events, 
Herkströter acknowledges that the incidents ‘demonstrated the degree of complexity in the 
multinational operations of Group companies and the need to gain broader understanding and 
acceptance of their activities. This is, in effect, the Group’s license to operate.’355 Whereas Shell 
consistently emphasized the legal as opposed to the morally legitimate aspect of its business in its 
interaction with anti-apartheid activists, Herkströter’s statement indicates a more profound 
acceptance of the inclusion of ethical concerns in Shell’s strategies and operations. According to a 
recent article by Hennchen, ‘Shell executives realized that the company had grown out of touch 
with societal expectations’ after the controversy in Nigeria.356 This observation is corroborated by 
Magdalena Bexell who proposes that the ‘spotlight on Shell led to a major shift in corporate 
awareness of issues arising from demands for a social responsibility of business.’357 
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This perception is further substantiated by statements from the Shell management, and while part of 
Shell’s strategy against the AAM had been to deny or downplay the impact of the anti-apartheid 
campaign, the rhetoric did indeed change considerably after 1995. Sir Philip Watts, Chairman of 
Royal Dutch/Shell, noted that Shell ‘had been the strong, silent type’ but that the company was now 
preoccupied with ‘engagement, engagement, engagement.’358 Presumably, this juxtaposition of 
Shell’s strategy during the anti-apartheid campaign with the company’s recently intensified 
commitment to CSR is intended to signal change rather than provide an adequate account of Shell’s 
strategies. As discussed in relation to the anti-apartheid campaign, Shell was persistently engaged in 
dialogue with the activists as well as other interest groups and stakeholders. To be precise, however, 
this interaction revolved around the effect of sanctions, disinvestment etc. and not the co-operative 
configuration of ethical guidelines and socially responsible policies. 
In the wake of the events of 1995, Mark Moody-Stuart, Chairman of the Committee of Managing 
Directors at Shell, stated that ‘Shell is undergoing fundamental change … We have learned the hard 
way that we must listen, engage and respond to our stakeholder groups.’359 Sluyterman expounds on 
this assertion by explaining that ‘with the help of research among the general public, special groups, 
and Shell managers, round-table meetings and benchmarking, Shell examined society’s rising 
expectations and Shell’s inability to meet them.’360 In 1996, the company established the ‘Society’s 
Changing Expectations’ project, which improved the conditions for auditing.361 The following year, 
Shell revised and expanded its 1976 Statement of General Business Principles and – among other 
initiatives – offered management training in order to enhance competence within the areas of social 
responsibility and respect for human rights.362 The company’s 1998 report Profits and Principles is 
characterized by Leslie Sklair as a ‘leading exemplar of the quest for global corporate citizenship, 
as state of the art in this realm at the end of the twentieth century.’363 
It is evident, then, that Shell’s CSR commitment escalated substantially in the aftermath of 1995. 
Despite the fact that a similar process had taken place during the anti-apartheid campaign, the 
company’s transformation in the late 1990s was more extensive. With few years between the 
campaigns, the rapid developments within the CSR field during this period should nonetheless not 
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be disregarded; thus, Soule points out that while in 1977 less than 50 per cent of Fortune 500 
companies included CSR in their annual reports, more than 90 per cent of them did by the end of 
the 1990s.364 Taking into account this gradual acceptance of CSR, by the late 1990s it had arguably 
become less controversial for Shell to engage more actively in this area. 
Grolin, conversely, seeks to explain the difference in response by Shell from a micro-perspective: as 
demonstrated earlier in this chapter, the campaign by the AAM against Shell attracted widespread 
media coverage while maintaining a visible public profile due to the pickets of petrol stations etc. 
Referencing this campaign, Grolin argues that ‘Shell’s buffer or allowance for mistakes had already 
been pretty much exhausted by the time the Brent Spar conflict started.’365 This analysis ties 
together the campaigns against Shell by suggesting that the anti-apartheid effort contributed to 
negative connotations among the public regarding the company and that this accumulated 
dissatisfaction resulted in greater pressure on Shell in 1995 than might otherwise have been the 
case. McDonnell, King, and Soule have recently conceptualized this idea by proposing a ‘process 
by which a movement’s activity can open avenues of influence for later movements.’366 As 
discussed in chapter two, this conception is grounded in the notion that activists and increased CSR 
commitment by a company ‘reinforce one another through a feedback cycle of activist activity and 
increased receptivity to activists,’ which aptly conveys the case of Shell’s transition from the mid-
1980s to the mid-1990s.367 
A plausible rationalization of the scholarly omittance of the anti-apartheid effort against Shell is that 
the campaign failed to attain its stated aim and that it gradually dissolved outside of the public’s 
attention. There was no blatant culmination to the campaign that functioned as a turning point for 
the company’s attitude towards CSR. In line with Markoff’s categories of historical analyses of 
social movements, there was no ‘punctual’ event that had a transformational impact on Shell. 
Rather, the ‘duration’ of the campaign – in combination with the company’s concern about potential 
long-term negative effects on its image – incited Shell to engage more actively in socially 
responsible conduct. Comparatively, the protests against the company motivated by the Brent Spar 
incident and the controversy in Nigeria were short-lived and had more decisive outcomes in the 
form of a tangible shift in rhetoric and policy. 
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Conclusion 
By presenting a historical account of Shell’s involvement in South Africa and the early international 
anti-apartheid action against the company in the first two sections of this chapter, I set the stage for 
an examination of the British campaign in the late 1980s. My subsequent analyses in sections three 
and four of the tactical repertoire employed by both sides of the campaign and the communicative 
relationship between the two actors traced developments in their interaction. As Erik van den Bergh 
observes, the ‘objectives were fixed; the strategy was extremely flexible.’368 It is safe to say that the 
campaign against Shell did not proceed as envisioned by the AAM since the activists failed – at the 
height of the popular support for the anti-apartheid cause – to compel the company to withdraw 
from South Africa. Internally, the declining effort by the activists during the course of the campaign 
prompted self-reflection on the future activities of the movement, which was reinforced by the 
prospect of democratic elections in South Africa. Having established a nuanced outline of the 
campaign, I was able to discern and discuss the implications of the consumer boycott on Shell’s 
CSR commitment in section five. Despite differences in opinion as to what constituted socially 
responsible conduct for Shell, I maintain that the interaction between the company and the activists 
generated deliberation within Shell on CSR, which increased the susceptibility of the company to 
public demands for more ambitious policies on this area a few years later. 
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Conclusion 
 
In 2002, a reparations case was filed at a US court by the Khulumani Support Group – backed by 
Jubilee South Africa – against numerous transnational corporations for ‘aiding and abetting’ crimes 
against humanity committed by the apartheid regime.1 Among the companies charged were 
Barclays, for subsidizing the military apparatus through loans to the South African government, and 
Shell, for violating trade embargoes.2 The cases were later dropped on account of a ruling that 
banks and oil companies merely provided their regular services.3 As I address later in this 
conclusion, however, such measures supplementing civil society campaigns have become 
increasingly commonplace and they are indicative of a heightened sensitivity to the negative side-
effects of economic globalization. 
Studying the influence of anti-apartheid consumer boycott campaigns on corporate targets dictates 
the inclusion of several fields of research. First, this dissertation expands the literature on British 
anti-apartheid activism by engaging closely with two of the major campaigns conducted by the 
AAM and its affiliated groups; these campaigns have not previously been examined in such detail, 
nor have the benefits of a comparative analysis of the campaigns for a more profound understanding 
of the strategies and tactics deployed by the activists been explored. 
Second, this dissertation addresses the pronounced lack of case studies observing responses by 
companies to boycott activity. Also, rather than approaching the interaction between the actors 
involved from the perspective either of the social movement or the company, I have sought to 
disclose internal discussions and reflections by both actors in an effort to provide a more 
comprehensive analysis of the campaigns. The diversification of my analytical perspective through 
my primary source material collected from Barclays, Shell, and British anti-apartheid groups further 
works in conjunction with the historical and theoretical contextualization provided by the secondary 
literature to substantiate my construal of the impact of the consumer boycott campaigns. 
                                                          
1 Bohler-Muller, “Reparations for Apartheid-Era Human Rights Abuses: The Ongoing Struggle of Khulumani Support 
Group.” 
2 Kollewe, “Barclays Faces Apartheid Court Action.” 
3 Bohler-Muller, “Reparations for Apartheid-Era Human Rights Abuses: The Ongoing Struggle of Khulumani Support 
Group.” 
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Finally, this dissertation contributes to the field of CSR by extrapolating on the development of the 
concept on the basis of historical case studies; the study of anti-apartheid consumer boycott 
campaigns extends previous findings on the advance of social responsibilities for companies by 
including (1) top-down regulations (codes of conduct, sanctions etc.), (2) bottom-up advocacy 
(social movement activity), and an (3) overview of contemporary attitudes by other companies 
(foreign investment in South Africa). Together with internal documents, minutes etc., this triad of 
contextual influences furthers insight into organizational decision-making at the junction between 
traditional shareholder concerns and CSR. A dissertational example of this process is the decision 
by Barclays – partly in response to political developments and the ‘bank run’ precipitated by Chase 
Manhattan – to disinvest, which incited concern among the shareholders and internal deliberation 
on the social responsibility of the bank. 
I want to conclude this dissertation by drawing connections between some of the main concepts 
involved as they figure in my historically framed analyses and their present contours. The purpose 
of this exercise is to trace the extended implications of anti-apartheid consumer boycott campaigns 
in order to discern their current relevance. I propose that the case studies conducted in this 
dissertation have played a prominent part in the development of social movement activism (notably 
boycotting and the call for divestment/disinvestment), CSR, and codes of conduct. Common to 
these phenomena is their maturation into more established concepts – in academic research and in 
practice – than during the apartheid era. 
 
Social Movements 
In a recent assessment of the field of social movement studies, Klaus Eder asserts that the ‘missing 
link between actors and the macro-reality of state, economy, and society are the micro-structures of 
social relations.’4 These micro-structures, he suggests, ‘constitute social action and […] force 
macro-structures to adapt.’5 In this capacity, the AAM’s definitive aim of terminating the apartheid 
system by isolating South Africa might be conceived as an effort to compel a macro-structure to 
adapt. Among the benefits of an amalgamation of Young’s social connection model, Beck’s 
subpolitics, and political consumerism is the formation of a theoretical construct that facilitates 
analysis on both micro- and macro-levels. Thus, the activists’ subpolitical strategies – including 
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surrogate boycotting and direct interaction with the targeted companies – can be viewed as remedies 
to the implication of individual responsibility inherent in the social structures explicated by Young; 
by problematizing these structures, macro-structures that are products of economic globalization 
might be renegotiated and altered. Further, Young and Beck’s theoretical narratives critically 
address the insistence by many managers of companies involved in apartheid South Africa (as 
discussed in chapter two) on a clear divide between economics and ethics. By demonstrating levels 
of connection between British citizens and the apartheid government through consumption, we are 
compelled to consider the rationale and potential of CSR. 
Despite the fact that the individual concepts of my analytical strategy do not constitute the cutting-
edge within social movement studies, I would argue that their advantage lies in the consolidation 
between the concepts as applied in this dissertation, which allows for a nuanced and historically 
anchored analysis of anti-apartheid consumer boycott activism as a catalyst for CSR.6 My 
permissive attitude towards tried concepts is conditioned in part by an apprehension towards the 
early proclamation of a shift away from previous procedures and circumstances. Thus, the 
contention by Michel Wieviorka (more than a decade ago) that the ‘era of “new social movements” 
is behind us now’ since it ‘corresponded to a transitional phase between the working-class 
movement of yesterday and the “global” movements of today’ may be both premature and a 
deterrent to valuable insights gained from comparative analyses of movements.7 The global 
movements referred to by Wieviorka are the anti-globalization movements that proliferated from 
the late 1990s, most visibly at the 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle. Stressing the continued relevance 
of NSMs, Kate Soper, Martin Ryle, and Lyn Thomas suggest that this meeting ‘opened a new 
phase, in which new social movements of an alternative-global variety have massively resorted to 
the whole spectrum of consumer actions (boycotts, naming and blaming, ethical merchandising, and 
so on) to widen the repertoire of political participation, find new ways to mobilise people, and 
address global issues.’8 William G. Martin adds that these movements ‘consciously and increasingly 
                                                          
6 I want to nuance my suggestion that Beck’s concepts and political consumerism do not constitute the ‘cutting edge’ 
within social movement studies: outside of this field, Beck’s general emphasis on unintended side-effects is widely 
applied such as in recent works on the socio-economic implications of climate change; see Urry, Climate Change and 
Society; Wright and Nyberg, Climate Change, Capitalism, and Corporations Processes of Creative Self-Destruction; 
while political consumerism is not a new area of research, it remains a highly relevant field in development; see 
Gotlieb, “Civic, Cooperative or Contrived? A Functional Approach to Political Consumerism Motivations”; Balsiger, 
“Making Political Consumers: The Tactical Action Repertoire of a Campaign for Clean Clothes”; Stolle, Political 
Consumerism. 
7 Wieviorka, “After New Social Movements,” 8. 
8 Ryle, The Politics and Pleasures of Consuming Differently, 34. 
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operate through transnational and transcontinental alliances.’9 Appreciating the tactics and 
experiences of transnational anti-apartheid activism aids an understanding of the subsequent 
development of social movement activism regardless of socio-technological advances. Thus, Håkan 
Thörn proposes an association between anti-apartheid activism and more recent movements: 
 
The history of the anti-apartheid struggle provides an important historical case for 
analysis of present-day global politics, as it is evident that the present mobilization of 
a global civil society in relation to economic globalization and supranational political 
institutions such as WTO, IMF and the World Bank, has historical links to the post-
war, transnational political culture that the anti-apartheid movement formed an 
important part of.10 
 
While several parallels can be drawn between anti-apartheid activism and movements of the past 
two decades, my concern is the type of activism that targets companies. By most accounts, political 
and economic influence has shifted in favour of large transnational corporations since the 
acceleration of economic globalization a few decades after the Second World War. With this 
process, social movement activism has shifted accordingly and has become increasingly 
preoccupied with targeting dominant actors in the private sector. Particularly since the 1990s, 
consumer boycott activism has been abetted by a ‘heightened vulnerability of corporate reputation 
and brand image.’11 Specifically, surrogate boycotting has become progressively more popular 
among activists; in 2013, a list by the Ethical Consumer indicated that 53 per cent of ongoing 
boycotts were surrogate boycotts.12 This strategy is not unproblematic from a CSR perspective (as 
discussed throughout this dissertation) since a perception of Barclays and Shell as means to an end 
possibly lessened activist interest in effecting sustained organizational transformation within the 
target companies. 
Integral to an analysis of the relationship between the anti-apartheid activists and institutional actors 
are also the concepts of disinvestment and divestment. As outlined in chapter two, my use of 
                                                          
9 Wallerstein, Martin, and Agartan, Making Waves: Worldwide Social Movements, 1750-2005, 8. 
10 Thörn, Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society, 206. 
11 Klein, Smith, and John, “Why We Boycott: Consumer Motivations for Boycott Participation,” 93. 
12 Balabanis, “Surrogate Boycotts against Multinational Corporations: Consumers’ Choice of Boycott Targets,” 515. 
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‘disinvestment’ denotes the choice by a company to rid itself of shares in or sell off its subsidiary. 
‘Divestment,’ alternatively, refers to a ‘socially responsible investing tactic to remove assets from a 
sector or industry based on moral objections to its business practices.’13 The decision by Lewisham 
Council to divest itself of Shell shares related in chapter four is an example of divestment within an 
apartheid context. The divestment tactic constituted a major part of the anti-apartheid action 
repertoire yet I have limited my discussion of this phenomenon to acts of divestment directly 
associated with the campaigns against Barclays and Shell. Divestment and disinvestment share 
similar traits in their emphasis on the economic and signal values of the selling of shares. 
In recent years, Gay W. Seidman asserts, divestment has ‘emerged as a mainstay of transnational 
activism.’14 Current divestment campaigns are rooted in apartheid-era divestment advocacy as well 
as in efforts to target controversial industries such as tobacco and arms.15 Together with other 
environmentalists, Bill McKibben launched a divestment campaign in 2012 that principally aims to 
encourage university students to compel their respective universities and colleges to divest from 
fossil fuels; this focus corresponds to the main strategy for apartheid-era divestment.16 According to 
Chelsie Hunt, Olaf Weber, and Truzaar Dordi, the ‘cause-effect relationship has yet to be 
established for both the anti-Apartheid and fossil fuel divestment campaigns.’17 This assessment, 
however, is concerned with economic ramifications. Seidman instead emphasizes the symbolic 
implications of divestment: 
 
Divestment is rarely a goal in itself. Most divestment activists are not interested in 
harming their own institutions, but rather seek to stigmatize longstanding business 
practices or push powerful actors to regulate those activities. Divestment is a tactical 
weapon, one that aims to call attention to larger issues, redrawing moral lines around 
acceptable behavior and changing the calculations of multinational corporations and 
national governments.18 
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15 Jill E. Hopke and Luis E. Hestres, “Fossil Fuel Divestment and Climate Change Communication,” 6. 
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Examining motivations for divestment, then, occasions reflection on the social responsibility of 
companies. In an article in The Guardian comparing apartheid-era divestment and the current 
campaigns against fossil fuels, Piers Telemacque refers to ‘divestment’s ability to turn the normal 
into the unthinkable.’19 Activism that challenges the norms by which the private sector operates, in 
other words, potentially expands the applicable social structures. As discussed in the introduction, 
the foremost contribution of Young’s social connection model to my analysis of the campaigns 
against Barclays and Shell is that it ‘brings into question precisely the background conditions that 
ascriptions of blame or fault assume as normal.’20 This effect resembles the qualities ascribed by 
Seidman and Telemacque to the strategy of divestment. More than the economic impact of 
divestment, the symbolic and structural implications are asserted as envisioned transformative 
repercussions. The value of this contribution is further reflected in the assessment by Roger 
Fieldhouse that the AAM’s ‘greatest achievement was in raising awareness both within the political 
establishment and the general public.’21 
In this capacity, the intended purpose of divestment is akin to the anti-apartheid activists’ 
conception of the consumer boycott as discussed in chapter one. A central distinction between the 
two tactics, however, is the proactive withdrawal of funds intrinsic to divestment as opposed to the 
abstentious character of the boycott. Whereas apartheid-era divestment revolved around links to 
South Africa, fossil fuel divestment tends to be industry-oriented; the two approaches are merged in 
this dissertation in my emphasis on the links between the banking and oil industries and South 
Africa. Thus, the overview of these industries in chapters three and four serves to explicate the 
significance of the specific sectors within which Barclays and Shell were embedded in order to 
further an understanding of the activists’ choice of targets and tactics, as well as the political and 
economic implications of the companies’ disinvestment or – alternatively – heightened commitment 
to constructive engagement. Important to my analyses of the campaigns, then, are the industry and 
corporate opportunity structures that conditioned the strategies of the activists and the responses by 
the companies.22 
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The propensity towards the professionalization of civil society actors described in chapter one has 
arguably intensified in the years following the abolishment of the apartheid system. New and often 
complicated standards of accountability for companies with cross-border product chains or 
transactions have necessitated supplementary expertise within the civil society. At the same time, 
the realization by movements and organizations of the potential for mobilization found in 
experienced full-time staff has motivated the shift towards professionalization as evidenced by the 
tendency by some PR consultancies to characterize civil society organizations as ‘brands,’ a label 
previously reserved for companies.23 Once again, early indications of the transformation conveyed 
here can be identified in anti-apartheid activism: we saw in chapter one how t-shirts with anti-
apartheid slogans were made in the mid-1980s and in chapter four how the employment of full-time 
staff was discussed as a compensation for the overstretch of the movement’s activities. Such 
initiatives are symptomatic of later developments in social movement activism and broader activity 
within civil society. 
I have refrained from discussing in detail the problem areas – or passive subpolitics – of consumer 
boycott activism; this is a deliberate choice conditioned by an assessment of such an undertaking as 
peripheral to the principal aim of this dissertation. As Seidman points out, however, it is worth 
noting that ‘local trade unionists express strong suspicions of transnational campaigns, viewing 
consumers boycotts as potentially undermining local efforts to organize workers.’24 This is merely 
one example of the dilemmas inherent to activism that circumvents institutional platforms. As 
explained in chapter four, another example is the unintended economic ramifications of the boycott 
of Shell petrol stations for the owners of the individual stations bearing the Shell name. I have 
sought to include reflections on this aspect of consumer boycott activism whenever relevant yet I 
maintain that such perspectives are marginal to an analysis of the impact of the anti-apartheid 
campaigns on Barclays and Shell. 
 
CSR and Codes of Conduct 
My discussion of the social responsibility of companies operating in apartheid-era South Africa has 
engaged with phenomenological observations on CSR rather than detailed outlines of the initiatives 
taken by Barclays and Shell. My usage of CSR has been intentionally generic on account of three 
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factors: first, the anti-apartheid activists were largely disinterested in the nuances of CSR but 
advocated a heightened attention to social responsibilities in corporate decision-making, which was 
believed to result in disinvestment. Second, this orientation by the activists is reflected in their 
interaction with Barclays and Shell, which had a similarly non-specific character; exceptions consist 
of attempts by the companies to demonstrate their social responsibility through constructive 
engagement programs. Finally, my research strategy of extrapolating from the historical case 
studies examined on wider CSR-related perceptions and advances diminishes the need to address in 
detail the manifestation of socially oriented concerns within Barclays and Shell. 
Instrumental to this approach is the assumption – as formulated by Gabriel Abend – that ‘business 
ethics is a great area to empirically study public moral normativity.’25 In this capacity, the 
qualitative analysis of anti-apartheid activism as a catalyst for CSR is intended to convey 
transformations in perceptions of the societal role of companies. Aiding the identification of such 
transformations is my conceptual framework, which embeds analyses of exchanges on CSR 
between activists and companies within a context of increasing awareness of the unintended side-
effects of economic globalization. Thus, the active subpolitics of the AAM figures as the remedial 
counter-strategy to the passive subpolitics of Barclays and Shell. Among the benefits of the 
conceptual framework as applied to my empirical source material is the potential for initiating 
discussion on the development of CSR on both micro- (changing perceptions within the targeted 
companies on their social responsibility) and macro-levels (normative conceptions). In this 
dissertation, I have merged the two levels in order to nuance and substantiate the findings derived 
from my analysis of the consumer boycott campaigns. 
With the bolstering of the notion in civil demands for CSR that the conduct of transnational 
corporations may have unintended negative consequences, the lack of governmental and 
institutional measures aimed at curtailing these passive subpolitical ramifications have come into 
focus. In fact, Jeremy Moon and David Vogel propose that civil society organizations target 
transnational corporations in response to the ‘regulatory vacuum created by the inadequacies of 
both national governments and international institutions.’26 While this attention to regulation has 
intensified in recent decades, I argue that international anti-apartheid activism also emerged in part 
as a consequence of the absence of institutionalized action against apartheid. Thus, rather than 
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considering measures such as ethical guidelines for companies a comparatively new phenomenon, 
insights may be gained from an examination of how the perceived shortcomings of institutional 
action have elicited earlier activist and civil society responses. 
Applying a longue durée perspective validates an accumulative conception of the proliferation of 
the standardization protocols known as ‘codes of conduct;’ this is similar to my argument in chapter 
four that Shell’s CSR commitment in the late 1990s was influenced by earlier interaction with the 
anti-apartheid activists. Seidman suggests that the ‘effort to monitor and transform corporate 
behavior in South Africa helped shape subsequent discussions about corporate codes of conduct.’27 
It was difficult for the activists to monitor companies, however, since it was ‘virtually impossible 
for them to gather detailed information about specific companies’ workplace behavior in South 
Africa.’28 Conceiving of codes of conduct partly as a by-product of anti-apartheid consumer boycott 
activism would appear paradoxical since most activists explicitly rejected codes as a tactic of 
constructive engagement (as discussed in chapter two). This opposition to codes, however, should 
be observed within an apartheid-era context in which complete disinvestment was the 
uncompromising objective. More commonly, codes of conduct would be included as part of the 
social responsibility of transnational corporations advocated by social movements such as the AAM 
and its affiliated groups. 
The assertion by Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello that ‘one of the determining elements in the 
formation of the spirit of capitalism peculiar to a period’ is the ‘satisfaction of certain criticisms,’ 
then, is discernable in the anti-apartheid promotion of social responsibilities for transnational 
corporations manifested in later codes of conduct.29 In early 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan and Reverend Sullivan jointly introduced the Global Sullivan Principles of Social 
Responsibility, which expanded the original principles beyond their focus on South Africa.30 
Despite the mixed results of the Sullivan Principles in the 1980s (as related in chapter two), the 
potential of such codes of conduct for providing a counter-measure to unregulated economic 
globalization was widely acknowledged. Shortly after the announcement of the new Sullivan 
Principles, Annan gave a speech at the World Economic Forum in which he affirmed that 
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‘globalization is a fact of life.’31 Annan then proclaimed the establishment of a formal UN code of 
conduct called the Global Compact that was intended to ‘give a human face to the world market.’32 
The launch of this code is indicative of the proliferation of ethical guidelines for companies from 
the late 1990s, which exhibits an increasing acceptance of the need to extend responsibility for 
human rights and the environment beyond the state-level. 
During the same period, labelling schemes and other product certifications became a common part 
of consumers’ shopping experiences. As discussed in chapter one, the AAM was continuously 
struggling with changes in legislation on product origins such as the Trade Descriptions Acts, and 
the effort to inform consumers about the implications of buying South African products often had to 
be performed on a manual case-by-case basis. Consequently, Lisbeth Segerlund points out that no 
one would have believed a claim ‘in the late 1980s […] that in 20 years’ time, we would have an 
international social labelling scheme for coffee that would give millions of small farmers and their 
families a guaranteed price.’33 This supposition is echoed in the contention by David Thackeray that 
‘by focusing on the power of multinational business, anti-apartheid also arguably played a vital role 
in setting the parameters of contemporary debates about ‘fair trade’ and ethical business practice.’34 
It is plausible that instances such as the anti-apartheid consumer boycott experience helped foster 
awareness about the disadvantages of a restriction on product information. Common to the 
development of many CSR-related facets is initial pressure exercised by the civil society. Seidman 
notes accordingly that ‘if the Sullivan experience shows that corporations can be persuaded to 
accept voluntary regulation, it also shows how difficult that persuasion can be, and what kind of 
persistent pressure is required to ratchet up that regulation beyond the barest minimum.’35 This 
deduction corresponds to my proposal in this dissertation that the perception of social responsibility 
for foreign-owned companies in apartheid-era South Africa was transformed through continuous 
renegotiation and reinterpretation between the activists and the companies (hence the title of the 
dissertation). 
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In contrast to the comparatively structured character of ethical guidelines, progression in the 
normative conceptions of CSR is also evidenced in the growth of the notion of ‘corporate 
legitimacy.’ In chapter two, I emphasized the socially constructed dimension of corporate 
legitimacy, which denotes the ‘result of communication where the societal limits on business are 
continuously defined and redefined.’36 This delineation of corporate legitimacy corroborates my 
approach to CSR as a renegotiation of responsibility and indicates that the extent of the legitimacy 
of Barclays and Shell was a product not of legal requirements but discursive compromise. 
Rather than grouping together Barclays and Shell for analytical simplicity, however, I want to 
reiterate the discrepancies between the two campaigns. Throughout chapter four, I sought to 
identify parallels and differences between the course of the campaigns, including contemporary 
socio-political developments and the implications of targeting the banking and oil industries. In my 
approach to this analysis, I emphasized discursive nuances and contextual interpretations of the 
interaction between activists and companies as opposed to a more quantitative isolation of variables 
from equivalents. Central to my juxtaposition of the two campaigns is the hypothesis that a 
comparative analysis offers new perspectives on social movement activism as a catalyst for CSR. 
Thus, I suggest that the differences in outcome of two campaigns conducted by the same movement 
elevate the campaigns against Barclays and Shell as exceptionally edifying objects for analysis. My 
selection of only two campaigns is compensated – besides the de facto limitations inherent to the 
launch of no more than two major single-company consumer boycott campaigns by the AAM – by 
the duration of the two consecutive campaigns and the attention to detail in the analyses.37 
As discussed in chapter three, the decision to disinvest constituted the ‘worst single financial loss 
Barclays had suffered to that point.’38 While this decision was the product of several factors, the 
media response largely recognized the announcement by the bank as a capitulation to the AAM. 
The eventual dominance of the activists in the ‘war of representation’ meant that the confluence of 
factors precipitating Barclays’ decision was discounted. As a consequence, the bank was provoked 
to consider the nature and public expectations of its social responsibility commitment. Already with 
the transition from Barclays D.C.O. to BARNAT in the early 1970s and the succeeding alterations 
                                                          
36 Joutsenvirta and Vaara, “Legitimacy Struggles and Political Corporate Social Responsibility in International Settings: 
A Comparative Discursive Analysis of a Contested Investment in Latin America,” 743. 
37 While the campaigns against Outspan could also be characterized as single-company consumer boycott campaigns, 
less material exists on these campaigns and activity by the activists was more sporadic. Also, as discussed in chapter 
three, the AAM identified the campaign against Barclays as the first single-company campaign despite previous activity 
aimed at Outspan. 
38 Ackrill and Hannah, Barclays: The Business of Banking, 1690-1996, 301. 
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in policy, Barclays had demonstrated a marked attentiveness to CSR compared with most other 
contemporary transnational corporations, albeit the bank’s apartheid-era initiatives seem negligible 
by present-day standards. In a progressive statement in 1987 (as related in chapter three), Sir Bevan, 
Chairman of Barclays, proposed that ‘large businesses do have a responsibility for the communities 
in which they operate.’39 Signifying the gradual acceptance of CSR in the banking industry in the 
decades that have passed since the mid-1980s, the current Barclays Group Statement on Human 
Rights from 2015 states: 
 
While it is incumbent upon governments to draft and implement national legislation to 
protect human rights, the extent to which it is implemented through national 
legislative frameworks varies significantly between countries. This Statement draws 
together the policies, principles and standards relevant to all parts of Barclays in 
respecting and promoting human rights consistently across our operations globally.40 
 
This statement addresses some of the negative aspects of economic globalization, and the 
accentuation of the imbalance in national regulation corresponds to the concerns raised by Young 
and Beck in their respective frameworks. I would argue that Barclays’ statement on human rights is 
indicative of a propensity still in development within the private sector to explicate more clearly the 
social responsibility of transnational corporations. 
The initial lesson afforded Shell departed from Barclays’ disinvestment experience. As related in 
chapter four, I disagree with the conclusion by Sluyterman that ‘Shell learned the importance of 
keeping up with the issues’ from being targeted by the anti-apartheid activists.41 The controversies 
of the mid-1990s appear to have had a more direct and profound impact on the company, though I 
argue that the subsequent intensification of Shell’s CSR commitment should also be perceived as a 
product of the accumulated dissatisfaction with the company originating with the anti-apartheid 
campaign. I want to pinpoint two more recent examples suggestive of the changes in the CSR 
                                                          
39 Proceedings at the AGM of Barclays on 22 April 1987, chaired by Sir Timothy Bevan: Barclays Archive 860/83. 
40 Excerpt from the 2015 “Barclays Group Statement on Human Rights,” see “Human Rights | Barclays.” 
41 Sluyterman, A History of Royal Dutch Shell, vol.3, 330. 
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landscape since the apartheid era: first, a landmark ruling in The Hague in 2013 held Shell 
accountable for oil pollution in the Niger Delta. Esther Hennchen contextualizes: 
 
A precedent was set. It was the first time that a company established in the European 
Union was held responsible in its own country for abuses committed elsewhere. The 
case was of considerable international significance since it stirred up a hot controversy 
over the scope of responsibilities of multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in a 
controversial human rights context and a public responsibility void for both their 
negative and positive impact.42 
 
Such verdicts bridge the gap that anti-apartheid activism aimed to address between national 
legislation and the negative side-effects of transnational corporate conduct. Prospectively, the 
deterrent value of the ruling against Shell may encourage further reflection within transnational 
corporations on the extent of their social responsibility. 
The second example is Shell’s partnership since 2011 with the Danish Institute for Human Rights. 
Such collaborations were highly exceptional in the 1970s and 1980s and they signify a new phase in 
the interaction between civil society and transnational corporations.43 Michael Yaziji and Jonathan 
P. Doh advise that the ‘importance and impact of corporate-NGO engagements – both adversarial 
and collaborative – is growing. A fuller understanding of the role of business in society requires a 
comprehensive understanding of these engagements.’44 I have aimed to produce an extensive 
account of the relationship between a social movement (AAM) and its target companies (Barclays 
and Shell), as well as the motivations, strategies, and responses of each actor. McDonnell, King, 
and Soule have recently suggested that ‘further exploring variations in the type of defensive 
strategies that firms use to respond to different classes of activist challenges represents a promising 
area for future research.’45 
                                                          
42 Hennchen, “Royal Dutch Shell in Nigeria: Where Do Responsibilities End?,” 2. 
43 The Danish Institute for Human Rights self-identifies as a ‘state institution, independent of government’ and as 
operating ‘at the nexus between governments, NGOs and businesses’ and is thus very different from a social movement 
yet there are numerous examples of cross-sector partnerships between civil society and transnational corporations: 
https://www.humanrights.dk/who-we-are. 
44 Yaziji and Doh, NGOs and Corporations: Conflict and Collaboration, xiv–xv. 
45 McDonnell, King, and Soule, “A Dynamic Process Model of Private Politics,” 675. 
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By examining consumer boycott campaigns by the AAM against companies involved in South 
Africa, the ambition of this dissertation is two-fold: first, it should be seen as an effort to advance 
research concerned with social movement consumer boycott strategies and the ensuing interaction 
between activists and companies. Second, this dissertation contributes with original perspectives on 
the emergence of CSR as a renegotiation of responsibility. 
In late 2015, a number of British student organizations decided to launch a divestment campaign 
against the banking sector, specifically targeting Barclays and HSBC for ‘financing the fossil fuel 
industry.’46 Taking into account the fact that Shell is also a major target of divestment activism, 
several patterns of recurrence between apartheid-era and present-day strategies can be discerned. A 
few years after the abolishment of the apartheid system, J.E. Spence suggested that the ‘South 
African episode was the first in which major companies and banks found themselves under 
sustained, well-nigh universal pressure to play a self-conscious positive role in effecting political 
change via the process of disinvestment [or divestment]’ and he surmised that it was ‘doubtful 
whether their experience on that scale would be repeated elsewhere.’47 In view of the parallels 
identified above, the doubt expressed by Spence appears to have been superseded by current 
developments. Experience gained from the anti-apartheid campaigns may translate into valuable 
insight not only for the current social movement effort to renegotiate the responsibility of 
transnational corporations but also for future research preoccupied with the societal role of the 
private sector and the negative consequences of economic globalization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
46 Jill E. Hopke and Luis E. Hestres, “Fossil Fuel Divestment and Climate Change Communication,” 11. 
47 Mitchell, “Companies in a World of Conflict NGOs, Sanctions and Corporate Responsibility,” 297. 
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